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ABSTRACT
In the post-PC era, mobile devices will replace desktops and become the main
personal computer for many people. People rely on mobile devices such as
smartphones and tablets for everything in their daily lives. A common
requirement for mobile computing is wireless communication. It allows mobile
devices to fetch remote resources easily. Unfortunately, the increasing demand
of the mobility brings many new wireless m anagem ent challenges such as
security, energy-saving and location-awareness. These challenges have already
impeded the advancement of mobile systems. In this dissertation we attempt to
discover the guidelines of how to mitigate these problems through three general
communication patterns in 802.11 wireless networks. W e propose a
cross-section of a few interesting and important enhancements to manage
wireless connectivity. These enhancem ents provide useful primitives for the
design of next-generation mobile systems in the future.
Specifically, w e improve the association mechanism for wireless clients to
defend against rogue wireless Access Points (APs) in Wireless LANs (W LANs)
and vehicular networks. Real-world prototype systems confirm that our scheme
can achieve high accuracy to detect even sophisticated rogue APs under
various network conditions. W e also develop a power-efficient system to reduce
the energy consumption for mobile devices working as software-defined APs.
Experimental results show that our system allows the Wi-Fi interface to sleep for
up to 88 % of the total time in several different applications and reduce the
system energy by up to 33%. W e achieve this while retaining com parable user
experiences. Finally, w e design a fine-grained scalable group localization
algorithm to enable location-aware wireless communication. O ur prototype
implemented on commercial smartphones proves that our algorithm can quickly
locate a group of mobile devices with centimeter-level accuracy.
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1 Introduction
The world has become increasingly mobile. As a result, mobile devices such as
smartphones and tablets, as the embodiment of today’s mobile computing, have
replaced desktops to become the main personal computing platforms. According
to Cisco's prediction, by the end of 2013, the number of mobile-connected devices
will exceed the number of people on this planet, and by 2017 there will be nearly
1.4 mobile devices per capita [5]. Not only has there been extraordinary growth in
popularity, the diversity of mobile devices has also increased rapidly. New types of
mobile devices such as "smart" watches, glasses and even driverless vehicles have
emerged recently. In our homes and enterprises, our recreation and profession,
mobile computing is playing a more and more important role. It is becoming an
essential and ubiquitous tool of the modern world.
Communication is the core of mobile computing. It allows mobile devices to
connect to networks and fetch remote resources. Due to the increasing demand of
mobility, traditional wired networks are now insufficient. If users have to use cables
for communication, their movement will be significantly reduced. W ireless commu
nication has no such restriction and thereby becom es an indispensable feature to
mobile computing. The majority of today's mobile devices have already integrated
multiple interfaces to support various wireless networks such as 802.11 networks
(a.k.a., W i-Fi), cellular networks and Bluetooth networks.
In the past decade, wireless communication has been greatly improved in band

1

width and latency.

However, mobility brings new challenges such as security,

energy-efficiency and location-awareness. Security is of growing importance as
more and more personal data are stored on mobile devices and transmitted through
wireless communications. Without careful protection, users' privacy will be vio
lated. Unlike workstations behind the firewalls, mobile devices typically operate
under risky circumstances, so they have more opportunities to be attacked by ad
versaries. To improve mobile security, mobile devices must have the capability to
defend against various attacks on their own. Energy is another important consid
eration for mobile devices. Mobility prevents mobile devices from always being
plugged in to power sources.

Insufficient battery life has seriously impeded the

advancement of mobile technology.

Given the fact that today's battery technol

ogy has hardly improved, while wireless networking is a significant contributor to
battery drain, more efficient power-saving techniques for wireless communication
are highly desired. Finally, location-aware wireless communication becomes useful
due to mobility. Knowing the location allows mobile devices to adapt to varying en
vironments and thereby improve the quality of wireless communication. Locationbased techniques like this could also bridge the perception gap between human and
machine, thus enabling more intuitive methods of communication such as transfer
ring data by swinging a device towards the target user. Furthermore, location could
help secure wireless communication (e.g., distance-bounding). However, there is
little research on how to obtain the in-situ location of mobile devices without the
support of network infrastructure.

It is advantageous to design new localization

schemes that can be applicable to anywhere. All the concerns rising from the se
curity, energy and localization motivate our work presented in this dissertation.
Our research seeks to mitigate the problems of security, energy, and localization
for mobile computing, but these problems exist in so many scenarios that we cannot
enumerate all of them. In this dissertation w e only consider a few enhancements
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In te rn e t

Client
Client

Client
Figure 1.1: Illustration of mobile devices acting as clients
for managing wireless connectivity in 802.11 networks. These enhancem ents will
shed light on a more generalized design of the next-generation mobile systems. In
any 802.11 wireless network, a mobile device must operate in one of three modes:
client, A P and ad hoc. Based on this division, 802.11 wireless communication can
be broadly classified into three patterns: client-to-AP, AP-to-client and client-toclient. By studying individual problems for different communication patterns, we
attempt to discover the guidelines for the security, energy m anagem ent and local
ization enhancements.
For security, we study the most common communication pattern: client-to-AP,
which is illustrated in Fig. 1.1. As an important part of this pattern, the wireless
Access Point (AP) is a bridge that connects wireless clients to wired backbone
networks. Mobile devices working as wireless clients associate to an AP to transfer
data. It is worth noting that clients cannot directly communicate with each other.
All the communications have to go through the A P which then routes the packets
to the desired destination. Thus, a critical security issue arises for each client:
How to determine which A P is a legitimate A P for association? A legitimate AP is
referred to as the AP deployed by network administrators, whereas a rogue AP is

Internet

Cellular Tower
! 2 .5 G /3 G /4 G
G atew ay

Figure 1.2: Illustration of a mobile device acting as a softAP
set up by the adversary who seeks to steal clients' information. A rogue AP will try
every method to masquerade as a legitimate AP to avoid detection. Therefore, it is
challenging for a client to detect rogue APs. W e investigate this security problem
and propose specific detection schemes for different network architectures.
As for energy issues, we study a new communication pattern for mobile devices.
In this pattern, a mobile device performs as a software-defined AP, allowing other
devices such as laptops and tablets to achieve everything from file transfer to Inter
net connectivity without relying on existing traditional APs. In the literature, these
types of devices are typically called softAPs. Fig. 1.2 shows an exam ple of a softAP
sharing cellular connectivity such as 3G or 4 G through Wi-Fi. Other devices can
then associate to share the Internet access. Energy issues are rarely considered in
this new pattern, because traditional APs do not rely on batteries. Old wisdom tells
us that performance is more important than the energy. However, this is not true
anymore for battery-powered mobile devices. Our initial findings can shed light for
further research on this topic.
As mobile users are increasingly grouped to exchange files or perform collab4

I

\

*

Ad hoc
Communication

/

/

>■

Peer

/

Peer

Figure 1.3: Illustration o f mobile devices acting as peers in ad hoc wireless networks
orative tasks when meeting together, the ad hoc communication pattern becomes
more and more popular. To improve this communication pattern, w e strive to en
able location-aware wireless networks. Fig. 1.3 shows a typical wireless ad hoc
network. In this network, inter-connected mobile devices can directly communicate
with each other. The ad hoc pattern increases the demand for more intuitive ways
to identify communication parties. In traditional networks, devices are labeled with
unique network addresses. To transfer data, the sender has to specify the network
address of the destination. This is not intuitive for humans, because the addresses
are long and semi-arbitrary. As a complimentary approach to the network address,
we propose the use of location to establish wireless communication. For exam 
ple, users can simply swing their device towards the destination devices to transfer
files. This technique will bridge the perception gap between the physical world and
digital world. The future development of mobile applications will benefit from our
scheme.
In summary, the architecture of this dissertation is shown in Fig. 1.4. Across

■' ' .
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RogueDetector
Chapter 2

VR-Defender

DozyAP

SG-LOC

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 3

Client M ode

AP M ode

Ad hoc M ode

M obile devices in 802.11 W ireless C om m unication
Figure 1.4: Architecture of the dissertation. Across three general communication patterns,
a few useful and important enhancements are grouped by security, energy and location
three general patterns of wireless communications, where mobile devices operate
in client, AP and ad hoc modes, w e propose three useful and important enhance
ments to improve security, energy, and localization.

1.1

Problems

Specifically we address four particular problems as follows.

1.1.1

Rogue AP detection in Wi-Fi networks

Public areas such as coffee shops, airports, and campuses all provide Wi-Fi access
to users, where people can use mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets to
access the Internet freely. This thesis presents a practical timing-based technique
to prevent wireless clients from connecting to potentially rogue APs. Our detection
scheme is a pure user-centric approach that only leverages the Round Trip Time
(RTT) between clients and local Domain Nam e System (D N S ) resolvers without any
support from the network administrators. W e implemented the detection technique
on commercially available mobile devices and evaluated the performance based on
extensive experiments. Our detection scheme achieves more than 90% accuracy
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in distinguishing rogue APs from legitimate APs under lightweight traffic conditions
and more than 60% accuracy under heavyweight traffic conditions.

1.1.2

Vehicular rogue AP detection

Increasingly, city-wide Wi-Fi networks are deployed around the world. As a result,
people in vehicles can access the Internet via roadside APs, called Drive-thru In
ternet [7]. This thesis considers the problem of rogue APs that are set up in moving
vehicles seeking to lure mobile users to associate by mimicking legitimate road
side APs. Because the users are moving in vehicles, and the non-malicious APs
are roadside, and therefore immobile, users will leave the radio range of each AP
and connect to another AP periodically. Vehicular rogue APs, however, are able
to maintain a long connection with users, thus having more time to launch various
attacks. W e propose a practical user-side detection scheme to prevent users from
connecting to vehicular rogue APs. Users can m erely measure the received sig
nal strength of beacons broadcasted by APs and actively send several messages
to validate whether an AP is a rogue AP. W e have implemented and evaluated
our detection technique on commercial off-the-shelf devices in the real world. W e
observed that our detection scheme can achieve more than 90% accuracy in the
experiments.

1.1.3

Power saving for Wi-Fi tethering

Wi-Fi tethering (i.e., sharing the Internet connection of a mobile phone via its Wi-Fi
interface) is a useful feature and is widely supported on commercial smartphones.
Yet existing Wi-Fi tethering schemes consume excessive power; they keep the W i
Fi interface in a high power state regardless if there is ongoing traffic or not. In
this thesis we propose DozyAP to improve the power efficiency of W i-Fi tethering.
Based on measurements in typical applications, w e identify m any opportunities for
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a tethering phone to sleep to save power. W e design a simple yet reliable sleep pro
tocol to coordinate the sleep schedule of the tethering phone with its clients without
requiring tight time synchronization. Furthermore, w e develop a two-stage, sleep
interval adaptation algorithm to automatically adapt the sleep intervals to fit ongo
ing traffic patterns of various applications. DozyAP does not require any changes
to the 802.11 protocol and is incrementally deployable through software updates.
W e have implemented DozyAP on commercial smartphones. Experimental results
show that, while retaining com parable user experiences, our implementation can
allow the Wi-Fi interface to sleep for up to 88 % of the total time in several different
applications, and reduce the system power consumption by up to 33% under the
restricted programmability of current Wi-Fi hardware.

1.1.4

Group Localization for wireless networks

Mobile devices are often grouped to exchange files or perform collaborative tasks
when meeting together. In these local groups, the relative locations of other group
members is critical to enabling location-aware applications for wireless communi
cation. Ideally, the localization process should be fine-grained, efficient, low-cost,
scalable, and user-friendly. Existing solutions do not satisfy all of these criteria.
They are some techniques that can only provide room-level positioning resolution,
while other techniques require a strong collaboration between every device to ex
change information or synchronize time. Som e techniques rely on infrastructure
support, and others require special hardware. In this thesis w e consider these cri
teria and propose SG -LO C , a system of grouping and locating mobile phone users
by performing a simple gesture. W e have implemented and evaluated our sys
tem on commercial smartphones. Our experiments have shown that SG -LO C can
achieve less than 1° orientation error and can successfully build a simple map of
five people in an office room with 20 cm error on average.
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1.2

Contributions

This thesis contributes to the following three aspects: mobile security, energy man
agement of wireless networks and mobile localization. Each aspect is described
as follows.

1.2.1

Contributions to mobile security

The rogue AP problem is a critical security problem for wireless clients. However,
there is little research on rogue A P detection, especially regarding "smart" but mali
cious rogue APs. In this thesis, we deeply investigate both static and mobile rogue
APs that are likely to be set up in the real world. Our main contributions are as
follows:
1. W e are the first to propose a timing-based detection scheme to defend against
static rogue AP in 802.11 networks. Our solution can detect sophisticated
rogue APs that try to avoid detections as opposed to "accidental" rogue APs,
for example, deployed by an innocent em ployee in an office. The detection
algorithm can be purely performed by end users without any help from network
administrators.
2. W e are the first to study the mobile rogue AP problem in vehicular networks.
Similarly, a novel user-side detection algorithm is designed to reduce the risk
of "man-in-the-middle" attacks.
3. Our schemes are compatible with 802.11 standards. W e have implemented
prototype systems on commercial hardware and evaluated them through realworld experiments. Our experience and findings will help the further research
on this topic.
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1.2.2

Contributions to energy management

To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the important problem of
how to save energy for softAPs in W i-Fi tethering. The main contributions are in
the following aspects:
• W e study the characteristics of existing Wi-Fi tethering. W e show that current
Wi-Fi tethering is power hungry, wasting energy unnecessarily. W e analyze
the traffic patterns of various applications and identify many opportunities to
optimize the power consumption of W i-Fi tethering.
• W e propose DozyAP to improve power efficiency of W i-Fi tethering. W e de
sign a simple yet reliable sleep protocol to schedule a mobile softAP to sleep
without requiring tight time synchronization between the softAP and its clients.
W e develop a two-stage adaptive sleep algorithm to allow a mobile softAP to
automatically adapt to the traffic load for the best sleep schedule.
• W e implement the DozyAP system on commercially available off-the-shelf
(C O TS ) smartphones and evaluate its performance through experiments with
real applications and simulations based on real user traces. Our evaluation
results show that DozyAP is able to significantly reduce power consumption
of Wi-Fi tethering and retain comparable user experience at the sam e time.

1.2.3

Contributions to mobile localization

This is the first work integrating commercial hardware such as Inertial Measure
ment Units (IM Us), speakers and microphones to locate mobile devices without
the support of network infrastructure. The main contributions are as follows:
• W e develop SG -LO C , a system to efficiently group and locate mobile users in
proximity, where the localization process cleverly leverages dead reckoning
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and multilateration algorithms without any infrastructure support.
• W e characterize the challenges of implementing SG -LO C , namely significant
drift in integration of sensors, signal detection in environment with highly self
correlated ambient noise, sampling rate drift between different devices, and
choosing the best gesture.
• SG -LO C operates in the application layer and does not require any modifica
tion to the OS. W e have implemented S G -LO C on commercial smartphones
and performed an extensive evaluation.

1.3

Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 w e describe a rogue
AP detection technique for Wi-Fi networks. Then we present V R -D efender to de
fend against vehicular rogue APs for Drive-thru Internet in Chapter 3. In Chapter
4, we introduce DozyAP system to improve the power efficiency of Wi-Fi tethering.
In Chapter 5, we present a localization algorithm to facilitate location-aware wire
less communications among a group of devices. W e conclude the dissertation in
Chapter 6 .
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2

Client-side Rogue AP Detection

Security, energy m anagement and location-awareness are three important aspects
to enhance today's mobile technologies. In this opening chapter, w e identify oppor
tunities to improve mobile security through a particular problem: the detection of
rogue APs. A rogue AP allows an adversary to launch a man-in-the-middle attack,
thus posing a security threat to mobile clients. This chapter shows how to prevent
clients from associating to malicious rogue APs without relying on any administrator
or infrastructure support.

2.1

Introduction

The proliferation of IEEE 802.11 networks (W LA N ) in public spaces such as airports
and coffee houses has increased the interest of security and privacy when using
such networks. A thread called rogue access points, or rogue APs, has emerged
as an important security problem in W LANs [1--3, 57, 7 6 ,8 6 ,9 3 ]. A rogue A P is
defined as an illegal access point that is not deployed by the W LA N administrator.
Two types of rogue APs can be set with different equipments. The first type uses
a typical wireless router connected directly into an Ethernet jack in a wall. The
second type of rogue APs are set on a portable laptop with two wireless cards,
one connected to a real AP and the other configured as an AP to provide Internet
access to W LAN stations. W e will further explore the differences between these
two types of rogue APs in later sections. In this chapter we focus on the detection
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Figure 2.1: Demonstration of the hardware for setting up a rogue AP. The requirement is
only a laptop with two wireless adaptors: A is an internal wireless adaptor which is con
nected to a legitimate AP, and B is an external wireless adaptor which behaves as a legiti
mate AP to induce users.
of the second type of rogue APs.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates that a laptop with two wireless adaptors can be easily set as
the rogue AP considered in this chapter. For exam ple, w e let the internal wireless
adaptor connect to a legitimate AP, and the external wireless adaptor pretend to
be a real AP to induce users. In Linux, running command iptables -t nat -A
POSTROUTING -o interface -j MASQUERADE can bridge packets from one adaptor

to the other easily. According to 802.11 standard, when multiple APs exist nearby,
a WLAN client will always choose the AP with the strongest signal to associate. To
attract clients, therefore, a rogue A P needs to be close to clients so that its signal
can be stronger than other legitimate APs. The rogue A P can then passively wait
for users to connect to it, or actively send a fake de-associate fram e to force users to
change connection. Note that, the setting here only demonstrates the basic steps
of setting up a rogue A P to launch attacks. In practice, a rogue AP needs further
configuration to avoid easy detections, such as spoofing MAC address, SSID and
vendor name, setting up a D H C P server to assign valid IP addresses to connected
clients.
Once an innocent client is connected to a rogue AP, the adversary can manip
ulate and monitor the incoming and outgoing traffic of the client, and further launch
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different kinds of attacks. For instance, the adversary can easily launch phishing
attacks by redirecting the user's web page request to a fake one to steal the user's
sensitive information such as bank account and password.
The previous work has explored several approaches for rogue AP detection.
One category of solutions is to measure some identities/fingerprints of an AP such
as SSID, MAC address, RSSI, and clock skew.

A rogue AP is detected when

its identities are compared to those of legitimate APs. The other category of ap
proaches is to analyze network traffic at the gateway to detect the presence of rogue
APs (more details are described in Section 2.2). These existing approaches cannot
effectively detect rogue APs from the client’s side, especially in the strong adver
sary model considered in this chapter, where rogue APs are aw are of the current
detection schemes, and try to evade the detections. Here we list some challenges
for designing a detection scheme:
• Clients may not have access to the information about legitimate APs, espe
cially those APs deployed in hotspots. Therefore, it is not possible to compare
the identity of an AP with that of authorized APs stored in the database.
• Clients have less privileges than administrators. They are limited by the set
tings of the network. For example, clients cannot set dedicated servers for
detection. They cannot use the existing protocols that are not supported by
the local network. Also, without the assistance from network administrators,
it is not easy for clients to collect network traffic at the gateway. Therefore,
some existing solutions cannot work.
• Malicious rogue APs know the detection schemes and m anage to escape
from detections. They can forge their identities, block or fake certain mes
sages, and directly reply to clients without forwarding m essages to legitimate
APs. Therefore, simple defenses could be easily circumvented. In Section
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2.3.2, we will look at the strategy for a sophisticated adversary in more detail.
In this chapter, we propose a timing-based rogue A P detection technique that
allows end users to independently determine whether an A P is legitimate or not
without the assistance from the W LAN administrators. To the best of our knowl
edge, we are the first to propose a rogue AP detection scheme that can be purely
implemented by end users. Our main contributions are listed as follows:
1. W e propose a timing-based rogue AP detection algorithm that is compatible
with existing networking protocols and can be applied to 802.11 based net
work without further modifications.
2. Our solution can detect powerful rogue APs that m anage to avoid detections
as opposed to "accidental" rogue APs deployed, for exam ple, by an innocent
employee in an office [20 ].
3. W e implement our scheme using commercial hardware and evaluate the per
formance in real-world networks. Extensive experiments show our algorithm
achieves more than 90% accuracy in distinguishing rogue A Ps from legitimate
APs in lightly-loaded traffic conditions and more than 60% accuracy in heavy
traffic conditions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. W e describe the related work,
and problem formulation in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.

Our algorithm is

detailed in Section 2.4, and our implementation is presented in Section 2.5. Finally,
we discuss the evaluation results in Section 2.6 and conclude in Section 2.7.

2.2

Related Work

The threat of rogue APs has attracted significant attentions from both industrial and
academic researchers. Existing rogue AP detections can be broadly classified into
15

two categories.
The first category relies on special hardware such as wireless sniffers to monitor
wireless network for rogue AP detection. These sniffers usually scan the spectrum
at 2.4 and 5G H z for unauthorized traffic. The sniffers will alert the system adminis
trators when such traffic is detected. Some commercial products [1--3] have been
developed using this technique. In these products, a variety of identifying charac
teristics including MAC addresses, vendor name, and SSID are used to distinguish
between a legitimate AP and a rogue AP. O ther alternatives collect R SS values [75],
radio frequency variations [26], and clock skews [46] as fingerprints to identify rogue
APs. For example, work by [46] calculates every A P ’s clock skew by collecting their
beacons and probe response messages. If any AP's clock skew is different from
existing clock skews in the database, the AP is then identified as a rogue AP. Other
work like [1 7 ,2 0 ,5 7 ,9 3 ] proposes several hybrid detection schem es consolidating
both wired and wireless-side efforts. For instance, in [93], special packets are sent
to a specified wired station through wired network. If wireless sniffers capture such
packets on air, the tested machine is identified as a rogue AP.
However, deploying wireless sniffers to adequately cover large scale networks
such as public hotspots is very expensive.

Our solution on the other hand has

a much lower operating cost. In addition, our solution can be performed by the
end users who have a natural interest in not connecting to a rogue AP, rather than
relying on system administrators to disable the rogue APs.
In the second category, detecting the presence of rogue APs is achieved by an
alyzing network traffic at the gateway. In [24], the authors were among the earliest
to suggest using temporal characteristics, such as inter-packet arrival time to detect
rogue APs. Later work by [76] builds on this idea by creating an automated clas
sifier. In [85] and [86], two similar detection schemes are proposed by examining
the arrival time of consecutive ACK pairs in T C P traffics. Work in [84] and [58] uti
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lizes the round trip time of T C P traffic to detect rogue APs, based on the C SM A /C A
mechanism and physical properties of half duplex channel. R ecent research [83]
detects rogue APs by extracting characteristics unique to a wireless stream from
network traffic.
The prior work focuses on detecting rogue APs that are directly connected to
a wired network. Our detection scheme instead targets a different type of rogue
AP attack, where the rogue A P is connected to legitimate APs. Furthermore, the
prior work all considers detecting the rogue APs from network administrator's point
of view, which is only feasible in corporate networks. In public networks like those
found in coffee shops, users cannot assume that the network provider will imple
ment any rogue AP detection scheme. Our proposed scheme can be executed by
end users without any help from network administrators.

2.3

Problem Formulation

W e consider a scenario when a wireless station tries to join a W LA N to access the
Internet. After scanning the channels, the station will discover multiple APs within
its communication range. Som e of these APs are legitimate and some might be
rogue APs. Our objective is to design an algorithm that helps the station to detect
the rogue AP. The detection algorithm should function in all IE E E 802.11 based
wireless networks without requiring additional modification. Our proposed scheme
is a client-centric approach, where end users can perform the schem e on their own.
It can be combined with administrator-centric approaches (described in Section 2.2)
to reduce the risk of rogue APs.
W e assume that the rogue AP will be launched using a mobile device with two
wireless interfaces. The first interface connects the rogue AP to the legitimate AP.
The second interface pretends to be a legitimate A P to induce users to connect to
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Legitimate AP

Legitimate AP

SSID: W-M_Wireless

SSID: W-M_Wireless

Stronger or C loser Rogue A P

SSID: W-M Wireless

/\
(a) Without Rogue AP

(b) With Rogue AP

Figure 2.2: This figure shows the setup of a rogue AP. A rogue AP is connected to the
wired network through a legitimate AP. Some stations inadvertently connect to the rogue
AP because the rogue AP is closer and broadcasts stronger signals to them.
it. W hen a user associates to the rogue AP, the rogue A P will forward packets from
the second interface to the first interface, and then towards the legitimate AP. This
way, the user will still be able to access the Internet as if connected to a real AP.
Fig. 2.2 illustrates the setup.
W e do not consider a rogue AP setup where the adversary directly plugs the
rogue AP into an Ethernet jack in the wall. There are three reasons for this.
First, there are a limited number of available Ethernet jacks in public places like
airports. Since a rogue AP that needs an Ethernet cannot launch an attack without
an available Ethernet jack, this m akes this type of rogue AP attacks less likely in
such places.
Second, rogue APs convince users to associate with them by offering a better
connection as indicated by a stronger signal strength. Ethernet based rogue APs
must remain connected to the Ethernet while launching the attack. As such, it is
difficult for such rogue APs to physically move closer to users to increase their
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of rogue AP attacks. In our experiments, a rogue AP is deployed at
location A, B and C.
signal strength to induce people to connect to them, thus limiting their impact.
Finally, network administrators can use other methods [1 7 ,2 0 ,8 3 ,8 6 ] to disallow
devices from accessing the network via Ethernet jacks, if they are not registered
or do not "behave" as wired stations. In this case, the rogue A P will be unable to
provide Internet access to users, making them easy to be detected.

2.3.1

Rogue AP Effectiveness

To demonstrate the effectiveness of our rogue AP, we set up a testbed shown in
Fig. 2.3. The station is placed in an office several meters aw ay from a legitimate
AP mounted on the ceiling. The S N R of legitimate A P measured by the station is
40dbm. W e then setup the rogue A P and place it at three separate locations A, B,
and C. Location A is one m eter aw ay from the station, location B is three meters
away, and location C is 6 meters aw ay behind a wall. The goal is to determine if
we could induce the station to connect to the rogue AP instead of the legitimate AP.
Table 2.1 shows the SN R values received by the station when the rogue is placed
at different locations. By default, the station will select the AP with the highest SN R
to connect. In our experiments, when the rogue AP's S N R is greater than 40 dbm,
it is highly likely that the station will be lured into connecting with the rogue AP.

T X Power
(dbm)
18 (default)
14

10

A (1m )
71
67
61

S N R (dbm)
B (3m ) C (6 m through a wall)
40
55
36
51
33
47

Table 2.1: Average SNR under different distance and tx power

2.3.2

Adversary Model

Here we consider some defenses that can be circumvented by a sophisticated ad
versary.

Identity verification: Users can run programs like traceroute to determine
whether the connected AP is a rogue AP, and traceroute will return the number
of intermediate hops to a host site. From the output, the station will learn that a
suspicious AP exists in the route.
However, the rogue AP can evade this detection by monitoring the wireless
channel to learn the SSID and M AC address of a legitimate AP, and then setup the
rogue AP to have the same parameters. The rogue can then avoid forwarding the
real A P’s reply to the user, thus giving the impression that it is connected to the
same gateway as a legitimate AP.

Traffic monitoring: Traffic monitoring is a technique to distinguish between
wireless and wired traffic. For instance, [86 ] monitors all the traffic at a gateway
and computes the interval between two consecutive T C P A CK packets. A longer
interval indicates that the TC P packets are traveling over a wireless connection.
However, since the user connecting to a legitimate or rogue A P must use a
wireless link, the resulting interval between T C P ACKs will experience high variance
due to fluctuating channel conditions. This m akes the traffic monitoring technique
unsuitable for rogue AP detection.

Simple timing: The station may use the timing information such as the round
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trip time (R TT) to detect a rogue AP. Since the rogue A P consists of an additional
wireless link to the legitimate AP, this may lead to a delay when transmitting data.
The station can determine the R TT by sending a m essage such as a ping request
or TC P data packets [84] and wait for a reply.
However, the rogue AP can simply forge a response to the user, thus avoiding
the time penalty of the additional wireless link. For instance, the rogue AP can
generate a ping response to return to the user without forwarding the request to
the real AP. Similarly when the user sends a T C P packet, the rogue AP can return
the ACK to the user directly.

2.4

Our protocol

Our rogue AP detection protocol uses timing information based on the round trip
time (RTT). The intuition is to let the user probe a server in the local network and
then measure the RTT from the response. The user repeats this process for a
number of times and records all the RTTs. If the mean value of RTTs is statistically
larger than a certain threshold, w e regard the associated A P as a rogue AP. W e
begin with examining the motivation and challenges of this approach, followed by
some background discussion. W e then propose our protocol and show how to
determine the parameters.

2.4.1

Motivation and challenges

There are two reasons for using RTT-based method to detect rogue APs. First,
when a user connects to the network via a rogue AP, all his packets traverse two
wireless hops, one between the user and the rogue AP, and the other between the
rogue AP and the real AP. W hen the user is communicating with a real AP, there is
only one wireless hop. This additional hop will introduce an unavoidable time delay
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provided that the rogue AP is forced to communicate with the real AP. Second,
it is easy for a user to m easure RTTs. Unlike non-timing methods mentioned in
the related work, measuring RTTs does not require any special equipment, such
as sniffers [1 ,2 ] or radio frequency analyzers [79].

It also does not require any

modification to the AP.
However, using R TT to detect rogue APs requires addressing three issues:
(1) The first issue is which server to contact. A server in the local network is
preferred over a remote server on the Internet because the RTT-based method is
sensitive to the delay in the wired network. Probing a remote server may lead to
significant variance of RTT due to the dynamic routing path and Internet traffic.
(2) The second issue is what type of probe m essage to use. W e want a probe
message that cannot be easily manipulated by the rogue AP, and can reach the
server regardless of network configuration. As we mentioned earlier, a simple ping
message can be easily returned by the rogue A P to evade detection and might be
blocked by some network administrators. In addition, our probe m essage has to
adhere to the existing networking protocols so as to avoid requiring assistance from
the network provider.
(3) Finally, we have to consider the effect of network traffic conditions. A busy
channel may adversely affect R TT timing and lead to incorrect rogue A P detection.

2.4.2

Background

Our solution lets the station contact a DNS server, and uses the D N S lookup as
the probe message. In addition, we use two 802.11 m anagem ent frames, probe
request and probe response, to determine the effects of network traffic.

DNS server and lookup: The basic function of D N S is to provide a distributed
database that maps human-readable host nam es (e.g., www.cs.wm.edu) to IP ad
dresses (e.g., 1 2 8 .2 3 9 .2 6 .6 4 ). The servers managing this distributed database
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are known as D NS servers. Current networks typically cache the queried records
to achieve high performance.
There are two typical types of D N S lookups: a recursive query and a nonrecur
sive query. In a recursive D N S lookup, a station queries a local server for a host
name. If this server cannot answer the query, it will contact the root D NS server
which will then recursively ask other servers to determine the IP address. In a non
recursive query, the local D N S server will only search the cached records locally
without contacting the root D NS server. If no matches are found, the local server
will send a "host not found" m essage back to the station.
In our algorithm, we use nonrecursive query as the probe m essage to measure
the RTT between the user and the D NS server. The user will send a D NS request
for a host name with the nonrecursive option. The user then waits for the response
from the local DNS server and measures the RTT. The user repeats this process
using a different host name each time.
Our proposed scheme is efficient since most local networks may have a local
DNS server or resolver for performance reasons [48]. Therefore, a station can
always send a request to the local D NS server and the time spent on the wired
network is small due to the local communication. Furthermore, since D N S lookup
support is mandatory, all networks will have this function. Finally, since the DNS
response varies for different queries, the adversary cannot predict in advance the
user's query. The adversary also cannot determine whether a particular query can
actually be satisfied by the real D N S server. Any rogue AP that returns an incorrect
answer will be detected by the user. This forces a rogue AP to forward the request
to the real D N S server to ensure that the reply is correct. Details of how to generate
and verify user's queries are presented in Section 2.4.7.

Network traffic conditions: To determine the wireless traffic conditions, we
measure another R TT using probe request and probe response m essages. These
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messages are typically used when a station is scanning for APs.
There are two advantages of using probe request and response. First, by calcu
lating the durations between these two packets, w e can estimate the channel traffic
and the AP's workload. The reason is that in a busy channel, both the probe re
quest and response will take a long time to transmit due to channel contention and
retransmission after signal collisions. Similarly, when the AP has a heavy work
load, i.e., the AP is sending many packets for other associated stations, the probe
response message has to wait in the AP's transmission queue for a long time be
fore being sent out. Second, it is difficult for a rogue AP to replicate a busy channel
by intentionally delaying the probe response because commercial wireless card
drivers do not dispatch this kind of low level m anagem ent fram es to OS. Further
more, it is difficult to delay a probe response since this function is not supported by
regular wireless drivers.
However, a regular probe request has a drawback in that it is a broadcast mes
sage and every AP that overhears this request will respond. This leads to multiple
responses, which will create unnecessary channel contention and lead to biased
RTT measurements. Furthermore, a broadcast m essage will not be retransmitted
if lost. The associated AP that does not receive the probe request correctly will
never reply. This may affect the R TT values. Therefore, we modify the probe re
quest packet to be a unicast message. This is done by putting the M AC address
of the target AP into the destination field in the probe request. This will ensure
that only the target AP will respond and other APs will not. Also, the station will
automatically retransmit the probe request if needed.

2.4.3

Protocol overview

Here we present the overview of our rogue A P detection scheme. W e use sta to
indicate a station. For a given A P X within s ta 's communication range, the station
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Algorithm 1 Detecting Rogue A P ( APX)
1: Connect and associate with A P X
2: for i = 1 to n do
3:
Send unicast probe request to A P X, record round trip time RTTprobe =
R T T p rob e

4:

T d a ta { p r o b e ) .

Send D N S lookup to local D N S server, record round trip time R T T dns =
R T T dns - Tdata(dns).

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

end for

12.

9 =

Filter out outliers
RTTprobe = Mean of remaining R T T probe
R T T dns = Mean of remaining R T T dns
Uprobe = Standard deviation of remaining R T T probe
adns = Standard deviation of remaining R T T dns
A t = R T T dna — RTTprobe
f (c fp ro b e i ® d n s )

13: if A t > 9 then
14:
APX is a rogue AP
15: end if

runs the Algorithm 1 to determine whether A P X is a rogue AP.
Our algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase (lines 2-5) measures the
RTTs, and the second phase (lines 6-15) analyzes the collected RTTs and decides
if the tested AP is rogue.
In the first phase, the station repeatedly sends a probe request (line 3) and a
DNS lookup (line 4) for n rounds. R T T wobe (R T T dns) records the round trip time
between the probe (D N S ) request and response. Note that w e subtract the data
transmission time Tdata from both R T T probe and R T T dns, because probe packets and
DNS packets have different packet sizes and transmission rates which may vary
in each round. After eliminating the effects caused by data transmission time, we
can compare R T T probe and R T T dns fairly. The detail of how to calculate Tdata is
discussed in next subsection. The choice of param eter n captures the tradeoff be
tween the overhead and accuracy. Larger n incurs a larger overhead, but increases
the detection accuracy. W e describe this issue in Section 2.4.6.
In the second phase, w e first filter out some outlier RTTs (line 6 ). After that,
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we calculate the mean value (lines 7-8) and standard deviation (lines 9 -1 0) of both
R T T probe and R T T dns. Finally, in lines 11-15, we check the difference between these
two RTTs A£ (line 11) against a threshold parameter 6 (line 12) to determine whether
this is a rogue A R The threshold 6 reflects the delay induced by the extra wireless
transmissions in rogue A P case, and is calculated by crwobe and a dns according to
experimental measurements. W e present the detail of function / in Section 2.4.5.

2.4.4

Outlier filter

As mentioned earlier, after measuring n sample values of the RTTs, our algorithm
runs a filtering process to eliminate some abnormally large values of RTTs that may
exist in the n samples due to dynamic network conditions. W e call these abnormal
values outliers. These outlier values may affect the final outcome. For example,
assuming w e have 50 RTT samples, and 49 samples are 1ms and a single sample
is 100ms. Without filtering out 100ms sample, we arrive at a m ean value of 2.98m s,
which is not representative of the majority of the samples.
There are many ways to define an outlier. In this chapter, w e consider a con
ventional definition based on the value distance. Consider n sample values are il
lustrated in a one-dimension space and each value is represented by a data point.
The distance between any two data points is defined as the absolute difference
between their values. Let D k(p) represent the distance between data point p and
its k-th nearest neighbor point, an outlier is defined as follows: Given k and m, we
first sort all n samples according to the value o f D k (p). The data points with the top
m largest values o f D k(p) are called outliers.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the filtering process. W e set k = m = 0.2 • n, where n is
the number of samples, i.e., w e will filter out 20 % abnormal values.

26

Algorithm 2 k- nearest neighbors outlier filter
1: k = m = 0.2 • n
2: for i = 1 to n do
3:
dt = D k{R T T i)
4:

end for

5: Sort all di in increasing order

6: Remove the top m largest values
Parameters
802.11b
20 us
50 us
192/96 /is
31

tslot
tDIFS
tpCLP

Values
8 0 2 .11g
9 us
34 iis
192/96 or 20 /is
15

802.11a
9 iis
28 us
20 iis
15

Table 2.2: IEEE 802.11 characteristics

2.4.5

Parameter values

Here we explain how to derive Tdata and 0 used in Algorithm 1. W e begin with a
quick review of the 802.11 protocol.
IEEE 802.11 medium access control adopts C S M A /C A model and the distributed
coordination function (D CF). Before transmitting a frame, a station first senses
whether the channel is idle.
mediately.

If the channel is idle, the station will transmit im

Otherwise the frame transmission will be deferred until the channel

becomes available. After the channel is free for certain period of time, which is
defined as DIFS, the station starts a back-off operation with a slot counter whose
value is randomly selected between 0 and the size of a contention window (C W min).
This back-off counter decreases by one for each idle slot time. W hen the back-off
counter becomes zero, the station transmits the fram e. W hen the destination re
ceives the frame successfully, it sends a MAC layer A CK back to notify the sender.
If the sender does not receive an ACK, it will retransmit the packet. Table 2.2 lists
some timing parameters in 802.11 standard that w e will use later.
Based on 802.11 mechanism, w e can express the delay for transmitting a packet
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as
T d e la y =

td e fe r +

tD IF S +

t bf

+

T d a ta +

^ re tra n s m it i

where tdef er is the time deferred due to a busy channel medium, t retTansmit is the
time for retransmission if no A CK is received, and t bf is the random back-off time.
The expected value of

t bJ

Data transmission time

is given by

T data

~r—

cw
fV m i n

tb f —

------------

^

,

--------------

*

ts lo t-

depends on the data size (L-byte payload) and the

transmission rate (r Mbps),

rJ - d a t a(T{ T ,-r'i
r)

where

t PCLP

-

I(28 + L ) ■8bits

— t p C L P ----- H----------------------------------- ,
r

is the physical layer packet overhead of any IEEE 802.11 packet in

cluding two parts: the Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (P C LP ) preamble used
for synchronization and the PCLP header. According to the standard, TPClp is

192/ . i s (96fis) for long (short) preamble, using E R P -D S S S modulation scheme (sup
porting 1-11 Mbps). The T PClp is 20fxs, using E R P -O FD M modulation scheme
(supporting 6-54 Mbps) [81]. The value 28 is the length of M AC header plus C RC
checksum. For every measured R TT at each round, the station is aware of the data
size (L) and transmitting rate (r) for every incoming and outgoing packet. The sta
tion can thus compute the exact values of

T d a ta ( p r o b e )

and

T d a ta ( d n s ) ,

and subtract

them from RTTs to eliminate the effect of different transmission time.
In order to derive 6, we need to analyze the RTTs. For a legitimate AP, the path
taken for an entire probe request and response is

S T A

-»

A P
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->■ S T A ,

and the path taken for an entire D N S lookup and answ er is

S T A —> A P —> S E R V —»• A P —> S TA .

For simplicity, we only consider the network overhead, but ignore the time for AP
and D NS server to process the packets. There, after subtracting Tdata, these two
RTTs for probe and DNS can be expressed as

& rT rr
1 probe ~

x lJ

rp st a ~+aP
o v e rh e a d

i
'

r p a p —¥ sta
o v e rh e a d

and
ftr p r p

1 dns ^

r r iS tQ —t a p

.

■*■o
o v e rh e a d

‘

an

,

rj~iQ.p—tStCL

overh<
1 wwirireedd T ' x o
v e rh e a d '

where Twerhead is used to indicate the remaining part of Tde,ay after deducting Tdata.
Since the RTTs of DNS and probe are measured at approximately the same time,
we assume the network conditions are stable during that time period1, so w e can
regard T ^^ead of probe and D N S as the same. Thus, the difference between two
RTTs is

A t = RTTdns ~ RTTprobe = T w ir e d ■

Based on our extensive experimental m easurements (which will be shown later in
Section 2.6), A t is no larger than 1.3 ms, even when we consider several hops
between sending a D NS lookup and receiving the answer back in the idle network
traffic condition.
On the other hand, if the tested AP is a rogue AP, the path taken for probe
1 [88] mentions that wireless network traffic rem ains stable within approxim ately 150 - 250 ms in
practice.
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messages is still
S T A -> R A P -> S T A ,
but the path for DNS messages is

S T A -» R A P ^ A P ^ S E R V ->• A P ->■ iL 4 P -> S T A .

Similarly, w e get

A^'

=

RTTdns — RTTprobe
r p r a p —* a p

d e la y

,

rp
'

w ir e d

,
'

r p a p —* r a p

d e la y

For a station, it is difficult to estimate Tdeiay between the rogue AP and its associated
legitimate AP, since the station does not know the transmission rate and network
condition at the AP side. However, based on our experiments, w e observe that A t'
is larger than

1.3 ms. Inorder

to effectively detect a rogue AP,9 needs to be set

between A t and A t' as A t < 6 < A t'. Therefore, w e set the threshold 6 to be 1.3
ms.
However, the threshold 9 may not perform well under heavy traffic condition.
This is because that the heavy traffic congests the AP causing long tx-queue,
packet loss, and retransmission. The mean value and variance of RTTs for both
probe and DNS will become larger. Additionally, heavy workload m ay delay each
packet waiting in the AP's queue until packets buffered ahead are transmitted.
To overcome this problem, we dynamically adjust the threshold 9 according
to the standard deviation of RTTprobe and R T T dns. Based on our extensive ex
periments, we find that the standard deviation is a good indicator of traffic load.
Heavy traffic conditions usually result in larger deviation than light traffic conditions.
Fig. 2.4 illustrates the mean value of A t against the average value of standard devi-
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Figure 2.4: Mean value of At against the average value of standard deviation of RTTprobe
and RTTdns under different traffic load condition
ation of RTTpr0be and R T T dns. In the figure, each data point indicates a test case for
a legitimate AP or a rogue AP. They are plotted with respect to their mean values
of A t and their standard deviations of RTT. As shown in the figure, we can divide
the data points into two groups, one for legitimate APs and the other for rogue APs,
by a single line. From the data, we empirically set

e =

/(^ ,

a dn. )

=a•

+ ft

(2 .1 )

where the a and /? values are 0.49 and 1.3 respectively. W e derive these param
eters by adjusting the line to let the most number of data points of legitimate APs
above the line, and the most number of data points of rogue APs below the line.
The particular line with the furthest mean distance to each data point is selected.
Finally, recall in Algorithm 1, after measuring enough samples of RTTs, a station
computes the A t and 9. If A t > 9, the station will mark the A P it connects to as a
rogue AP. Then the station will choose another AP for test.
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of the trend of mean value and standard deviation of A t against the
number of samples.

2.4.6

Number of samples

In our experiments, we find that when the wireless traffic is lightly-loaded, our de
tection algorithm can detect rogue AP with high probability even if w e use a small
number of samples. However, when the traffic is heavy, the algorithm needs more
samples to achieve desired accuracy. In order to reduce the detection time with
out sacrificing accuracy, we present a heuristic algorithm to adjust the number of
samples dynamically, rather than using a fixed number.
The intuition is based on the experimental observations. In Fig. 2.5, we illus
trates the trend of the mean and standard deviation of A t against the sample size.
In the horizontal axis, each pair of two bars present the mean value of A t and the
standard deviation of RTT every 10 samples. W e observe the values may vary a
lot if the sample size is not large enough. But once collecting enough number of
samples, the variance will be stable. Therefore, to check w hether the number of
samples is large enough, we re-calculate the variance of the whole samples every
10 samples, and compare it with previous values. W hen the difference of the vari
ances is smaller than a predefined threshold, we stop sampling. This is because
additional samples will not help detection.
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2.4.7

DNS operations

Our scheme has two DNS operations. The first is to determine a set of n different
host names for measuring n samples of RTTs. The second operation is verifying
DNS answers.

Determining DNS queries. W e generate D NS queries as follows. In a station,
two pools are constructed. The first pool contains valid host nam es that can be
extracted from local caches of web browsers (like firefox and IE). The other pool
contains some randomly generated host names. W e do not know whether they
are valid or not.

Once the two pools have been constructed, w e will randomly

select a pool to pick a host name to test. Then, w e delete that host name from
the pool to avoid using it again. This prevents a rogue AP from remembering the
corresponding answers. Note that if w e need a lot of samples, we assign a smaller
weight to the first pool to prevent it from exhausting too fast.

Verifying DNS answers. Suppose that a station hears m + 1 (m > 1) APs
composed of m legitimate APs and one rogue AP. T h e station will first randomly
select one AP and send a recursive DNS query to it.
Assuming this selected AP is not a rogue AP, it will execute this recursive query.
This forces the local DNS server to provide an answer to the query by querying
other name servers on the Internet and cache the response. The station then uses
the same host name and queries all other APs in non-recursive queries. Now the
answer to the query should be cached on the DNS server. W e then execute Al
gorithm 1 on the remaining APs. The legitimate APs will respond accordingly with
a reasonably short RTT. For the rogue AP, if it chooses to forward the query, the
rogue AP will be detected by our algorithm. If the rogue AP does not forward the
query, the rogue AP does not know the correct answer and can only return a "host
not found" message. The station can thus determine that AP is a rogue AP.
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Traffic G enerator

D N S S erv er B
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DNS
S erver A

AP B

R outer
R ogue AP

Ap A
R outer

Figure 2.6: Illustration of the architecture of the testbed
If the selected AP is a rogue AP, it must forward the recursive D N S query to the
real AP. This is because if the rogue AP does not forward the query, the D N S server
would not contain the correct answer. W hen the station runs our algorithm, all the
other APs will reply with a "host not found" message. W hen this happens, the
rogue AP will be detected, since a legitimate AP will always execute the recursive
DNS query.
W e then repeat the process for the remaining A Ps to detect the rogue AP. In
this chapter, we do not consider the case of multiple rogue APs colluding with each
other. This will be examined in our future work.

2.5

Implementation and Setup

This section describes the experiment setup and system implementation in detail.

2.5.1

Hardware description

Fig. 2.6 illustrates the infrastructure of our testbed which consists of two APs and
three laptops: one laptop is used as a traffic generator, and the remaining laptops
serve as a station and a rogue AP. Server A is the D NS server in the campus
network. To investigate the effect of wired link on our algorithm, another DNS server
B in the same subnet of APs is utilized.
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Commercial Wireless Cards

Chipset

Driver

Intel PRO/W ireless 3945A BG
TP-Link T L -W N 610G
D-Link W N A -2330
Dell wireless 1390 W LAN

Intel
Atheros
Atheros
Broadcom

ipw3945 (v1.2.2)
madwifi (vO.9.4)
madwifi (vO.9.4)
BCM4311

Table 2.3: Description of commercial wireless cards, chipsets and corresponding drivers
used in our experiments
The hardware specification of each component is described as follows.

Access Points: W e use a Linksys W PA 54G and D-Link D I-6 2 4 + A fo r our APs.
Both APs operate in the 80 2.1 1g mode.

Wireless Stations: All laptops in Fig. 2.6 are 2G H z x86 machines running Linux
2.6x kernel. The traffic generator and the station are equipped with a TP-Link TLW N 610G wireless card while the rogue A P possesses 2 wireless cards, one TPLink TL-W N 610G , and the other Intel 3495A BG .

DNS Server: Both DNS servers are campus servers connected in local wired
networks at different locations.

2.5.2

Software description

Drivers: W e use Madwifi (v0.9.4) driver [11] for the wireless cards with Atheros
chipset, ipw3945 (v1.2.2) driver [9] for those with Intel chipset, and BCM4311 linux
driver for those with Broadcom chipset. Table 2.3 lists all wireless cards, chipsets
and corresponding drivers used in our experiments.

Click toolkit on station:

On the station side, w e implement the proposed

algorithm using Click [49] toolkit with the wireless card turned into monitor mode.
Click toolkit is a powerful tool over the driver layer. It is well connected with the
wireless card's monitor mode and provides a flexible programming environment
to implement our protocol. The most important feature is that we can inject raw
data by using Click, such that our unicast probe request can be sent easily. The
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Unmodified probe request
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MAC a d dress o f AP

/
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00:17:9A:68:9A:91

6

6
MAC header

Figure 2.7: MAC header comparison between unmodified probe request and our probe
request
comparison between two probe requests are shown in Fig 2.7.

Configuration on the rogue AP: For the rogue AP, one of its wireless cards
is configured to work in the AP mode, and the other wireless card is configured to
the station mode and connects to a legitimate AP. Tunneling these two interfaces
is achieved by adding rules in iptables.
W e use a tool called m acchanger to spoof the M AC address of a legitimate AP. A
station connected to the rogue AP will be assigned a valid IP address by dnsmasq,
as if it obtains it from a legitimate AP. The adversary's strategies mentioned before
are implemented by netfilter/iptables.

Traffic load:

W e use channel utilization as in [47] to quantify the traffic load.

The channel utilization per second is computed by adding (1) the time spent by the
on-air transmission of all data (including retransmitting), management, and control
frames transmitted during a second, and (2) the overhead for each frame, such as
DIFS and SIFS. This overhead is a part of channel utilization, since the channel
remains unavailable at that time. In our experiments, the traffic generator will send
packets with constant bit rate (C B R ) to generate a required channel utilization.

Recording RTTs:

Click toolkit leverages libpcap [10] to push/pull packets

to/from the W LAN driver (shown in Fig. 2.8). O nce a probe request (or D N S lookup)
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Link-level
driver
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Network

Figure 2.8: Basic journey of a packet and the place where we record RTTs.
is created in a click module, the packet will be sent to the W LAN driver for link-level
processing before being pushed to the tx-queue of the wireless card. W e record the
transmission time just before the packet is pushed to the tx-queue. It is known this
time is not the instance when the packet is actually transmitted, since the packet
must wait until previous packets in the queue have been transmitted. To account
for this delay, we regulate the rate in which packets are added to the tx-queue such
that there is at most one packet in the queue at all times.
W hen the wireless card receives a probe or D N S response, w e record the arrival
time when an interrupt is delivered to the driver.

This may incur a slight delay

since the kernel has to process the interrupt. Since w e determine A t by subtracting
RTTprobe from R T T dns, this delay is eliminated.
Unlike previous method mentioned in [40] where RTTs are recorded in user
space, our method can record more accurate RTTs. That is because each packet
is timestamped close to the time when the packet is actually being sent or received.
This may prevent including the delay for packets walking through the kernel. Thus,
our measured RTTs are not affected by the workload of the station.
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Figure 2.9: Testing the accuracy of our detection algorithm at different locations in real
world. Location 1 is in the China State Key laboratory of Novel Software Technology at
Nanjing University, and location 2 is in the campus at College of William and Mary.

2.6

Evaluation

Here we present the experimental results of our rogue AP detection algorithm. W e
use real settings to evaluate the robustness of our algorithm in practice. Our ex
periments are performed in two campuses referred to as location 1 and location
2. The configurations in both places follow similar architecture shown in Fig 2.6.
However, the network environment including AP's capacity, the workload of local
DNS server, the number of users, and interference may be different.
Fig. 2.9 shows the observable experience of our detection algorithm in those two
places. In the location 1, we first use the algorithm to test a real AP 50 times. Our
approach only fails 3 times. The false positive rate is only 6 %. Then, W e repeat
tests for determining a rogue AP. At this time, detection fails 8 times. The false
negative rate is nearly 16%. Similar experiments are conducted in the location 2.
The corresponding false positive rate and false negative rate are 12.5% and 5%
respectively. As w e see, our detection accuracy is about 90% in total. That is really
robust in practice.
In the following, we investigate the performance of our detection scheme, while
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considering some factors that may affect our algorithm. Recall that, the key of our
approach is using the round trip time to detect a rogue AP. W e consider the following
factors that have influence on timing RTT.

Data transmission rate: R TT is inversely proportional to data transmission
rate. High transmission rate usually leads to small RTT. In Section 2.6.1, we inves
tigate whether a rogue AP can manipulate its transmission rate to avoid detection.

Location of DNS server: In some small hotspots (eg. coffee shops, restau
rants), APs are usually connected to a close D N S server or resolver provided by
ISP. This server may be located some hops aw ay from APs. In this case, w e have
possibility to falsely identify a legitimate AP as a rogue A P due to large RTT. Section
2.6.2 describes the impact of this factor. W e show that our schem e can tolerate a
DNS server with several hops away.

Wireless traffic: As mentioned early, wireless traffic may incur large variance
of RTT. That is because some packets may be sent immediately with no contention,
but some packets may be deferred for a long time due to collision or interference
with others. The variance may hide rogue AP's additional wireless link, and make
the detection hard.

In Section 2.6.3, we evaluate our algorithm under different

wireless traffic conditions.

AP's workload: AP's workload is related to the utilization of AP's queue. It is
caused by network traffic, but not equivalent to the traffic. W e exam ine this factor
in Section 2.6.4.
Finally, Section 2.6.5 discusses the accuracy of our algorithm by using different
number of samples, and Section 2 .6 .6 shows how much time w e will spend to test
an AP.
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RAP
Rate
adaptation

Fixed
54Mbps

Average R TT after removing outliers (ms)
0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.72
R T T p ro b e
R T T dna
2.66 2.71 2.65 2.67 2.66
1.94 1.98 1.92 1.94 1.94
At
1.33 1.32 1.32 1.33 1.33
e
0.72 0.73 0.74 0 .73
0.73
R T T p ro b e
R T T dns
2.92 3.13 2.98 3.92 2 .84
At
2.19 2.41
2.25 3.18 2.11
9
1.32 1.43 1.33 1.44 1.32

Table 2.4: Comparison between rate adaptation and fixed 54Mbps under idle traffic condi
tion

2.6.1

Data transmission rate

Most wireless devices adopt rate adaptation algorithms to adjust their transmission
rate with respect to varied wireless conditions. However, since there are no speci
fications with regards to rate adaptation in 802.11 networks, the rogue AP is free to
use any 802.11 transmission rate to try to avoid detection. The idea is that a rogue
may attempt to always use the highest rate when connected to a legitimate A P so
as to reduce the RTT.
To test, we first set up a rogue AP to use the default rate adaptation in idle traffic
condition, and run our detection algorithm. W e then repeat the experiment using
the same traffic condition, except w e set the rogue A P to always use the highest
possible transmission rate of 54Mbps. In both tests, we use the sam e settings,
where sample size n = 100 and contacting the D NS server B. Table 2.4 shows
the results for the two tests, where R T T probe (or R T T dns) is average R TT between
probe (or DNS) request and the response minus the data transmission time (see
lines 7-8 in Algorithm 1), A t = R T T dns - R T T prohe, and 9 is computed according to
Eq.(1). In our algorithm, if A t > 9, the tested AP is identified as rogue; otherwise
as legitimate. W e observe that (1) even if the rogue A P were set to always send at
the highest possible rate, w e can still detect the rogue AP, and (2) the performance
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Figure 2.10: Delay for transmitting 64 byte packets via different number of hops on wired
link, t is the mean of delay, and A is the variance.
gain by the rogue AP in using a fixed rate appears to be minor, since rate adaptation
can quickly converge to use the best possible rate even if the initial rate is much
lower. In fact, in a practical environment, using a fixed rate m ay result in a worse
performance since more packets will be dropped when traffic conditions fluctuate.
This is shown in the larger A t values in fixed rate experiments. These results are
omitted due to page limit. Lastly, since utilizing a fix rate yields no benefits, w e let
the rogue AP use rate adaptation for the rest of our experiments.

2.6.2

Location of DNS server

To illustrate the delay introduced by multiple wired hops, we send 64 byte packets to
a local host located at two, four, and five hops away from the station, and measure
the time taken for the host to respond. Fig. 2.10 shows the results. W e find that the
increased time resulting from additional hops is every small. O ne additional hop
only incurs less than 0.1 millisecond time.
Next, w e examine our detection algorithm when tested A Ps are connected to
different D NS servers under idle traffic condition. In the first test, w e let the legit
imate AP and the rogue AP both use a far D N S server A (see Fig. 2.6). Packets
sent by the station need 3 wired hops to reach the D N S server, and 2 wired hops
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Legitimate
AP
(Server B)
Rogue
AP
(Server B)
Legitimate
AP
(Server A)
Rogue
AP
(Server A)

Average R TT after removing outliers (ms)
0.633
0.632 0.6 3 4 0.634
R T T p ro b e
0.633
R T T dns
1.152
1.151
1.148 1.156
1.130
0.518
0.5 1 6 0.5 2 2 0.025
At
0.519
e
1.314
1.315
1.316 1.316 1.503
0.6 6 4 0.6 6 4 0.661
0.671
0.663
R T T p ro b e
2.219
2.4 5 2 2.371
2.455
2.151
RTTdns
1.794
At
1.48
1.556
1.788 1.707
1.357
1.362
9
1.345
1.357 1.362
0.0.72
0.73
0 .73
0.73
0 .73
R T T p ro b e
1.67
1.62
1.59
1.60
1.58
RTTdns
0.94
0 .89
0 .89
At
0.86
0.85
1.35
9
1.33
1.36
1.33
1.33
0 .74
0.74
0 .74
0.74
0.75
R T T p ro b e
2
.67
2.84
2.7 6
2.92
2.71
RTTdns
1.97
2.09
At
2.02
2 .18
1.93
1.41
1.41
9
1.43
1.39
1.41

Table 2.5: Average RTT for DNS server under idle traffic situation
for the response coming back. In the second test, w e have both legitimate and
rogue APs connect to a close D NS server B which is located in the sam e subnet
with APs. Table 2.5 shows the results. W e see that our algorithm is able to detect
the rogue AP even when the D NS server is located at the place several hops away.

2.6.3

Wireless Traffic

Here, we examine the effects of wireless traffic on our detection algorithm. Since we
adopt a timing-based approach, variations in network traffic may adversely affect
our results. To only evaluate the negative impact, w e ignore the traffic occurs on
the channel used between rogue AP and real AP, since this will help us to detect
the rogue AP. W e only consider the wireless traffic between the station and the
tested AP, and set the rogue AP to use the most favorable conditions to avoid
detection. Because the rogue AP can best avoid detection when it can forward
packets from the station to the real AP as fast as possible, w e let the connection
between the rogue A P and the AP A be free of any traffic, thus ensuring the fastest
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Figure 2.11: Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP A and rogue AP in idle traffic situation,
while the DNS server is B, transmission rate is automatic, and n = 100.
possible transmission between the rogue AP and real AP. In our experiments, this
connection is set to the channel 11 with idle traffic and good quality of signals.
W e then test the rogue AP against AP B, both of which are set to the channel 1.
W e use separate laptops as a traffic generators to control the amount of traffic on
that channel. W e experiment over three traffic conditions, idle traffic, half-saturated
traffic, and saturated traffic. In all experiments, we set n — 100 and use D NS server
B.

Idle traffic:

W e create idle traffic condition by restricting data packets on the

channel. But note that, idle traffic does not mean the channel utilization (as men
tioned in Section 2.5.2 (d)) is zero (nearly 10% in our testbeds), since there are
management frames including beacons and so on. Fig. 2.11 describes the empiri
cal CDF of R TT for a legitimate A P and a rogue AP measured in one experiment.
The complete results are listed in Table 2.5. As we can see, the value of A t is
small, and the 9 varies a little in idle traffic situation. For the legitimate AP, all A t
are smaller than corresponding 9, whereas all A t for the rogue A P are larger than
9. Our scheme achieves nearly 100% accuracy, and the total testing time is no
longer than 1s.

Half-saturated traffic: W e define a half-saturated traffic condition when the
ratio of on-air time of all transmitted packets to the total time is nearly 45%. The
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Figure 2.12: Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP B and rogue AP in half saturated traffic
situation, while DNS server is B, transmission rate is automatic, and n = 100.

Legitimate
AP
(Server B)
Rogue
AP
(Server B)

Average R TT after removing outliers (ms)
1.67
2.0 0 9 1.664 1.787
RTTprobe 1.895
3.415 3.133
2.788
3.486
3.291
RTTdns
1.346
At
0.893
1.816 1.282 1.751
2.556 2.572 2.8 2 5 2.586 2.585
e
1.982
1.744 2.067
2.69
2.749
R T T p ro b e
All
6 .2 1 5 6.222 4.8 3 8
4.692
RTTdns
At
2.948 2.703 3.525 3.473 2.856
2.634 2 .8 9 6 3.156 2.672
2.821
e

Table 2.6: Average RTT in half saturated traffic situation
traffic generators periodically send packets to create this condition. The experiment
is then repeated to test our algorithm. W e find that as the traffic load increases, the
average RTT for both probe and D NS m essages also increase. At the sam e time,
our algorithm is still able to identify the rogue AP with high probability. Fig. 2.12
illustrates C D F for one experiment. The details are shown in Table 2.6.

Saturated traffic: Here, we let the traffic generators send enough packets to
create a 90% channel utilization before starting the experiments. Fig. 2 .13 and Ta
ble 2.7 describe the results. W e find that under heavy traffic condition, the variance
of RTT for a probe request (D N S lookup) becom es large. The values range from
several milliseconds to hundreds of milliseconds. As a result, some of the legitimate
APs may be incorrectly classified as a rogue AP.
In summary, Fig. 2.14 shows the trends of the mean value of A t and the thresh-
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Figure 2.13: Empirical CDF of RTT for legitimate AP B and rogue AP in saturated traffic
situation, while DNS server is B, transmission rate is automatic, and n = 100.

Legitimate
AP
(Serv B)
Rogue
AP
(Serv B)

Average RTT after removing outliers (ms)
RTTprobe 37.78 41.07 52.55 5 4 .6 3 29.36
RTTdns
38.46 45.22 61.28 6 4 .4 3 41.72
12.36
At
4 .1 5
8.73
9.80
0.68
9.56
11.57
14.12 13.49
9
7.70
RTTprobe 53.04 63.18 67.34 5 9 .1 8 54.95
R T T dna
69 .1 3 82.34 79.46 7 7 .5 9 69.36
14.41
At
16.09 19.16 12.12 18.41
9
12.42 13.29
11.73 12.86 15.33

Table 2.7: Average RTT in saturated traffic situation
old 9 for both legitimate AP (a) and rogue AP (b) varying against the channel utiliza
tion. In the experiments, we set n = 100 and contact the DNS server B. In the figure,
the circles represent the false detections. As we see, the threshold 9 according to
the standard deviation of RTT can reflect the traffic condition. Large channel utiliza
tion incurs a large value of 9. By dynamically adjusting the threshold, our detection
algorithm can achieve relatively high accuracy under different channel utilization.

2.6.4

AP's workload

Besides the channel contention of wireless traffic, AP's workload also affects packet's
RTT. W hen an AP suffers heavy workload, each packet needs more time to pro
cess, and has to wait in the queue of the A P until packets ahead are sent out. It
will adversely affect the detection. Hence, w e focus on AP's workload to evaluate
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Figure 2.14: Illustration of the trend of the mean value of A t and the threshold 6 varying
against the channel utilization.

the performance of our approach in this subsection.
W e conduct four sets of experiments. For all experiments, w e use the same
settings except changing the throughput of the AP. For each set, we test our detec
tion algorithm 10 times. In the first set, we restrict the AP with idle workload, that
is either the uplink or downlink throughput is smaller than 10kps. For the second
set, to create 1Mbps throughput for both uplink and downlink of the AP, a wireless
station is used to transmit U D P packets at constant bit rate to another wireless sta
tion through the AP. Similarly, 2Mbps and 5M bps throughput are generated for the
third and fourth set separately.
Fig. 2.15 shows the comparison of four kinds of situations. In the figure, the dark
shaded bar describes the number of correct detections out of 10 times, and the light
shaded bar indicates the number of wrong detections. W e find our algorithm works
well when the AP's workload is lower than 5Mbps.

After that, the performance

decreases.
Note that w e only consider the case of an AP being falsely identified as a rogue
AP due to the workload. W e ignore the case that a rogue A P may suffer heavy
workload, since that will help us to detect the rogue AP. Therefore, we assume a
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Figure 2.15: Histogram of the accuracy of our detection algorithm under different AP's
workloads. The "Correct" means a legitimate AP is correctly identified, and the "Wrong"
indicates falsely detecting an AP as a rogue AP.
rogue AP will never have heavy workload.

2.6.5

Number of samples

Previously, we found that our algorithm does not work well when the wireless traffic
is saturated. Here, we are curious whether increasing n could improve the perfor
mance. In our experiments, we increase the original value of n from 100 to 300.
Again, we test a legitimate AP and rogue A P separately under different channel
utilization. Both tests are repeated 10 times. The detection accuracy is the ratio of
the number of the tests in which the AP is correctly identified over the total number.
Fig. 2.16 illustrates the accuracy of our algorithm against the channel utilization.
W e find that using n = 100 is enough to achieve 100 percent of detection ac
curacy in low traffic situation. However, the accuracy falls to 65% as the channel
becomes increasingly saturated. W hen setting n = 300, we are able to obtain 80%
as the channel saturation increases.
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Figure 2.16: Detection accuracy against channel utilization

2.6.6

Testing time

To evaluate the efficiency of our detection algorithm, w e use testing time, which is
approximately the product of the mean value of R TT and the sample size. W e do not
consider other factors such as the time needed to associate to an A P or to obtain an
IP address because those factors are dependent on specific AP configuration and
may vary widely from one A P to another. Clearly, heavy traffic and large number of
samples will lead to long testing time. Table 2 .8 shows the time for testing a rogue
AP under three traffic conditions. As w e see, our algorithm requires less than one
second under lightly-loaded traffic condition, and tens of seconds for heavy traffic
condition.

Idle
n = 100

0.2

n = 300

0.3
0.5

0.8

Detection time (second)
Half saturated Saturated
0.9
11.3
17.2
1.1
2.7
39.1
3.2
50.7

AP
RAP
AP
RAP

Table 2.8: Testing time under different network traffic conditions
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2.7

Conclusion

The ease of setting up a successful rogue AP makes this form of wireless attack a
serious security problem. W hile existing techniques can alleviate this threat, they
nonetheless require active participation on the part of the network administrator. In
this chapter, w e present a practical, timing-based scheme for the end user to avoid
connecting to rogue APs. This is done without any assistance from the network
administrator.
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3

Vehicular Rogue AP Detection

To deeply study the rogue AP problem, we consider another interesting and prac
tical type of rogue AP which is set up in a moving vehicle for Drive-thru Internet.
Unlike the rogue APs considered in the previous chapter, vehicular rogue APs are
always moving and therefore more difficult to be detected. This chapter presents
a novel scheme to prevent users from connecting to vehicular rogue APs.

3.1

Introduction

The Drive-thru Internet [7] has been of special interest in wireless communication
research area for several years. The goal of Drive-thru Internet is to provide seam 
less Internet access to mobile users in moving vehicles by exploiting IEEE 802.11
technology [28,64]. Fig. 3.1 illustrates a typical Drive-thru Internet scenario, where
the IEEE 802.11-based access points (APs) are deployed along the roads -- within
the city or on a freeway. Mobile users in vehicles (i.e., vehicular clients) connect to
these APs (so called roadside A Ps) for the Internet access. Recently, many citywide Wi-Fi infrastructure for Drive-thru Internet has already been deployed in the
real world. For example, Google provides a free wireless Internet service to the city
of Mountain View [8].
Due to the ubiquitous deployment of APs, the problem of rogue A Ps has emerged
as a well recognized security issue. A rogue AP is a malicious A P that pretends to
be a legitimate AP to induce users to connect. Once an innocent user has associ50

Internet

Roadside AP

Roadside AP
Vehicular
client

Lane

Lane

Figure 3.1: Illustration of a typical Drive-thru Internet scenario
ated to a rogue AP, the adversary can then launch various attacks via manipulating
user's packets. For example, the adversary can launch phishing attacks to redirect
user's web page requests to fake ones, seeking to steal user's secrets such as
bank account numbers and passwords.
Rogue APs in vehicular networks can be broadly classified into two categories:
stationary and mobile.

In the first category, a stationary rogue AP is set up at

a fixed place, such as in a building facing a busy road.

Due to the mobility of

vehicular clients, these types of rogue APs are unlikely to keep a long connection
with clients. As a result, the time window for adversaries to steal users' secrets is
short and the dam age is restricted. In addition, a stationary rogue AP usually keeps
active for a long time in a place. It is relatively not difficult for authorities to detect
such a rogue AP. Previous works [1 7 ,2 0 ,2 4 , 39, 57, 7 6 ,8 3 - 8 6 , 93] have already
proposed several methods to detect stationary rogue APs. However, there is little
work on how to defend against a mobile rogue AP or a vehicular rogue AP, where
a malicious rogue AP is set up in a moving vehicle. Since a mobile rogue A P could
follow traffic on a road, such an AP is able to maintain a long connection with users.
Thus, this type of mobile rogue APs are more dangerous because they have more
time to launch various attacks.
In this chapter, we consider the problem of detecting vehicular rogue APs from
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user's perspective. It is challenging because the duration for a vehicular client con
nected to an AP is short, so that the time left for the detection is restricted. Accord
ing to IEEE 802.11 standards, when the signal strength of a connected AP is less
than a threshold, the client will perform a handoff [36] and re-associate to another
AP with the strongest signal strength nearby. Accordingly, it is meaningless to de
termine whether or not an A P is rogue while such an A P is out of the client's reach.
Another challenge is that the information obtained by clients has to go through APs.
To evade detection, a rogue AP can impersonate a legitimate AP by providing fake
information such as MAC address, B SSID and other configurations. There is no
trusted authorities that can be used to validate this information.
Considering the above challenges, we propose a practical detection scheme
that prevents users from connecting to vehicular rogue APs. Our solution is com
patible with IEEE 802.11 standards and imposes little modification to the AP side.
The only change to existing APs is to add their G PS information in each beacon
they broadcast.

Based on that, clients are able to m easure the received signal

strength (R SS), coupled with several test packets with controlled transmission (tx)
power and data rate to detect rogue APs. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to consider the vehicular rogue AP problem and propose a practical user-side
detection scheme. Our main contributions are listed as follows:
1. W e are the first to study the vehicular rogue AP problem. The vehicular rogue
APs considered in this chapter are set up in moving vehicles by malicious
attackers. They are powerful and capable of forging anything to escape from
detection.
2. W e propose a practical scheme to defend against vehicular rogue APs. Our
approach is a pure user-centric method that can be performed by end users
without any help from network administrators. In addition, our approach is
compatible with 802.11 standards.
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3. W e implement our scheme using commercial off-the-shelf devices including
APs, wireless cards, antennas, and G P S modules. In addition, we show our
scheme is effective in real world environment through extensive experiments
on realistic road conditions.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the re
lated work. Section 3.3 describes the adversary model. Our detection algorithms
are detailed in Section 3.4. The implementation and evaluation are presented in
Section 3.5. Last, we discuss the limitation of our solution in Section 3.6 and con
clude in Section 3.7.

3.2

Related Work

The threat of rogue APs has attracted the attention of both industrial and academic
researchers. Previous research has been mainly focused on detecting static rogue
APs in enterprise or hotspot scenarios. Existing schem es can be broadly classified
into to three categories.
The first category relies on sniffers to monitor wireless traffic. These sniffers
usually scan spectrum to examine the 2.4 and 5G H z frequencies. Once detecting
any traffic from unauthorized APs, they will alert the administrator. This approach
usually demands well controlled infrastructure such as enterprise networks, where
the administrator can easily deploy sniffers and cut off the access of rogue APs
to Internet. Some commercial products [1 -3 ] have been developed following this
technique. In academic community, an architecture for diagnosing various faults
in WLAN including rogue APs, is presented in [17], where multiple APs and mobile
clients installing a special diagnostic software cooperate to perform RF monitor
ing. In [20], another monitoring infrastructure called D AIR is proposed, where USB
wireless adapters are attached to desktop machines for capturing more compre
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hensive traffic to reduce false detection rate. Different from this type of solution,
our defending scheme does not reply on sniffers. That is because a small amount
of sniffers may not catch vehicular rogue APs well, but extensive deployment of
sniffers is impractical.
The technique used in the second category is leveraging fingerprints to iden
tify rogue APs. Since an advanced adversary can easily spoof a rogue AP's MAC
address, SSID , vendor name, and configuration to escape from the detection, the
previous work often adopted the fingerprints that cannot be easily forged. For ex
ample, the work by [46] calculated every AP's clock skew by collecting their beacons
and probe responses. Since clock skew is difficult to forge , any AP with unknown
clock skew is identified as a rogue AP. In addition to clock skew, R SS values [75],
radio frequency variations [26] are also used. However, a major drawback of this
type of schemes is that the AP validation requires to access a database containing
the fingerprints of all legitimate APs. This database may not be available for end
users before they connect to the AP. Our solution differs from such schemes in that
we do not assume the clients know the fingerprints of legitimate A Ps in advance.
Therefore, our detection scheme can apply to not only network administrators but
also end users who use the wireless network for the first time.
The last category exploits the features of wireless traffic to detect the presence
of rogue APs [3 9 ,5 7 ,8 6 ,9 3 ]. In [39], a practical timing based schem e is proposed.
The method employs the round trip time between user and local D N S server to
detect rogue APs without assistance from network administrators. [84] utilizes the
immediate switch connecting rogue APs to m easure round trip time of T C P traffic.
Other work by [2 4 ,7 6] uses the spacing between packets to distinguish wireless
networks from wired networks.

In [86], inter-arrival time of A CK -pair is used to

detect rogue APs. In [93], wired verifier and wireless sniffers are deployed at the
same time to detect layer-3 rogue APs. Since we consider a new type of rogue AP,
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it is unclear whether previous solutions could work in vehicular networks. Although
some schemes might work, it may spend much time on analyzing the network traffic.
Our solution is more efficient and user-centric.

3.3

Adversary model

Vehicular rogue APs considered in this chapter are set up in moving vehicles by
malicious attackers. The goal of the rogue AP is to induce clients to connect. If
any client associates to a vehicular rogue AP, the adversaries succeed. Several
assumptions are described as follows.
(1) W e assume the vehicular rogue APs and vehicular clients stay on the same
lane of a road and follow traffic.

In other words, the relative distance between

a rogue AP and a client will not change too much. The vehicular rogue APs on
the opposite lane are not considered, because the time window for them to launch
further attacks is extremely limited. Even though som e clients may associate to the
rogue APs on the other lane by accident, they will quickly move out of the range.
(2) Previous work [39] assumes that rogue APs have to connect to existing le
gitimate APs to access Internet, so they suffer from multi-hop wireless transmission
and are slower than legitimate APs. Here we do not hold this assumption, as well as
any other assumptions about the back-end infrastructure for vehicular rogue APs
to access Internet.
(3) W e assume that rogue APs are able to transmit any packet with arbitrary
tx power and inject packets with any content.

For example, the adversary can

generate fake re-associate fram es to force clients to re-select APs immediately,
and provide whatever fake information to clients.
(4) W e assume the adversary cannot modify the firmware of wireless cards. For
example, the rogue AP cannot control Ack fram es. Although Ack frames can be
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generated by software, they cannot be sent back to clients within pre-determined
Ack timeout. It is mentioned that the time interval between data and Ack is a SIFS
(10 fis in 80 2.1 1g [82]). Software (not firmware) Ack cannot be prepared within
such a short interval [62],
(5)

W e do not consider the Drive-thru Internet is capable of using R AD IU S-

based 8 0 2 .1X authentication of users, since it requires each vehicle to have the
correct key to access the network. W hile this may be possible, for example, every
car when registered with the D M V is issued the appropriate credentials, it is unclear
how well this will work in practice. Thus, we only consider the open 802.11 network
where any car can connect.
Based on these assumptions, the adversary can launch two types of attacks.

Basic attack.

In the basic attack, vehicular rogue APs broadcast beacons

with the maximum tx power. The maximum power will lead to the strongest sig
nal strength with which the vehicular rogue APs have most probability to attract
users to connect. The advantage of the basic attack is its easy setup. Without
any complicated configuration, the basic attack can be launched anytime and any
where.

Advanced attack. The major difference between the advanced attack and the
basic attack is that the former attack needs background preparation before creating
a vehicular rogue AP. For example, the adversary could first drive along the road as
a client to profile R SS values from existing roadside APs, and then tune tx power to
make the signal strength received by nearby clients similar to the profiled values. By
doing so, RSS-based solution cannot work well, because the R S S values measured
by the clients appear like "real". Com pared to the basic attack, the advanced attack
is more time-consuming, but is more difficult to be detected.
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3.4

Our Solution

The algorithms for detecting basic attacks and advanced attacks are presented
separately. In both algorithms, each AP needs to broadcast its physical location
such as G P S coordinates. Since the IEEE 802.11 standards allow adding arbitrary
information elements with variable-length in beacons, the G P S information can be
easily included in beacons which are broadcasted by every AP periodically. To
determine AP's location, the network administrator can resort to an external G PS
module and measure it offline. Upon receiving a beacon, clients know the AP's
location. If any AP refuses to expose its G P S location, the client will never connect
to that AP for security consideration. For a legitimate AP, it always reports its actual
GPS coordinates which indicate a fixed location alongside the road. However, a
vehicular rogue AP is afraid of reporting its true G PS location, because that location
indicates such an AP is always moving on the road. A user can easily detect it
and avoid connecting to that AP. Hence the vehicular rogue A P has to forge G PS
location to escape from the simple detection. The problem of detecting rogue APs
is then converted to the problem of verifying whether an AP lies on its G P S location.
Any AP who lies on its location is deem ed as a rogue AP; otherwise, it is a legitimate
AP.

3.4.1

Defending against basic attacks

First, w e present the algorithm to defend against basic attacks. The basic idea of
this algorithm is to leverage R SS on the client side to verify w hether the rogue AP
lies on its location. Since the rogue A P is not physically at the reported location, the
RSS values should be able to tell the difference especially when the car is always
moving. The intuition is shown in Fig. 3.2. Suppose a vehicular client moves on a
road and receives m beacons at different places. The RSS value of each beacon
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Figure 3.2: Intuition of defending against basic attacks, where a vehicular client needs to
measure RSS and its own GPS location at multiple places
is denoted as rss* where i e [1,• • • ,m ], and each location gpsi indicates the exact
location where the beacon is received. Thus, based on AP's reported location gpsap
and its own gpsit the client can continuously compute the distance between the AP
and itself (i.e., dx, d2, • • • , dm). On the other hand, the distance can also be inferred
from RSS values. If the distances computed from G P S coordinates significantly
differ from those inferred from RSS values, that AP is highly likely to be a vehicular
rogue AP.

How to infer the distance from RSS? W e adopt a widely used log-distance
propagation model to characterize the relationship between distance and R SS. In
this model, the received signal power decreases logarithmically with distance and
it is expressed as
(3.1)
where Pt is referred to as transmit power of the sender, Pr (d) is the received sig
nal strength at a distance of d, and c is a correction constant which captures the
effects of transmit frequency, antenna gains of both sender and receiver, as well
as other factors in the environment. The path loss exponent 7 determines the rate
of attenuation when the signal propagating through the space, which is dependent
on the propagation environment. A larger

7

m eans the environment is lossy and

will cause the fall of RSS faster with distance.
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In the scale of decibel (dB), Eq. 3.1 can be rewritten as

Pr (d) = Pt + c - 107 log 10(d) +

(3.2)

which depicts a linear relationship between RSS and the logarithmical distance.
The newly introduced X$ is a random variable with zero mean, which reflects the
attenuation caused by flat fading [31]. Such a log-distance model has been verified
to predict RSS well in various locations including outdoor scenario by previous re
search [65] and our real world experiments. However, the model parameters (i.e.,
c and

7

) should be adjusted according to specific outdoor space. As mentioned

in [41,65], 7 normally ranges from 2 to 6 , where 2 is for propagation in free space
and 6 is for heavily lossy environment.

Overview of algorithm. The overview of the algorithm is described in Algo
rithm 3. For each AP that a client tries to associate to, this algorithm is performed
to test whether such an AP is a rogue AP. The inputs of the algorithm are gpsap, time
series data rss, and gpsi where i e [1, 2, • • • , m ). Nam ely gpsap denotes the reported
location of the tested AP, rss* is the received signal strength of the ith beacon, and
gpsi is the location of the client where the ?th beacon is received. The param eter m

determines the number of samples dem anded to perform the algorithm. Now let us
assume all inputs are available. Later, we will elaborate how to obtain them. The
output of the algorithm is either true or false, which means the tested AP is a rogue
AP or not respectively. Initially, the client computes the distance dt between the
reported location of the AP and itself (from line 1 to line 3). Next, r s s t and d* are fit
into Eq. 3.2 to estimate the parameter
7

7

using least square method. If the value of

is within the normal range from 2 to 6 , the algorithm terminates and returns false

otherwise true.
Fig. 3.3 illustrates an example of the least square fit of the samples collected
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Algorithm 3 Detecting Basic R ogue A P s
Input: gpsap, rs s i and gpsi where i € [1,2 , • • • , m ]
Output: true or false

1: for k = 1 to m do
2:
d{ = \\gpsap - gpsi\\
3: end for
4: Use least square fit of < rs s u
> to estimate 7
5: if 7 falls into the range from 2 to 6 then
6:
Return false
7: else
8:
Return true
9: end if
-4 5

Measured samples
Least square fit

-5 0
-5 5

-7 0
-7 5
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the least square fit of the measured samples collected from a real
roadside AP
from a real roadside AP. As we see, the estimated param eter

7

indeed falls into the

normal range from 2 to 6 . W e also tested many other APs using different devices
and in varying environment. They all have similar results, but most vehicular rogue
APs yield out-of-range results. The results are presented in Section 3.5.

How to obtain GPS and RSS? W hen receiving a beacon, a client can m ea
sure its R S S value. However, the frequency of G P S update in practice is much
slower than that of receiving a beacon. For exam ple, most commercial G PS mod
ules update G PS coordinates less than 1 Hz, whereas a client m ay receive about
10 beacons within 1 second. It then raises a problem of how to assign a location for
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each beacon. To address this problem, w e assume that the client did not change
the speed during the interval of G P S update. This is true, because the interval is
very small so that the speed diversity can be ignored. Next w e apply interpolation
on G PS data. Suppose two G PS updates occur at timestamps u and t j t and the co
ordinates change from g p s fa ) to g p s (tj). Between them, the client receives several
beacons with rs s k where i < k < j . To estimate gps(tk), w e have

gps(tk) = gps(ti) + (g p s (tj) - g p s fc )) ■ [k
Zj

T>i

How to deal with RSS noise? Due to many reasons such as dynamic envi
ronment interference, the measured R SS may suffer from som e extrem e values.
With these abnormal values the model parameters may be estimated inaccurately.
Therefore, w e have to filter out them before applying the least square fit. The pro
cess is simple as follows: the client checks consecutive three R S S values. If the
difference between the median value and the average of its prior and following val
ues exceeds a threshold r , the median value is replaced by the average value.
Heuristically, we set r to 5 dBm.

How to determine the number of samples? The number of samples m affects
the time duration and the accuracy of the detection. A larger m typically leads to a
more accurate result but costs longer time to finish. To determine m, w e propose a
method that can adaptively involve more samples until the estimated parameter

7

becomes stable. In the approach, once an AP is first discovered, the client keeps
measuring R SS in background. Every time duration A t (second), all the accumu
lated RSS values for that AP are fitted into Eq. 3.2 to estimate
change within a threshold 9 for continuous two A t,

7

7

. If

7

does not

is deem ed to be stable and

we stop to involve more samples. This method works well in practice by setting
At =

1

and 9 = 0.5. The experiment results are presented in Section 3.5.
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3.4.2

Defending against advanced attacks

As mentioned in Section 3.3, by profiling in advance, a sophisticated rogue AP is
able to tune tx power to mimic the R SS trend of a roadside AP. In this case, the de
tection cannot merely rely on R SS values because they appear like "real". Hence,
our algorithm for basic attacks cannot work. It is much more challenging than de
fending against basic attacks, because the adversary is more sophisticated. In this
section, we present a novel user-side algorithm for defending against advanced
attacks. This algorithm demand clients to send probe requests to the AP and per
form a series of lie-detection tests. Note that this algorithm is complementary to the
previous algorithm. They can be combined together to make the detection more
accurate.

Background. Before presenting the detail, let us first introduce some back
ground knowledge. In wireless communication, the transmission distance that can
be achieved between two wireless devices is influenced by the tx power of the
sender and the rx sensitivity of the receiver. Out of this distance, the receiver can
not receive packets correctly. As a sender, there are two ways to adjust the trans
mission distance in purpose. Tweaking tx power is one of them. Fig. 3.4 shows
RSS values versus various tx powers at distance of one meter between a sender
and a receiver in our experiments. As w e see, the average R SS values decrease
linearly with tx power. That means large tx power leads to long communication
distance.
Using rx sensitivity is another way to change the transmission distance. With
greater rx sensitivity, the device is able to receive w eaker signals, thus owning
longer transmission distance. In particular, rx sensitivity is influenced by data rate
which is controlled by the sender. Different data rate achieved by different mod
ulation schemes requires different rx sensitivity. W hen RSS value is less than rx
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Figure 3.4: Average RSS values versus varying tx powers
Rates (Mbps)

6
9

12
18
24
36
48
54

Standard
802.11a/g
802.11a/g
802.11a/g
80 2.1 1a/g
802.11a/g
802.11a/g
802.11a/g
802.11a/g

Modulation
B PS K /O FD M
B PS K /O FD M
Q P S K /O FD M
Q P S K /O FD M
Q A M -16/O F D M
Q A M -16/O F D M
Q A M -64/O F D M
Q A M -64/O F D M

Rx sensitivity (dBm)
-82
-81
-79
-77
-74
-70

-66
-65

Table 3.1: Modulations for 802.11a/g
sensitivity, the packet cannot be demodulated correctly. Table 3.1 presents an ex
ample of mapping between data rate (modulation) and rx sensitivity for each data
rate supported in 80 2.1 1a/g networks. It is seen that a fast data rate typically re
quires a large rx sensitivity, thus leading to a short communication distance.

Intuition. Given a certain tx power and data rate, the communication range
between the client and the AP is determined. If the reported location yields a sig
nificant departure from that range, there should be something wrong. For example,
an AP claims far away from the client, but it can receive packets with very low tx
powers and high data rates. Such an A P is likely to be a rogue AP. The client her
self could perform this test according to the reported location of the AP. However,
the problem is that different AP may have different rx sensitivity for each data rate,
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which may affect the correctness of the test. For instance, the succuss in receiving
a packet with low tx power and high data rate may be due to a powerful antenna
rather than a short distance. To cope with this problem, our algorithm choose a
different strategy that the client will test each AP with a vector of power-and-rate
combinations in the order from the low-power/high-rate end to the high-power/lowrate end.

In this vector, the AP could receive the packets at the beginning but

fail after a certain combination. Such a combination is labeled as the boundary of
the vector, which reflects the communication distance. After testing several times,
if the client finds that the reported distance changes a lot but the boundary rarely
changes, then such an AP is deem ed as a rogue AP. The rationale behind this idea
is that the relative distance between a legitimate roadside AP and a client changes
when the client is moving on the road, but the distance between a mobile rogue AP
and the client never changes so much.

Overview of the algorithm. Algorithm 4 describes the detail. The procedure
send_probe_requests is used to send probe requests with varying tx powers and
data rates to test an AP. Instead of exhausting all the combinations, we only picks
a subset to reduce the finish time. Suppose the maximum tx power of a client is
p w r max = 27dBm , then the power set is {7 d B m , 17d B m , 27d B m } . The selected rate
set is always limited to {54Mbps, 48Mbps, 36Mbps, 24M bps), since it can separate
the 10dBm difference well. The vector of combinations is as follow:

{7 d B m /5 4 M b p s , 7 d B m /4 8 M b p s , 7 d B m /2 4 M b p s , • • • , 27d B m /2 4 M b p s ).

It should be noticed that according to our experiments the current ordering of the
vector strictly follows the communication distance from short to long . For each
combination, the client sends several probe requests to the AP. If more than half
of packets got Ack back, such an combination is deem ed as receivable else non-
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Algorithm 4 Detecting A dvanced R ogue A P s
procedure: send_probe_requests
p w rs e t 4 - { p w r max% 1 0 , p w r max% 10 + 10,•■• , p w r max}
ra te se t <- {54,48,36,24}
for i = 1 to s iz e (p w rs e t) * s iz e (ra te s e t) do
Set tx power to p w r s e t \ c e il( siIe(i^ ^ )]
Set data rate to r a te s e t[i% s iz e ( r a te s e t )]
Send n probe requests to A P with tx power and data rate above. If more than
half receive Ack back, then V[ i ) = 1; Otherwise, V[ i ] = 0

end for
1: if AP is first discovered (weak R S S) then
2: Call send_probe to obtain a vector V
3: end if
4: if client intends to associate to that AP (strong R S S ) then
5:
Call send_probe to obtain another vector V '
6 : end if
7: Find the boundary in both V and V ' such that the ratio of 1 to the number of
elements before the boundary and the ratio of 0 to the number of elements after
the boundary are maximized.
8: if b o u n d a ry (V ) — b o u n d a r y ( V ') < th r e s h o ld then
9:
Such an AP is a rogue AP
10: end if

receivable, denoted by 1 or 0 separately. Based on this vector, the boundary is
computed such that the ratio of 1 to the number of elements before the boundary
and the ratio of 0 to the number of elem ents after the boundary are maximized.
In the algorithm, the client calls this procedure twice: once at the time when first
discovering the AP (weak R SS), and the other time when trying to associate to
that AP (strong RSS). By comparing the boundary of two vectors, if the difference
does not exceed a threshold, the client will never connect to that AP. The reason
is that the physical distance has changed a lot so the boundary difference should
reflect this change. If not, such an AP is deem ed as a rogue AP. In this chapter, we
heuristically set this threshold to 4 based on our experiments.
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3.5

Evaluation

In this section, we present our experimental setup, the methodology and exper
imental results, which attempt to answer the following questions: 1) W hat is the
performance of both basic algorithm and advanced algorithm working in practice?
2) W hat is the time cost of determining whether or not an AP is a rogue AP? 3) How
does the speed of a vehicle affect the performance?

3.5.1

Experimental setup and methodology

The devices used in our experiments are comprised of a roadside AP, a vehicular
rogue AP, and a vehicular client.

Roadside AP. A commercial outdoor AP (Deliberant C PE 2 -1 2 ) was configured
as a roadside AP. The specification of this model can be found in [6], The AP was
mounted on top of a tripod that is 2m high (see the left part of Fig. 3.5). W hen
deploying the AP alongside the road, w e used a G P S receiver (GlobalSat B U-353)
to measure its physical location. To enable broadcasting the G P S information via
beacons, we loaded the AP with OpenW rt [15] firmware and a modified Wi-Fi driver.
The extra content in each beacon has 18 bytes including 1 byte elem ent ID, 1 byte
length, 8 bytes latitude, and 8 bytes longitude.

Vehicular rogue AP. A laptop connected with an external om ni-antenna and
a GPS receiver (see the right part of Fig. 3 .5 ) mounted on the roof of a car was
configured as a vehicular rogue AP. The laptop was running a 2.6.27-generic Linux
kernel with madwifi driver (svn r4128). Similar to the roadside AP, w e modified the
madwifi driver to support GPS broadcast. W e did not set up the Internet access for
all APs, since it does not affect the performance of our algorithms. In basic attacks,
we fixed the tx power by executing command iw co nf i g txpow er [v a lu e ] with the
maximum power value. In advanced attacks, we tried to automatically adjust tx
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Figure 3.5: Experimental setups of a roadside AP (left) and a vehicular rogue AP (right)
power to mimic the real trend of RSS values, but eventually we found that it was re
ally difficulty to make it work in practice. Most of time, the advanced rogue AP could
be detected by our basic algorithm. To ease evaluation, we optimistically assume
the rogue AP can escape from our basic algorithm and evaluate our advanced al
gorithm without changing the tx power of the AP. This is reasonable because our
algorithm does not rely on any configuration of APs.

Vehicular client. The vehicular client used the sam e hardware as the vehicular
rogue AP. The Wi-Fi interface of the client was set to monitor mode which could
capture all the packets in air. Injecting and receiving packets w ere achieved by libpcap. The control of per-packet tx power and data rate w as done by radiotap header.
In Linux, the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer allows arbitrary injected packet composed in
the following format:

[radiotap header] + [ieee80211 header] + [payload].

IEEE80211 _RAD10TAP_RATE and IEEE80211_RADI0TAP_DMB_TX_P0WER in the radio-

tap header are used to control the data rate and the tx power of injected packets.
Given different values, a packet can be transmitted with the desired power and
data rate. Note that to control per-packet tx power, h a l_ tp c must be enabled while
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Name

Notation

AP
Laptop
GPS
Wireless card
Antenna

Deliberant C PE 2-12 based on W D B -500 platform
Lenovo T61 with 2 .0 G H z processor and 1G RAM
GlobalSat B U -353 USB G PS receiver
C B 9-G P Cardbus 802.11a/b/g based on Atheros chipset
7 dBi M A 24-7N magnetic-mount omnidirectional
Table 3.2: Equipment description

loading the madwifi module. Table 3.2 summarizes all the equipm ent used in our
experiments.
The experiments were conducted in a suburban area, w here w e could freely
drive along the road and stop to collect measurem ents. In the experiments, a road
side AP was placed at a parking lot around 60m aw ay from the road. Two cars
configured to be a vehicular rogue AP and a vehicular client w ere driven along
the road passing through the roadside AP. The roadside AP broadcasted its ac
tual GPS location, and the rogue AP broadcasted a location close to the roadside
AP. W e took two sets of experiments to evaluate our vehicular rogue AP detection
schemes. The first set of experiments was used to evaluate the performance of our
basic algorithm, where the client passively listened beacons. The second set was
to evaluate the advanced algorithm, where the client actively sent probe requests
to the AP.

3.5.2

Experimental results

B asic attack evaluation . First, we tested if legitimate roadside APs could pass
our basic algorithm. As an example, Fig. 3.6 illustrates the m easured RSS values
against the logarithmical distance in an experiment. The client started the algorithm
when observing the first beacon from a roadside AP and terminated the algorithm
when 7 was stable. In total, the client collected 110 beacons within 11 seconds.
The estimated 7 was 3.31 eventually, which falls into the valid range from 2 to 6 .
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Figure 3.6: Result of our basic algorithm in the case of a legitimate AP
Therefore, the AP is labeled as a legitimate AP correctly. Although the finish time
seems a little long, it should be noticed that this cost only occurs once when the
client initially turns on the Wi-Fi and tries to find an A P to connect. After that, the
client will wait for a certain period until the signal strength of current AP becomes
weak. Only at that time, the client needs to find another AP for handoff. During the
waiting period, the client should have collected enough RSS values from nearby
APs to determine which APs are rogue APs. To investigate the robustness of our
algorithm, we also conducted experiments in different environments. W e observed
that 7 varied across environments but they all felt into the normal range.
Next, we tested the performance of the algorithm when the tested AP is a rogue
AP. Fig. 3.7 shows the result. As we see, after collecting 90 beacons, 7 was stable
at 1. It is clear that the tested A P is a rogue AP.

Advanced attack evaluation. Fig. 3.8 and Fig. 3 .9 depicts the experimental
results of our advanced algorithm in respect to a legitimate roadside AP and a
vehicular rogue AP. The figure only shows a part of the vector which contains the

0/1 boundary. The first test occurred when the first beacon w as received, and the
second test was performed when the client tried to associate to that AP. It is seen
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Figure 3.7: Results of our basic algorithm in the case of a vehicular rogue AP
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Figure 3.8: Results of our advanced algorithm in case of a roadside AP
that the boundary for a roadside AP changed significantly due to the mobility of the
vehicle. By contrast, the boundary changed little when the tested A P is a rogue AP.
W e also evaluated the performance at different locations. W e observed that our
algorithm could achieve more than 90% accurate to label an A P correctly. Due to
page limit, the results are not presented in this chapter.

Finish time versus vehicle speed. The finish tim e of our basic algorithm is
determined by the duration when 7 becomes stable.

W e have investigated the

finish time and the difference of 7 (the value when the algorithm is terminated to the
ground truth) against different vehicle speeds. The finish time is measured in unit
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Figure 3.9: Results of our advanced algorithm in case of a vehicular rogue AP
20
I
I Finish time
—e—Y difference

0.8

o
CD
</>

15

0.6

CD

.110
0.4

0.2

20 mph

25mph

40mph

0

Figure 3.10: Finish time and 7 difference versus the vehicle speed
of second, and the ground truth of

7

is derived when all beacons (from entering to

leaving the communication range of the A P) are used for least square fit. Fig. 3.10
presents the results. As we see, the faster the speed of vehicle, the quicker the
algorithm can finish. Again, this cost only incurs when the W i-Fi interface is initially
turned on. After that the cost can be amortized by background scan. In addition,
we find our algorithm can estimate

7

accurately. The difference of
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7

is within 0.3.

3.6

Discussion

Our solutions make use of physical characteristic such as path loss and the percent
age of acknowledged tx packets to determine the discrepancy between the rogue
AP's actual location and its reported location. This makes our solutions vulnerable
to the following factors.
One factor is that outdoor wireless condition is unpredictable.

Although our

solution relies on a well-known signal propagation models, it is inevitable that there
will be instances where the actual conditions deviate from the models. W hen this
happens, our solution is not able to detect the rogue AP successfully. W e can
mitigate by adopting a more accurate model in our solution. In addition, it is unclear
how well the adversary can take advantage of this limitation since the adversary is
unable to predict the channel conditions as well. Finally, we have observed that our
solutions may not work as well in some locations w here there are a lot of buildings.
W e will investigate more complex environments and refine our algorithms in our
future work.
Another factor is that the wireless interference may have a negative effect on
the packet reception. It is difficult for a sender to infer that an unsuccessful packet
transmission is caused by either bad signal strength or interference. W hen this
happens, our advanced algorithm may not detect the rogue A P well. However, the
adversary cannot easily utilize this uncontrolled factor to increase the probability of
escaping from the detection. In the future work, w e will study how to reduce the
detection errors caused by the interference.
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3.7

Conclusion

Attacks from vehicular rogue APs have raised a serious security problem for Drivethru Internet. In this chapter, we are the first to demonstrate the feasibility of this
type of rogue APs and present a practical defending scheme to prevent users from
connecting to vehicular rogue APs. W e implement our approach on commercially
available hardware and perform extensive real-world experiments that confirm the
efficacy of our solutions.
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4

Power Saving for Wi-Fi Tethering

The previous chapters discover the guidelines for improving mobile security. How
ever, the concepts of security and energy are closely related with each other. A
system or algorithm design for mobile computing that considers only security but
not energy is unlikely to work well in practice.

If an enhancem ent is at the ex

pense of the energy consumption, it will not be accepted by battery-powered mo
bile devices. In this chapter w e study the problem of how to save power without
compromising the user experience. Our power-efficient system called DozyAP can
significantly reduce the power consumption of mobile devices working as softAPs
in Wi-Fi tethering, while retaining a good user experience.

4.1

Introduction

Wi-Fi tethering, also known as a "mobile hotspot", means sharing the Internet con
nection (e.g., a 3G connection) of an Internet-capable mobile phone with other
devices over W i-Fi. As shown in Figure 4.1, a W i-Fi tethering mobile phone acts
as a mobile software access point (softAP). Other devices such as laptops, tablet
PCs and other mobile phones can connect to the mobile softAP through their Wi-Fi
interfaces. The mobile softAP routes the data packets between its 3G interface and
its Wi-Fi interface. Consequently, all the devices connected to the mobile softAP
are able to access the Internet.
Wi-Fi tethering is highly desired. Main-streaming smartphones including iPhones
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of a typical setting of Wi-Fi tethering
(iOS 4.3+), Android phones (Android 2 .2 + ) and W indows phones (Windows Phone
7.5+) all provide built-in support of Wi-Fi tethering. There w ere also many thirdparty Wi-Fi tethering tools with customized features in App markets. W e believe
there are two main reasons why W i-Fi tethering is so desirable. First, cellular data
networks provide ubiquitous Internet access over the world but the coverage of W i
Fi networks is much limited. Second, it is common for people to own multiple mobile
devices but likely they do not have a dedicated cellular data plan for every device.
As a result, it demands to share a data plan among multiple devices, e.g., sharing
the 3G connection of an iPhone with a Wi-Fi only iPad. Wi-Fi tethering provides a
convenient way to do this.
However, Wi-Fi tethering significantly burdens smartphone's battery. W hen en
abling tethering, the Wi-Fi interface always stays in high power state and never
sleeps even when there is no data traffic going on. This increases the power con
sumption by one order of magnitude and reduces the battery life from days to hours
(more details in Section 4.2.1). To save power, Windows Phone automatically turns
off Wi-Fi tethering if the network is inactive for a time threshold of several minutes.
However, this method has two drawbacks. First, the W i-Fi interface still operates in
a high power state for the idle intervals less than the threshold, leading to waste of
energy. Second, it harms usability. If a user does not generate any traffic for a time
period longer than the threshold (e.g., while reading a long news article) and then
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starts to use the network again (e.g., by clicking another news link), the user will
have to go back to the smartphone and manually re-enable W i-Fi tethering, which
results in poor user experience.
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines the power saving mechanism for wireless
stations in client mode, ad hoc mode, but not in AP mode. That is because tradi
tional APs are externally powered by cables, so that power saving is not an crucial
issue for those APs. However, old wisdom does not work for the battery-powered
smartphones operating in W i-Fi tethering. Hence, it is time to think about how to
save power for smartphones working as softAPs.
Recently, Wi-Fi Direct specification introduces a power saving protocol for Wi-Fi
Direct devices acting as APs. The protocol operates in the m edia access control
(MAC) Layer and allows APs to notify clients with newly defined m essages when
they are going to sleep. However, existing 802.11 devices including most smart
phones cannot benefit from the new feature supplied by Wi-Fi Direct. Future mobile
devices may have a chipset that can support Wi-Fi Direct. However, due to the lack
of the programmability of Wi-Fi chipsets in Wi-Fi industry, a device vendor still may
find it difficult to implement its own tethering solution independent of the one deliv
ered by the chipset vendor. In this chapter, we propose a new approach for device
vendors and software developers to implement a power-efficient W i-Fi tethering so
lution without underlying support. To demonstrate its efficacy, w e design DozyAP,
a system to reduce power consumption of W i-Fi tethering on smartphones while
still retaining a good user experience.
The key idea of DozyAP is to put the Wi-Fi interface of a softAP into sleep to
save power. W e measured the traffic pattern of various online applications used
in Wi-Fi tethering. W e find that the W i-Fi network is idle for a large portion of total
application time (more details in Section 4.2.2), which means the AP could sleep
during this idle time. Furthermore, w e know that the cellular interface is typically
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slower than Wi-Fi interface. Thus, the Wi-Fi interface of a softAP could sleep while
waiting for the data transmission through the cellular network. All of these indicates
there are many opportunities to reduce softAP's power consumption. With DozyAP,
a softAP can automatically sleep to save power when the network is idle and wake
up on demand if the network becomes active again.
Putting a softAP into sleep imposes two challenges.

First, without a careful

design, it may cause packet loss. Existing Wi-Fi clients assume that APs are always
available for receiving packets, so whenever a client receives an outgoing packet
from applications, it will immediately send the packet to its AP. However, if the AP
is in the sleep mode, this packet will be lost, even after the retries that occur at
the low layers of the network stack. Second, putting an AP to sleep will introduce
increased network latency and may impair user experience if the extra latency is
user perceivable.
DozyAP addresses the first challenge with a sleep request-response protocol
with which a softAP and its clients negotiate and agree on a valid sleep schedule.
To avoid possible packet loss, a client will transmit packets only when the softAP is
active and buffer outgoing packets otherwise. To address the second challenge, we
design an adaptive sleep scheme and limit the maximum sleep duration. Conse
quently, DozyAP is able to reduce power consumption of Wi-Fi tethering with negli
gible impact on the network performance. DozyAP does not require any changes to
the 802.11 protocol and is incrementally deployable via software updates to mobile
devices.
W e have implemented the DozyAP system on existing commercial smartphones
and evaluated its performance using various applications and the traces from real
users. Evaluation results show that DozyAP can put the Wi-Fi interface of a softAP
to sleep for up to 88 % of the total time in several different applications. Due to
the restricted programmability of current Wi-Fi hardware on smartphones, forcing a
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softAP to sleep or wake up consumes considerable overhead. Thus, DozyAP only
saves power by up to 33% while increasing network latency by less than 5.1% .
It is noticed that tethering can be also enabled by USB, bluetooth and Wi-Fi
in ad-hoc mode. However, USB tethering has drawbacks that can only support
one client. Also, connecting phones to devices such as tablets is not easy due to
the constrained interface and complicated system configuration. Bluetooth suffers
high energy consumption per bit transmission cost and low bandwidth [74], thus
consuming more energy than W i-Fi. Ad-hoc mode of W i-Fi is less used than the in
frastructure mode in practice. The O S on many mobile devices including Windows
phones, Android phones and iPhones hides such a mode, preventing a device from
connecting to an ad hoc network [87]. Due to the above reasons, those tethering
methods are out of scope of this dissertation.
To the best of our knowledge, w e are the first to study the power efficiency of a
softAP in Wi-Fi tethering. The main contributions of this chapter are:
• W e study the characteristics of existing Wi-Fi tethering and present our find
ings. W e show that current Wi-Fi tethering is power hungry, wasting energy
unnecessarily. W e analyze the traffic patterns of various applications and
identify many opportunities to optimize the power consumption of Wi-Fi teth
ering.
• W e propose DozyAP to improve power efficiency of Wi-Fi tethering. W e de
sign a simple yet reliable sleep protocol to schedule a mobile softAP to sleep
without requiring tight time synchronization between the softAP and its clients.
W e develop a two-stage adaptive sleep algorithm to allow a mobile softAP to
automatically adapt to the traffic load for the best sleep schedule.
• W e implement DozyAP system on commercially available off-the-shelf (C O T S )
smartphones and evaluate its performance through experiments with real ap-
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plications and simulations based on real user traces. Evaluation results show
that DozyAP is able to significantly reduce power consumption of W i-Fi teth
ering and retain comparable user experience at the same time.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4 .2 w e report our
findings on existing Wi-Fi tethering, with focus on the power consumption and the
traffic patterns of various applications. Based on the findings, in Section 4.3 we
design DozyAP that can schedule a mobile softAP to sleep, and present the design
details. W e describe our implementation in Section 4 .4 and evaluate it in Section
4.5. W e discuss limitations of DozyAP and future work in Section 4.6, survey the
related work in Section 4.7, and conclude in Section 4.8.

4.2

Understanding Wi-Fi Tethering

In this section we report our findings on the characteristics of W i-Fi tethering through
real measurements on existing commercial smartphones. W e focus on two char
acteristics: the power consumption and the traffic pattern of various online applica
tions used in Wi-Fi tethering. Furthermore, we provide some background on Wi-Fi
power m anagement to set up the context of our DozyAP design.

4.2.1

Power Consumption

W e first measure the power consumption of existing commercial smartphones re
garding the Wi-Fi tethering. W e impose no traffic but simply turn on/off the Wi-Fi
tethering, i.e., the Wi-Fi interface and the 3G interface were kept on but idle. W e
used a Nexus One phone (Android 2.3.6), a H TC H D 7 Windows Phone (Windows
Phone 7.5) and an iPhone 4 (iOS 4 .3 .5 ) for experiments. For the Nexus One and
the HTC HD7, we measured the power consumption of the whole system using a
Monsoon Power Monitor [12]. However, it is impossible to use the Monsoon Power
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Figure 4.2: Measured power consumption of Wi-Fi tethering on Nexus One and HTC HD7
without background traffic
Monitor to measure the power consumption of the iPhone without damaging the
phone. Instead, w e used MyWi 5.0 [13], a very popular third-party Wi-Fi tether
ing tool on iOS that is able to tell the draining current of the battery, to measure
the power consumption of the iPhone 4 when Wi-Fi tethering is enabled. In all the
experiments, the display was turned off.
With Wi-Fi tethering disabled, the power consumption of all smartphones was
pretty low, because the Wi-Fi and 3G interfaces were in sleep for most of the time.
The average power consumption was only 20m W for the Nexus One and 30m W
for the HTC HD7, respectively. For the iPhone 4, MyWi read a draining current of

6 mA, equivalently a power consumption of 22mW .
With Wi-Fi tethering enabled, the power consumption of the smartphones in
creased significantly. Figure 4.2 shows the results of the Nexus O ne and the HTC
HD7 smartphones. W e can see that both smartphones operated in a high power
state constantly even though there was no traffic at all. There are periodic spikes in
the plots, caused by periodic Wi-Fi beacon transmissions. On average the power
consumption was 270m W for the Nexus One and 3 0 2 m W fo r the H TC HD7. For the
iPhone 4, MyWi read a draining current of 90mA, equivalently a power consump
tion of 333mW. While software reading may not be as accurate as the Monsoon
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Power Monitor, the result still clearly indicates that W i-Fi tethering on the iPhone
4 has similar power consumption as on the Nexus O n e and the H TC HD7. Also,
we tested phones with the latest OS versions such as Android v4.x. The power
consumption was similar.
The above results demonstrate that existing W i-Fi tethering schemes on all the
three mobile platforms are power hungry. T h ey consume an order o f magnitude
more pow er than necessary when there is no ongoing traffic, i.e., in idle network
state. In next subsection w e will show that such idle states occurs frequently in
various typical Internet access scenarios.
Intuitively, the Wi-Fi interface should be put to sleep when the W i-Fi network
is idle. As the battery is a very scarce resource on smartphones, this calls for a
power-efficient Wi-Fi tethering solution and motivates us to conduct the work in this
chapter.

4.2.2

Traffic Pattern

Next, w e study how frequently the W i-Fi network is actually in an idle state and
how long the idle state typically lasts. W e enabled W i-Fi tethering on a Nexus One
smartphone with a China Unicom 3G connection. A Wi-Fi client is connected to
such a mobile softAP. On the client side, we launched various applications to ac
cess the Internet and they are used normally. In the meantime, w e used a Lenovo
T61 laptop running Linux 2 .6.32 as a Wi-Fi sniffer to capture all the packets ex
changed between the client and the softAP. W e studied two different clients: a
Nexus One smartphone and a Wi-Fi version iPad 2. Seven applications were m ea
sured including news reading, online book reading, video streaming, search, Map,
email and RSS.
Note that some websites detect the type of client devices and return different
content for different device types. For exam ple, when the Nexus O ne smartphone
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Probability of sleeping for 100ms after an idle threshold.
is used, Baidu News automatically redirects to its mobile version that returns less
complex webpages than the normal version. Similarly, Youku streams low bitrate
video clips to the Nexus One smartphone but high bitrate ones of the sam e videos
to the iPad 2. As a result, the same application may behave differently on different
devices. For each application, we study the traffic patterns by analyzing the packet
inter-arrival time of all the captured packets.
Figure 4.3 shows the results of the Nexus One. Due to the space limitation, we
omit the iPad 2 case which also has similar results. W e first study the distribution of
packet inter-arrival intervals in the total application time which indicates the period
from the first packet to the last one. The left figure in Figure 4 .3 shows the Cumu
lative Distribution Function (C D F ) for all the applications, where the y-axis depicts
the percentage of packets with inter-packet intervals less than or equal to a specific
value in the x-axis to the total application time. To m ake the curves easy to read,
we only show the data for the time intervals less than one second. W e can see that
the intervals under 200m s only take less than 30% of the total application time for
all the applications on the Nexus One. For the iPad 2, the corresponding number
is 35% . For some applications, these intervals consume as low as 20% or even
less than 10% on the Nexus One or the iPad 2. If w e consider the network "idle"
during the packet inter-arrival intervals larger than 200 ms, then w e can say that the
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Wi-Fi network was idle for 70% -9 0 % of the total application time. This shows that
these applications only spent a small portion of time for the Internet access and
their network traffic is very sparse and bursty.
There are two main reasons for the above findings. First, all the applications
consist of two phases: a content fetching phase and a content consuming phase.
Once users download some content from a remote server (e.g., a W eb server), they
need to spend time to consume the content (e.g., reading the text). The content
consuming time may vary from seconds to tens of seconds to even minutes. During
such a time, the network is mostly idle. In the email case, replying to emails and
composing new ones also result in significant network idle time.

Secondly, the

bandwidth of 3G is much lower than that of W i-Fi. According to 3GTest [45], 3G
typically offers 500Kbps-1Mbps downlink throughput for US carriers but the Wi-Fi
offers much higher data rates (54Mbps for 802.11a/g and 300M bps for 8 0 2 .11n).
Furthermore, 3G has much higher RTTs, ranging from 200m s to 500m s [45], than
that of Wi-Fi. Consequently, the W i-Fi interface of a softAP in W i-Fi tethering often
has to wait for data to be received from or transmitted over 3G. Such a waiting
period will put the Wi-Fi interface in an "idle" state.
While the results are somehow as expected for those interactive applications,
we are surprised to see that similar patterns were observed in the video streaming
case. Even for the iPad 2 on which a high bitrate video clip was continuously played
back, the packet inter-arrival intervals larger than 200 ms took more than 60% of the
total streaming time. After carefully checking the captured trace, w e found that it
used a large video buffer when streaming video clips. It aggressively downloaded
video content until the video buffer was full. Then it stopped video downloading.
The downloaded bits were constantly consumed and drained from the buffer. Once
the buffer level became lower than a threshold, the aggressive downloading was
resumed again.
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The large percentage of the Wi-Fi idle time in these applications demonstrates
that there are many opportunities to reduce the power consumption of Wi-Fi tether
ing. During the large network idle intervals, the W i-Fi interface of a mobile softAP
should sleep to save power. More specifically, there are two kinds of network idle
intervals that we exploit in this chapter. The first one is the long network idle inter
vals resulting from the user content consuming behavior. The second one is the
relatively shorter network idle intervals that occur during the content downloading.
The latter case is mainly caused by the RTTs of 3G: after a client sends a request
packet to a remote server, it has to wait for at least a RTT of 3G to get the first
response packet from the server. For example, to access a W eb server, we can
typically see two such network idle intervals: one for the DNS name lookup for the
server and the other for making a T C P connection to the server.
W e further study how putting a softAP to sleep can affect the network perfor
mance. The middle figure in Figure 4 .3 shows the C D F of packet inter-arrival inter
val in total packets, where the y-axis depicts the percentage of the packets whose
inter-packet interval is less than or equal to a specific value in the x-axis to the total
number of packets. W e can see that the inter-packet intervals under 150ms cover
more than 80% of all the packets for all the applications. For some applications the
number is as high as 90% or even 95% . This means that if we use an idle threshold
of 150ms to decide whether to put the softAP to sleep or not, most of the packets
will not be affected. The right figure in Figure 4 .3 further shows the probability that
the softAP could successfully sleep for extra 100ms after waiting for different idle
thresholds. W e found that 150ms was a good threshold to optimize the energy
saving and minimize the incurred network latency in terms of sleeping probability
and the number of involved packets.
All the above findings demonstrate that a mobile softAP could and should sleep
to save power in Wi-Fi tethering, which provides the foundation for our DozyAP
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design.

4.2.3

Background: Wi-Fi Power Saving

The IEEE 802.11 standard defines a Power Saving M ode (P S M ) to save power for
Wi-Fi clients [16]. In PSM , the Wi-Fi interface of a client always stays in a very low
power state to save power and cannot receive or transmit any data. If an AP needs
to send some packets to a client in PSM , the AP will first buffer the packet and
set the Traffic Indication Map (TIM ) in its beacons, which are broadcasted typically
every 100ms. A PSM client periodically (i.e., every a certain number of beacon
intervals) wakes up to listen to beacons.

If the client detects a TIM for itself, it

sends a individual PS-Poll frame to notify the AP of sending a buffered packet.
Otherwise, it goes to sleep immediately. W hen the AP transmits a buffered packet
to the client, a M O R E flag in the header of the data fram e is set if the A P has more
packets for the client. This allows the client to decide when to stop sending PS-Poll
frames.
On the Nexus One, the above static PSM scheme is called "PM_MAX". PM _M A X
allows a client to sleep as long as the A P does not have any packet for it. However,
this leads to long network latency and hence low network efficiency. Therefore,
on the Nexus One, another power saving scheme called "PM _FAST" is used. In
PM_FAST, a client stays in active unless its W i-Fi interface is idle for a threshold of
200ms. Then it sends a Null-Data fram e with power m anagem ent flag set to 1 to
tell its AP that it will sleep soon. If such a fram e is acknowledged, the client is able
to go to sleep since all packets destined for it will be buffered at AP. Otherwise, the
client cannot go to sleep. Once the client detects a T IM for itself from beacons, it
notifies the AP that it is active and ready to receive packets by a single Null-Data
frame with power m anagement flag set to 0. Many other Wi-Fi devices today also
implement a similar scheme known as adaptive PSM [50]. P M _FA S T is designed
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Figure 4.4: Interaction of a softAP and a client using the sleep request-response protocol
for fast system response and P M _M A X is more suitable for background services.
By default Nexus One smartphones use P M _FA S T if the screen is on and switch
to PM _M A X if the screen is turned off.

4.3

DozyAP Design

Guided by the findings in Section 4.2, w e design the DozyAP system that aims to
reduce the power consumption of Wi-Fi tethering by putting the W i-Fi interface of
a mobile softAP into sleep mode whenever possible. Below w e present the detail
of DozyAP and the rationale of the design decisions. W e start with a single client
and describe the extension to support multiple clients later on.

4.3.1

Scheduling a SoftAP to Sleep

W e design a simple sleep request-response protocol to enable a mobile softAP to
safely sleep in Wi-Fi tethering according to its own best schedule. W hile the softAP
can sleep at will, it can only do so when the client agrees, to avoid possible packet
loss. Therefore, before entering sleep mode, a softAP sends a sleep request to its
client. If the client sends back a sleep response to accept the sleep request, the
softAP then enters the sleep mode. Otherwise, it will continue to stay in the active
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T
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0x1: sleep request
0x2: sleep response

Figure 4.5: Packet format o f the sleep protocol.
state. Figure 4.4 shows a typical interaction procedure between a softAP and a
client. At time t u the softAP decides to sleep and enters sleep m ode at time t2 after
receiving the client's agreement. W hen the sleep times out at time t3, the softAP
wakes up and continues to communicate with the client.
P acket form at. Both the sleep request and the sleep response are transmitted
as a normal Wi-Fi unicast data packet. This design does not require any modifi
cation on existing Wi-Fi standard and is easy to implement. Figure 4 .5 shows the
packet format. The sleep protocol is implemented directly on top of the underlying
link layer without T C P /IP headers in the middle to reduce the overhead. The sleep
protocol packets have three fields. The "Type" field indicates the packet type: "0x1"
means sleep request and "0x2" means sleep response. The "Sequence Number"
field is a unique ID to identify a sleep request-response pair. It starts from zero and
increases by one for every new sleep request. The "Time Duration" field specifies
how long (in milliseconds) the softAP requests to sleep. All the sequence numbers
and time durations are decided by the softAP. W hen the client accepts a sleep
request, it simply copies the sequence number and time duration from the sleep
request packet into its sleep response packet. Sleep response packets are used
only for accepting a sleep request. If the client does not agree the softAP to sleep,
it simply chooses not to send out the sleep response. There is only one case that
the client will decline the sleep request of the softAP: it has more data packets to
transmit. In that case, the client will send a data packet, instead of the sleep re
sponse packet, to the softAP. The softAP then learns that the client has declined the
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sleep request and thus stays active. This design reduces the overhead of the sleep
protocol because a sleep response packet is transmitted only when it is necessary.
S tate m achine. Figure 4 .6 shows the state machine of a softAP and a client.
A softAP has three states: Normal, Pre-sleep and Sleep. In the Norm al state, the
softAP is active and can transmit and receive packets normally. W hen the Wi-Fi
interface of the softAP is idle for a time period larger than a pre-defined threshold,
the softAP sends a sleep request packet to its client with a sequence number seq
and a time duration d u r. Then it enters the Pre-sleep state and waits for a sleep
response. If it receives the right sleep response with the sam e sequence number
seq and time duration dur, it will put its W i-Fi interface into sleep mode and enter
the Sleep state; if it receives any packet other than the expected sleep response,
it will go back to the Normal state and invalidate the sleep request. In the Sleep
state, the Wi-Fi interface of the softAP is turned to sleep to save power. Thus,
the softAP cannot receive any packets over W i-Fi. If it receives any data from its
3G interface, it will buffer them during the whole period of Sleep state. W hen the
sleep timeout expires and some data are buffered, the softAP wakes up its Wi-Fi
interface, switches to Norm al state, and transmits the buffered data to the client.
Otherwise, it moves back to the Pre-sleep state, sends out another sleep request
with a new sequence number n e w js e q and a new time duration n e w _ d u r, and waits
for the next sleep response.
The state machine of a client has only two states: Normal and Block. In the
Normal state, the client communicates with the softAP as normal. It may use any
Wi-Fi power saving schemes such as P M _M A X , PM _FA ST or none. If the client
receives a sleep request from the softAP and agrees, i.e., it does not have any
packets to transmit, it tentatively sets its Wi-Fi power saving schem e to PM _M AX,
sends back a sleep response to the softAP, and enters the Block state. Note that by
switching to PM _M AX, the firmware automatically sends a Null-Data frame to tell
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Normal

Event: rx sleep_resp(seq, dur)
Action: put Wi-Fi interface to sleep

Event: sleep timeout but no buffered packets
Action: wake up Wi-Fi interface and send
sleep_req(new_seq, new_dur)

Event: rx steep_req(seq, dur) and no buffered packets
Action: set PS scheme and send back sleep_resp(seq, dur)

Block

Normal

Event: sleep timeout or rx any packet
Action: restore PS scheme

Figure 4.6: State machine for a softAP (top) and a client (bottom)
the softAP that the client is going to sleep. Do this way, the client can go to sleep
as quickly as possible (i.e., immediately after the sleep response).

In contrast,

if a client that uses PM _FA ST does not change to P M _M A X before sending the
sleep response, it will wait for 200m s idle period to send out a Null-Data frame.
However, as the softAP has already entered the Sleep state once receiving the
sleep response, it cannot receive the Null-Data fram e afterwards. As a result, the
Null-Data frame is not acknowledged and the client cannot go to sleep as supposed.
Therefore, it is essential for clients to switch to P M _M A X to maximally save power.
In the Block state, the Wi-Fi interface of the client is in power saving mode and the
client knows that the softAP is sleeping. Thus, it blocks all the packet transmissions
by buffering all the packets from applications. If the sleep schedule times out or the
client receives a data packet from the softAP, it restores the previous power saving
scheme (e.g., back to PM _FA ST) and moves back to the Normal state. At this time,
both the softAP and the client can communicate normally. Otherwise, the softAP
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will send a new sleep request to try to sleep again.

4.3.2

Synchronization

One advantage of the sleep request-response protocol is that it does not require
tight time synchronization between the softAP and the client. If the softAP and the
client can synchronize their time perfectly, they can coordinate their sleep schedul
ing to avoid packet loss without transmitting any extra sleep request and response
packets. However, this is hard to achieve in practice. Although very fine-grained
hardware timestamps (e.g., at microsecond granularity) exists at link layer, such
timestamps are segregated inside firmware and are not available to the Wi-Fi driver
and applications. It is possible to do time synchronization by explicitly exchanging
packets with timing information between the softAP and the client. Such time syn
chronization must be done periodically due to clock drift, which increases power
consumption. Due to these considerations, w e intentionally avoided the time syn
chronization approach.
Interestingly, the proposed sleep protocol can achieve loose synchronization
between a softAP and a client, with a desirable property: the client will never con
clude that the softAP is awake while it is sleeping. Therefore, our approach will not
lead to packet loss that would arise from wrong attem pts of sending packets while
the softAP is actually in sleep mode. In normal case, this is obvious because the
softAP will sleep only after it receives a sleep response from the client. However,
due to the uncertainty and complexity of wireless communication, the sleep pro
tocol may not work as smoothly as expected. Below w e analyze several possible
abnormal cases and their consequences, as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
P acket loss. First, sleep request or response packets may be lost during their
transmissions. For example, a sleep request may be lost. In this case, the softAP
will stay in active. If later on the client or the softAP has data to transmit, they start
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Figure 4.7: Abnormal cases, (a) a sleep request is lost, (b) a sleep response is lost, (c) a
sleep response is delayed, (d) a data packet is delayed.
to communicate as normal. O r the softAP will send out a new sleep request after
the network remains idle for a period longer than the pre-defined idle threshold,
as shown in Figure 4.7(a). The worst effect of losing a sleep request is that the
softAP would waste some energy for staying in unnecessary active state between
two successive sleep requests. Similarly, if a sleep response is lost, the softAP
also has to stay in active until the next sleep request. However, in this case, as the
client has concluded that the softAP is in sleep, it will stay in the Block state and
start to buffer packets. Thus, it may further incur extra delay up to the idle threshold
to the client, as shown in Figure 4.7(b).
P acket ou t-o f-order. Second, packet transmission may be delayed due to the
hardware queuing and wireless contention. As a result, there is a slight chance that
packets may not arrive at their destinations in the expected order. For example,
Figure 4.7(c) shows the case that a sleep response is delayed by the clientus
hardware.

The softAP receives sleep response 1 after sleep request 2 is sent

out. In this case, the softAP just ignores sleep response 1 but it has to stay in
active between the two sleep requests. Figure 4.7(d) shows a more complex case.
The client has already passed a packet to the firmware and the packet is waiting
for transmission in the hardware queue. At this moment the client receives a sleep
request from the softAP. As the client does not have more data to transmit, it replies
a sleep response. However, once the softAP receives the data packet, it resets its
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idle timer, stays in active and ignores the sleep response. Consequently, the softAP
and the client are out of sync: the softAP stays in active, wasting energy, but the
client assumes the softAP is in sleep and delays its packets transmission.
Based on the above analysis, w e can see that those abnormal cases would at
most cause some overhead in energy and transmission latency, but they would
not break the desired synchronization property of our sleep protocol. A client will
never try to send packets when the softAP is actually in sleep. The softAP and the
client may run out of sync temporally, but will always resume sync after the sub
sequent sync response. This demonstrates the robustness of our sleep protocol.
In addition, in the Wi-Fi tethering, the bottleneck is usually the 3G connection as
its bandwidth is much lower than that of W i-Fi. The necessity airtime of Wi-Fi is
usually light, and thus, the above abnormal cases can rarely happen.
It is noticed that the sleep request-response protocol operates above the MAC
layer, thus all the MAC layer frames such as beacons and Null-Data cannot be seen
by the protocol. That is why DozyAP has to explicitly exchange sleep requests and
responses to negotiate a sleeping schedule. If the protocol is applied to the MAC
layer, the negotiation can be performed through existing MAC layer frames. For
example, if a client does not have data to transmit, it sends a null-data frames with
power management flag set to 1. Once observing that all clients have been in
sleep mode, the AP automatically turns off. Owing to the tight time synchronization
existing at M AC layer, both AP and clients could w ake up almost at the same time
when the pre-determined sleep timeout or next beacon is due. Then A P could send
buffered packets and clients could upload buffered packets.

4.3.3

Adaptive Sleeping

Our sleep protocol allows a softAP to sleep. The next natural question is: how long
should it sleep? The simplest solution is certainly to sleep for a fixed interval. How
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ever, it is difficult to determine such an interval, because the R T T of 3G connection
varies and the packet arrival time is irregular. In our design, w e come up with an
adaptive sleep scheduling algorithm to adapt to the traffic pattern and also the 3G
network property. Our adaptive sleep algorithm consists of two stages, namely a
short sleep stage and a long sleep stage, that are designed to exploit the two dis
tinctive phases (i.e., the content downloading phase and the content consumption
phase) of interactive applications, respectively.

Sleep algorithm. Figure 4 .8 shows how the two-stage adaptive sleep algorithm
works. The basic idea is to probe the optimal sleep interval such that the softAP
can wake up shortly before a packet arrives. Starting with an initial conservative
sleep interval, the sleep interval is gradually increased, at a conservative pace,
until a packet has arrived during the last sleeping. Then the initial sleep interval is
updated dynamically. For sake of easier expression, all the successive sleep slots
are collectively called a sleep cycle.
More concretely, when the Wi-Fi interface remains idle for a time period of
thresh, the softAP will enter the short sleep stage.

It first sleeps for a time pe

riod of init which equals to min initially. W hen the softAP wakes up, it either goes
back to the A C T IV E mode if there are pending outgoing or incoming packets, or
continues to sleep for a fixed interval of step. Depending on the real packet arrival
pattern, the length of the sleep cycle may become longer and longer between two
subsequent wake-ups. The sleep period can be expressed as i n i t + N * step where
N is the number of continuous sleep slots after the first sleep slot of init.

As waking the Wi-Fi hardware up introduces certain energy overhead [59], it is
desirable to reduce the number of unnecessary wake-ups. This calls for a good init
value that can let the softAP sleep as long as possible while still being able to wake
up in time, i.e., to avoid or shorten the probing process. W e determine the init value
by exploiting the sleep history. W e use parameters cur and pre to track the gross
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1: // Parameters:

2: thresh, min, max, init, step, cur, pre, thresh l, long ;
3: ACTIVE:
4: measure the W i-Fi network idle time;
5: SHORT SLEEP:
6: i f (W i-Fi network idle time > thresh)

7:

firs t = true',

8:
sleep for a time period o f init,
9: while (1)

10:

cur - firs t! in it : (cur + step)', firs t = false',

11:

if receive or transmit a packet

12:

13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:

i f {cur < - mil)

init - max(mi7 - step, min)',
pre = cur, goto A C TIVE;
if {{cur > init + step) && (pre >init + step))
init = min( in it + step, max),
if {cur >= thresh J )
pre = cur, goto LONG SLEEP;

sleep for a time period of step;

20: LONG SLEEP:
21: while (1)
22:
sleep for a time period o f long,
23:
i f receive or transmit a packet;
24:
goto AC TIVE;

Figure 4.8: The two-stage adaptive sleep algorithm.
length of all successful sleep slots in the current sleep cycle and that in the previous
sleep cycle, respectively. That is, w e have cur equals to i n i t + ( N - 1 ) * s t e p because
a sleep cycle is always ended up by a false sleep slot during which a packet has
arrived and been buffered. Param eter pre is simply a running record of the previous
cur. Based on the values of cur and pre, w e adjust the value of init with a simple
algorithm IN IT JJP D A TE as follows: if both cur and pre are greater than current
init plus step, we increase i n i t by step for the next sleep cycle. If c u r is less than
or equal to current i n i t minus step, w e decrease i n i t by step. To avoid excessive
latency that may be caused by an overly greedy i n i t value, we cap it to the value
of m a x. In S H O R T_S LE E P stage, if the softAP has continuously been in sleep for
a time period of th re s h J , it goes to LO N G _S LE E P stage. In L O N G _S L E E P stage,
the softAP simply sleeps for a time period of lo ng periodically until it quits from sleep
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to communicate with the client.

Example. Figure 4 .9 illustrates the algorithm with a concrete exam ple. Some
details such as the time for waking up the Wi-Fi interface between continuous sleep
slots are omitted for sake of easier reading. Assume current value of i n i t is 200ms
and the value of step is 100ms, in the first short sleep circle (the 460m s one), after
th re s h (150m s) idle time for triggering sleep request-response protocol, the softAP

will first sleep for 200m s, followed by two 100ms sleep slots. Suppose the value of
i n i t is then qualified to increase to 300m s. In the second short sleep circle, after

150ms idle time, the softAP will first sleep for 300m s followed by one more 100ms
sleep slot.

In the content consuming period, after sleeping for a time period of

t h r e s h j , the softAP enters the long sleep stage and periodically sleeps for a time

period of lo n g (500ms).
The above algorithm is specially designed for the traffic patterns of typical ap
plications in Wi-Fi tethering as shown in Section 4 .2 .2 . The short sleep stage is
designed for the softAP to sleep between the time when the client sends out a
request to a remote server and the time when the first response packet from the
remote server is received. That duration is roughly a RTT of the 3G connection
(typically hundreds of milliseconds [45]). The purpose of i n i t param eter is exactly
to estimate the 3GCS R TT in an elegant way, based on the length of last two sleep
cycles. Note that our algorithm is conservative in the sense that it tries to reduce
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the energy consumption under minimal impairment to user experience, i.e., extra
latency incurred. W e decrease the value of i n i t quickly, by considering only the
length of the current sleep cycle, but increase the value of i n i t slowly by consid
ering the length of both the current and the previous sleep cycles. In addition, we
use the parameter t h re s h to prevent the softAP from entering the short sleep stage
during burst data transmission period (e.g., multiple response packets from a re
mote server for the same client request such as fetching a picture. In Section 4.4
we describe the parameter values used in our implementation.
In summary, our sleep algorithm automatically adapts to the traffic pattern of
applications and achieves a good balance between power saving and network per
formance.

4.3.4

Supporting Multiple Clients

DozyAP can support multiple clients by repeatedly applying the sleep requestresponse protocol to each client. A client goes to sleep once it agrees to the AP's
sleep request. A softAP can sleep only if it receives the sleep responses from all
the clients. If some clients replied to a sleep response but other clients did not,
the softAP has to stay awake in this case.

This design makes sense because

some clients may have data to send and the softAP must serve those clients. It is
expected that the softAP sleeps less and consumes more power in the multi-client
case. However, extending DozyAP to support multiple clients will not break the syn
chronization property of the sleep protocol: no client will send a packet when the
softAP is in sleep. Note that we considered the possibility of broadcasting the sleep
requests as it can obviously reduce the overhead of the sleep protocol. However,
we do not take this approach for two reasons. First, broadcast packets are less
reliable because they are transmitted without link layer retransmissions. Second,
the clients in PSM likely cannot receive broadcast packets, whereas the unicast
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Figure 4.10: Implementation architecture of the client part (left) and the softAP part (right).
packets will be buffered in A P ’s hardware transmission queue until clients wake up
from PSM. Therefore, the improvement of using broadcast is expected to be very
small in multi-client case, and for single client case, it is worse than using unicast.
Another minor issue with the multi-client case is the beacon. In our design a
softAP does not send out beacons in the sleep mode. Thus, a new client cannot
join the Wi-Fi network when the softAP is in sleep.

However, the softAP sends

out periodic beacons when it is active. Even in long sleep stage, it still wakes up
periodically and can send out beacons. Consequently, a new client is still able to
find the softAP but may experience slightly longer latency. As this only happens
when a new client joins the network, we think it is acceptable.

4.4

Implementation

W e have implemented the DozyAP system on a Nexus One smartphone running
Android 2.3.6, with a Wi-Fi chipset of Broadcom B C M 4329 802.11 a/b/g/n [27].
The overall architecture consists of two parts: the softAP part and the client part,
as shown in Figure 4.10. The softAP part is directly modified from the open source
Wi-Fi driver in which we embedded the sleep request-response protocol and the
two-stage adaptive sleep algorithm. W hen the softAP is in sleep state, all the pack
ets received from 3G interface are buffered. The client part is implemented as a
loadable module where a packet buffer is implemented, together with a blocking
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controller to decide if and when application packets must be buffered. In our pro
totype we use a special Ethernet type of Oxf f f ff (a reserved value that should not
be used in products) for the packets of the sleep request-response protocol. In real
deployment, other approaches can be used to implement the sleep protocol, e.g.,
using dedicated IP packets rather than the special Ethernet type. W e use netfilter
to intercept all the outgoing packets and to detect the packets of sleep requests
and response. Implementing the client part as a loadable module does not require
any modifications to the source code of the client OS. This makes it easy to deploy
DozyAP on different types of client devices.

Putting a mobile softAP into sleep. One practical difficulty we met is how
to put a mobile softAP to sleep. On smartphones (Nexus One, and other types of
smartphones), most Wi-Fi M AC layer functionalities are implemented in the firmware
running on the Wi-Fi chipset, not in the CPU-hosted Wi-Fi driver. W hen Wi-Fi teth
ering is enabled, the firmware keeps the Wi-Fi always in a high power state. There
is no interface available to change the power states. After trying many methods,
all that we can do in the driver is to turn on/off the W i-Fi interface when the softAP
decides to wake up/sleep. By modifying the source of the driver, w e hide the fact
that the Wi-Fi interface is turned off. Thus, applications and the O S can work as
normal as if the Wi-Fi interface is always on.

Energy overhead of turning on/off the Wi-Fi. It costs extra energy to switch
ing on/off the Wi-Fi interface. W e measured such energy overhead on a Nexus
One smartphone and Figure 4.11 shows the m easurem ent results. Initially, the W i
Fi interface was off. Then w e turned on the Wi-Fi interface for 100m s and turned it
off again. W e can observe two artifacts: First, when the Wi-Fi interface is merely
turned on without transmitting any packet, the system stays in an average power
state of 40 0m W which is higher than the normal power consumption of Wi-Fi teth
ering in idle case as shown in Figure 4.2. W e think this part of overhead is caused
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Figure 4.11: Power consumption of switching on/off the Wi-Fi interface.
by the CPU and I/O operations for waking up the W i-Fi interface. Second, when
the off command is issued, the power consumption reduced immediately, but re
mains at a power level as high as 150m W for about one second before entering a
very low power state of 10mW. This finding is similar to what the authors reported
in [59]. They pointed out that when the Wi-Fi interface goes to sleep, it first enters a
"light sleep" state and then enters a "deep sleep" state after som e time. W e cannot
control this behavior but it significantly affects how much power we can save. W e
want to point out that this is a platform-specific limitation caused by the restricted
programmability over the Wi-Fi hardware. Our design itself does not impose any
limitation. If the smartphone can incur less wakeup overhead or enter the "deep
sleep" state more quickly, our approach can save much more power.

Parameter values. W e determine the param eter values based on the realworld traces described in Section 4.2. All the parameters are set in a conservative
way to handle the variations of network conditions. W e set t h r e s h to 150ms for
triggering a softAP to enter sleep mode. With this parameter, the chance of sleep
ing is maximized and the number of involved packets is limited to avoid introducing
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more network latency. Due to the overhead of wakeup, the sleep duration less than
100ms may not yield much power saving. Thus, we set m in to 100m s. Consider
ing the R TT of 3G and to limit the maximum extra latency, w e set m a x to 500m s.
The value of i n i t varies between 100m s and 500m s. W e set th re s h _ l to 3s for
switching to the long sleep stage where the softAP periodically sleeps for 500m s
(i.e., long equals to 500m s). It should be noticed that different W i-Fi chipsets may
have the different overhead of waking up, and thereby affecting the choice of the
parameter values above. The guideline is as follows: If the overhead is larger, then
the parameters should be adjusted to avoid sleeping too frequently. Otherwise, it
is better to set to gain more power saving.

4.5

Evaluation

W e evaluate the performance of DozyAP by answering the following questions. 1)
How much power can DozyAP save for a mobile softAP in various applications?
2) W hat is the impact of DozyAP on client side power consumption? 3) How much
extra latency does DozyAP introduce? 4) How much power can be saved in multi
client case? 5) W hat is the performance degradation if clients are not changed?

4.5.1

Experiment Setup

Hardware devices. W e used a Nexus One smartphone as a softAP with a China
Unicom 3G connection (W C D M A ), and another Nexus One smartphone as a client
to run applications. Both smartphones run Android 2.3.6. W e used a Monsoon
Power Monitor [12] to measure the power consumption. W e repeated every exper
iment for at least five times to compute average results.

Applications and methodology. W e used five of the applications described in
Section 4.2, including news reading, book reading, video streaming, search, and
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Figure 4.12: Power saving and energy saving of the softAP in idle (I), busy download (D),
and the five applications of news reading (N), book reading (B), video streaming (V), search
(S), and map (M)
map. To make the experiments repeatable, w e analyze the captured trace of the
applications to find out all the H TTP requests contained in the traces except video
streaming. Then we wrote a test program in Java to send out those H TTP requests
with the exact same order and timing as the traces. The program uses the W ebView
class in the WebKit package [4]. Thus, we could easily repeat every experiment.
For the video streaming, we manually played the sam e video clip.

Traces. To evaluate DozyAP with more diverse and realistic traffic patterns, we
asked the authors of M oodSense [53] for the traces collected from real users. In
MoodSense, the authors conducted a two-month field study with 25 iPhone users
and collected their network traffic everyday using tcpdump [78]. W e selected the
traces of the top eight most active 3G users. For each of them, w e further selected
the trace of the day when the user generated the largest 3G traffic volume. W e
used the eight-day traces to evaluate the performance of DozyAP.

4.5.2

Power Consumption

Average power. W e first measured the power consumption of a mobile softAP with
DozyAP and without DozyAP. Besides the five applications, w e also measured two
extreme cases: idle and busy download. In the idle case, we measured the power
consumption of the softAP with one client associated but without any network traffic.
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In the busy download case, w e measured the power consumption of downloading
a 1MB file from a W eb server. The dark bars in Figure 4.12 show the average
power saving of DozyAP. Without explicit mention, the error bars depict the mini
mum and maximum values in all the experiments. W e see that DozyAP can reduce
the average power by 12.2% to 32.8% for the five applications. In the idle case, it
can save power by 36.5% . Even for the busy download case, the average power
can be reduced by 3.3% . It is worth noting that the power saving percentage is
calculated in the total power consumption o f the whole system, including the power
consumed by CPU and 3G. 3G consumes significant power when transmitting and
receiving data.

If we only consider the power consumption of W i-Fi, the power

saving percentage will be even higher in busy download and the five applications.

Total energy. As DozyAP buffers packets and delays their transmission, it may
lead to longer application time comparing with the case without DozyAP. Thus, we
also measured the total energy for the busy download case and the five applica
tions. Total energy does not make sense for the idle case. The light bars in Fig
ure 4.12 show the results. W e see that DozyAP does not increase the total energy.
Instead, it can save the total energy by 12.2% to 3 2.9% for the five applications,
which is almost the same as the result of average power. As we show in Section
4.5.3, DozyAP indeed introduces very little network latency which has negligible
impact on the total energy. Even in the busy download case, DozyAP can save the
total energy by 2.3% .

Wi-Fi interface sleep time. As w e point out in Section 4 .4 , with the current
commercially available smartphones, forcing the softAP to go to sleep or wakeup
can be only achieved by turning off/on the W i-Fi interface. That results in significant
overhead (see Figure 4.11). If w e have more control on the power states of the Wi-Fi
hardware (e.g., if we can directly modify the firmware or if we have a MadWifi [11]
style driver which implements most M AC layer functions in driver rather than in
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Figure 4.14: Wi-Fi interface sleep time calculated based on the traces of eight real users
firmware), DozyAP should be able to save significantly more power. W e measured
how much time DozyAP can put the Wi-Fi interface of a mobile softAP to sleep.
Figure 4.13 shows the results. W e see that the W i-Fi interface of a softAP can
stay in sleep mode for 4 7 % -88% of the total time in the five applications. Even
in the busy download case, w e can turn the W i-Fi interface to sleep for 11% of
the total time. These results demonstrate the potential of DozyAP to significantly
reduce the power consumption of Wi-Fi tethering. Given proper control over the
Wi-Fi hardware, more energy is expected to be saved from sleeping.
W e also evaluated the W i-Fi interface sleep time with the real traces of the eight
users in M oodSense [53]. To do it, w e wrote a program to analyze the packet inter
arrival time of the traces and calculate the W i-Fi interface sleep time as if these
traces have happened in W i-Fi tethering. To m ake the calculation reasonable, we
ignored all the inter-packet arrival intervals larger than 5 minutes. That is, for any
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Figure 4.15: Power increasing of the Nexus One client in idle, busy download and the five
applications
intervals larger than 5 minutes, we treated it as if the user stopped using the phone
and turned Wi-Fi tethering off. This treatment is conservative because a user may
spend more than 5 minutes to read a long news article or Wi-Fi tethering might not
be turned off even the user stopped using the phone for 5 minutes. Figure 4.14
shows the calculated results. W e see that DozyAP is able to allow the Wi-Fi inter
face of a softAP stay in sleep mode for 77% -95% of the time for the mixed multi
application user traffic. The numbers in Figure 4 .1 4 are higher than the ones in
Figure 4.13. The reason is that the experiments in Figure 4 .1 3 focused on single
application usage only. In practice users may use multiple applications one by one.
Switching from one application to another leads to more network idle time.

Power consumption of a client. W e also measured the power consumption
of the Nexus One client in the idle case, busy download and the five applications.
Figure 4 .15 shows the results. W e see that DozyAP can increase the power con
sumption of the client by less than 7.1% for these five applications. The reason
is that the client needs to w ake up to receive the sleep requests from the softAP
and send back the sleep responses when the network is idle. Thus, the idle case
introduces the highest overhead but it is still only 8 % . Compared to the large power
saving of the softAP, this small overhead is acceptable.

Multiple applications on single client. In som e cases, multiple applications
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Figure 4.16: Finish time of busy download and the five applications
may run on a single client simultaneously. W e evaluated DozyAP in a typical sce
nario where a user is reading news in the foreground meanwhile listening online
music in the background. To do it, w e first started Douban F M (which is a popular
app in China like Last.fm). Once the music began to load, w e started the news
reading program (the same as before) immediately. The average power saving
and energy saving over ten experiments is 14.5% and 14.2% respectively.

4.5.3

Latency

DozyAP incurs extra network latency because it delays packet transmissions when
a softAP is in sleep mode. If the extra latency is user perceivable, it may impair
user experience. As all the five applications are about fetching remote W eb content,
users care about the page loading time which is the period from the time when a
user sends out a webpage request to the time when the w ebpage is fetched and
rendered by the browser. The page loading time metric is widely used to evaluate
the performance of browsers and W eb servers. W e evaluated the finish time of
loading content which is the sum of the page load time of all the w ebpage requests
in an application. The W ebView object used in our test program could tell when a
webpage is loaded. In the experiments, we sent out all the w ebpage requests of
an application one by one without any time interval and calculated the total finish
time.

105

(BSD - DozyAP)/DozyAP
120%

£$

80%
60%
40%
20%

0%

■ Latency
« No. of wakeups

102%

100%

13%
■ 5%

84%

if
8
v;
3
i
ii
2»f S'S

31%
w

11%
»

2%

2%.

-2%

- 20 %

N

B

V

S

M

E

R

Figure 4.17: BSD vs. DozyAP in news reading (N), book reading (B), video streaming (V),
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Figure 4.16 shows the average result and the variance in busy download and
the five applications. W e see that DozyAP introduces very small extra network
latency, ranging from 0.9% to 5.1% . Such small extra latency is hardly perceivable
by users because of two reasons. First, as the 3G network has limited throughput
and large RTT, it takes several hundred milliseconds to even seconds to load a
webpage. Second, the time variance of the page loading time is pretty large, up
to several seconds. That is, even without DozyAP, users already experience long
page loading time with large variance. Therefore, the small latency increase of less
than 5.1% is very hard to detect.
In addition, we compared our adaptive sleeping algorithm to BSD algorithm [50].
The reason why we choose BSD is that it is the-state-of-the-art algorithm that can
adapt to the sleep duration without the M AC layer or lower layer support. To be fair,
we investigated BSD and our algorithm based on on the sam e traffic traces col
lected from the user studies (as mentioned in Section 4.2). The results are shown
in Fig. 4.17. As we see, BSD algorithm may introduce extra network latency and
more wakeups in most cases. This extra latency may delay the application finish
time. The increased number of wakeups may cost more energy due to the wakeup
overhead.
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4.5.4

Multiple Clients

W e first evaluated the performance of DozyAP with two clients associated: a smart
phone and a tablet. Each client ran the sam e programs simultaneously. Figure 4.18
shows the average energy saving and power saving in busy download, the five ap
plications and the idle case. As expected, the most power and energy savings
are lower than the ones in single client scenario. However, the saving in down
load case does not drop as much as other applications. That is because no matter
one or multiple clients were downloading, the cellular bandwidth was similarly sat
urated so that the chance for softAP to sleep is equivalent. Another finding is that
the power saving for video streaming has a significant drop from about 28% to less
than 10%. The reason is that two clients were competing in streaming video so that
both of them needed more time to finish. Thus, the softAP had less opportunity to
sleep.
W e also conducted user studies to evaluate DozyAP with more clients. In the
experiments, four clients with two phones, a tablet and a laptop were tethered to a
DozyAP-enabled smartphone. They were asked to access Internet freely, such as
reading news, checking and replying emails, listening Internet radios, and search
ing interesting places on Google Map.

Since clients behave differently in each

experiment, it is difficult for us to obtain the ground truth about the power con-
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Figure 4.19: Performance of DozyAP w/ four clients. The ratios of sleep time and delayed
packets are measured, whereas the ratio of power saving is approximated based on the
ratio of sleep time.
sumption without DozyAP. Thus, we only measured the sleep time to approximate
the power saving and count the buffered packets to show the incurred network
latency. The results are shown in Fig. 4.19. W e see that DozyAP allows the W i
Fi to sleep for 59% of total application time and only causes about 1.4% delayed
packets. From the experiments in Fig. 4 .12 and Fig. 4.13, w e observed that the
sleep-to-power-saving translation ratio was around 18% to 36% . Therefore, the
approximated power saving for our four-client tests is about 16.2% on average.
It is worth noting that the energy gain of DozyAP mainly depends on the traffic
rather than the number of clients. Even if a single client is associated, it may gener
ate continuously bursty traffic such as downloading. T h e power saving in that case
is still less than the case of multiple clients but with sparse traffic.

4.5.5

Comparison with client-independent solution

To show the necessity of changing clients, w e compared DozyAP to a straightfor
ward client-independent solution, where the A P periodically w akes up after a sleep.
If not receiving any data, the A P waits for a fixed time period and then goes back
to sleep again. In this approach, the softAP wakes up and sleeps without noti
fying clients, so the packets transmitted by the clients may be lost. W e use a to
denote the ratio of the wakeup duration to the sleep duration and investigated the
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performance degradation with varying a.
W e selected four applications including browsing websites (both 3G and regular
websites), searching, downloading, and video streaming. The performance metrics
are as follows:

• Timeout ratio. It depicts the percentage of the connection timeout reported
by the client's web browser. The connection timeout is caused by the loss of
HTTP requests when the client sent those requests but the softAP in sleep
mode did not receive them.
• Latency increasing ratio.

With respect to page (or download) finish time,

latency increasing ratio presents the increased latency normalized by the
benchmark finish time in DozyAP. A large ratio means that more delays are
introduced by the client-independent solution mentioned above.
• Traffic increasing ratio. Due to the retransmission of lost packets, the client
may send or receive more packets. Traffic increasing ratio is used to describe
the percentage of the number of increased packets to the number of total
packets.
• Pow er saving ratio and energy saving ratio. Th e meaning of these metrics
are the same as mentioned before. Note that these metrics are measured
on the AP side, whereas the above three metrics are measured on the client
side.

Table 4.1 shows the averaged results over ten tests when a — 0 .4 . Other values
of a yielded worse results, so w e do not present them here. As we see, without
modifying the clients the timeout ratio is between 2 0 % -4 0 % , thereby impairing the
user experience of Internet access. Both latency and traffic are heavily increased,
where video streaming has the lowest increasing ratio and searching has the high-
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Timeout

Latency

Traffic

Power

Energy

W eb(3G )

20 %

46%

15%

20 %

- 11%

Web

40%

38%

7%

20 %

-7%

Search

30%

74%

50%

29%

-26%

Download

40%

17%

4%

17%

-3%

Video

20 %

12 %

1%

16%

-3%

Table 4.1: Performance of client-independent solution
est increasing ratio. The power saving by the client-independent solution is com
petitive to softAP, because the W i-Fi interface is also turned off periodically. How
ever, due to longer application finish time, the client-independent solution actually
spends more energy than existing Wi-Fi tethering schemes. Therefore, it demands
modifying the clients to achieve better performance.

4.6

Discussion and Future Work

DozyAP requires patching the O S of smartphones working in W i-Fi tethering and
installing a loadable module on a client, which may be a hurdle for device vendors
to overcome in practice. Despite this, we believe this problem is not very difficult
to tackle, for instance, through O ver The Air (OTA) upgrade. It also may be diffi
cult to upgrade the software of dumb Wi-Fi client devices, e.g., music players and
e-readers. However, to access the Internet, most people use "smart" devices in
cluding smartphones, tablets and laptops. All these devices are programmable and
upgradable. Although our current implementation is based on Linux-style OS ker
nel including iOS, for Windows based devices a similar approach can be used via
loadable Network Driver Interface Specification (N D IS ) [14] driver.
DozyAP takes advantage of the speed discrepancy between cellular and W i
Fi. One may argue that such an advantage will not exist when 4G is deployed.
However, the speed of Wi-Fi increases fast too. With 11n and 11ac, there is still a
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big gap between cellular and W i-Fi. In addition, our solution benefits not only from
such a speed discrepancy, but also from the long content consuming time of users.
Our implementation uses fixed parameter values derived from the measurement
results, which can be improved. For example, one m ay use a dynamic approach to
tune the parameters to better adapt to the network conditions. Even though we use
fixed values, we take a conservative way, e.g., the sleep time starts from a small
value of 100ms. As shown in Figure 8 , the tuning procedure of param eter in it is
also conservative.
More power can be saved through transmission power adaptation. The builtin Wi-Fi tethering on existing smartphones always uses the highest transmission
power.

It wastes energy because a softAP is often close to its clients in Wi-Fi

tethering. W e plan to design a scheme to automatically adjust the transmission
power based on the network conditions (e.g., R SS I and packet loss). W e also
plan to further take advantage of the bandwidth discrepancy between 3G and W i
Fi to create more opportunities for a softAP to sleep. Th e basic idea is shaping the
traffic between 3G and Wi-Fi. For downlink traffic, the softAP can buffer the packets
received from 3G and send them to the client over W i-Fi in batch. For uplink traffic,
if the 3G connection is congested, the softAP can ask the client to stop sending
more data. Thus, the W i-Fi interface of both the softAP and the client can sleep
longer.
DozyAP could be implemented in the M AC layer for further improvement if the
Wi-Fi firmware is open on smartphones. The current implementation of DozyAP
incurs the performance penalty from three aspects. First, explicit transmission of
sleep request and response packets consume extra power for both A P and clients.
Second, the overhead of switching on and off Wi-Fi interface is considerable. Third,
additional power consumption is imposed by the C P U computation, since DozyAP
has to involve the CPU to generate packets and run algorithms that are supposed
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to run on Wi-Fi chipsets.

4.7

Related Work

Wi-Fi power saving. There has been a lot of research effort devoted to power
saving in Wi-Fi [1 9 ,2 3 ,3 3 ,4 4 ,5 0 ,5 5 ,5 9 ,6 8 ,7 0 ,7 2 ], focusing on improving the ex
isting PSM in general or targeting at specific applications or usage scenarios. To
name some recent work, Catnap [33] exploits the bandwidth discrepancy between
Wi-Fi and broadband to save energy for mobile devices. NAPm an [72] employs
an energy-aware scheduling algorithm to reduce energy consumption by eliminat
ing unnecessary retransmissions. SleepWell [59] coordinates the activity circles of
multiple APs to allow client devices to sleep longer. All these solutions are for Wi-Fi
clients only. DozyAP is complementary, focusing on the power efficiency of APs.
Putting an AP to sleep is more challenging than putting a client to sleep because
client devices expect that their AP is always on. To avoid packet loss, a softAP in
DozyAP must coordinate its sleep schedule with its clients, which is different from
existing work.
There is little work on power saving of APs. In [90,96], the authors propose to ex
tend the IEEE 802.11 standard to support power saving access points for multi-hop
solar/battery powered applications. Without building any real systems, they focus
on protocol analysis and simulation, assuming Network Allocation Vector (NAV) can
be used. Our work focuses on system design and implementation. W e build real
systems on commercial smartphones and do evaluation with real experiments. In
addition, the NAV-based approach cannot work on existing smartphones because
NAV is only visible in firmware. Cool-Tether [74] considers an alternative way to
address the mobile hotspot problem that involves reversing the role of the phone
and the client. However, it significantly increases the power consumption of the
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client and does not support multiple clients. In [29], the authors design algorithms
to save power for APs with Wi-Fi Direct. Since W i-Fi Direct is a separate mode
on devices, it cannot be used for tethering till now. Furthermore, w e measured the
power consumption of current Wi-Fi Direct enabled devices, it is slightly higher than
tethering.

Traffic-driven design. Adapting to traffic load for better sleeping is not a new
idea [19,70]. Traffic patterns in different applications and scenarios have also been
studied in some papers and the similar observations are identified (e.g., the large
portion of network idle time) [50,55]. DozyAP builds on top of the basic techniques
and applies them to Wi-Fi tethering scenario. Furthermore, DozyAP can be im
proved by leveraging existing literature, e.g., by traffic shaping [33,68] and sleeping
in short intervals [55].

Sleep scheduling. Sleep/wake scheduling has been extensively studied in
Bluetooth domain, e.g., [3 5 ,5 4] and sensor network domain, e.g., [8 0 ,8 9 ]. How
ever, those approaches usually focus on M A C layer design, resulting in a new
MAC protocol, and often require time synchronization. DozyAP employs a sim
ple application-level protocol to coordinate the sleep schedule of a softAP with its
client, without requiring time synchronization or any modifications on existing IEEE
802.11 protocol. Thus, DozyAP is easy to deploy on existing smartphones.

Dedicated Wi-Fi tethering devices.
hotspot device.

MiFi [60] is a dedicated mobile Wi-Fi

However, such a device also stays in a high power state even

without any ongoing traffic. W e measured a Huawei E 5830 MiFi device and found
the average power consumption was as high as 4 2 0 m W in idle case. W e believe
MiFi devices can benefit from DozyAP design if they are programmable.
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4.8

Conclusion

In this chapter we have studied the power efficiency of Wi-Fi tethering. W e show
that Wi-Fi tethering on existing smartphones is power hungry and wastes energy
unnecessarily, but there are many opportunities to save power by putting a mobile
softAP to sleep. W e propose DozyAP system to improve the power efficiency of
Wi-Fi tethering. DozyAP employs a lightweight yet reliable sleep request-response
protocol for a mobile softAP to coordinate its sleep schedule with its clients without
requiring tight time synchronization. Based on our findings on the traffic patterns of
typical applications used in Wi-Fi tethering, w e design a two-stage adaptive sleep
algorithm to allow a mobile softAP to automatically adapt to the ongoing traffic load
for the best power saving. W e have implemented DozyAP system on commercial
smartphones.

Experimental results demonstrate that DozyAP is able to signifi

cantly reduce the power consumption of Wi-Fi tethering without impairing the user
experience.
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5

Group Localization via Gestures

In addition to the security and energy-saving discussed in the previous chapters,
location-awareness is desired more than ever as this world has become increas
ingly mobile. However, current localization techniques are inadequate to m eet dif
ferent demands for location such as fine-resolution, low-cost and scalability. To
shed light upon the general research that explores more comprehensive locationaware techniques for mobile systems, this chapter describes a novel group local
ization scheme that can be used for mobile user to locate others in ad hoc wireless
networks.

5.1

Introduction

Consider the following scenario. A group of people at a conference or a workshop
come together in a room for a meeting. They may not know each other in advance,
so have no knowledge about each other's name.

They would like, however, to

share information or exchange electronic documents during the meeting. They will
use their electronic devices (smartphones or laptops) to quickly set up a local net
work and then localize each person on a simple map. This location information is
extremely useful for people to identify each other. If the involved people choose
to remain anonymous, they can use an intuitive gesture to transfer information be
tween each other. For exam ple, when two people would like to share files, they can
use swipe-to-share, in which users can directly send files by swiping their phones
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towards the receiver. This type of technology can be potentially applied to other
scenarios as well. Gam e players use gestures to communicate with each other in
recently emerging phone-to-phone games [97]. People or parties exchange elec
tronic documents during contract negotiation.
It is our expectation that this type of group localization should m eet the following
criteria: (1) Scalability. The solution should be lightweight so that it can scale to a
reasonable sized group.

(2) Accuracy. W hile exact positioning is not required,

the localization error should be reasonably small so that group members can be
identified. (3) Security. Only devices within certain range can be included in the
group. The design should be resilient to adversary attacks.
A large body of research has been dedicated to localization without Global Po
sitioning System (G P S ) for various purposes over decades. Most work relies on in
frastructure support such as Wi-Fi access points (A Ps) and cellular towers, where
the location of each device is either assigned by central server or self-computed
and shared with other devices via network communication. However, the infras
tructure support may not be available in every phone-to-phone scenario, thus lim
iting the generality of such approaches. On the other hand, if the location is self
computed from such as RSSI, RF signature, or magnetic fields, malicious users
may cheat on their locations to launch attacks. Moreover, these techniques typi
cally cannot achieve satisfactory accuracy. Other localization approaches demand
special hardware design, complex signal processing, or access of very low layer
information. Due to the constraints, those approaches can not be easily applied
to smartphones. Recent work proposes som e acoustic ranging based techniques
that can be used for smartphones with speakers/microphones. However, they have
some practical limitations. In BeepBeep [66 ], every device beeps at least once to
measure the distance between each other and then calculate the location of each
device. The limitations of this approach are: (1) at least three devices are needed
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to perform localization, otherwise only distance can be derived; ( 2 ) all devices have
to collaboratively beep, thus making the approach not scale well with the number of
devices; and (3) this approach requires that every user agrees on the sam e beep
ing order and is synchronized well to avoid the collision of beeping simultaneously.
Based on BeepBeep, another localization algorithm that can be used between two
phones is proposed in [71]. This approach requires time synchronization and still
does not scale well with multiple devices.
In this chapter, we propose SG -LO C , a system to efficiently group and locate
mobile devices. The localization process of S G -L O C cleverly strengthens Beep
Beep using on-broad sensors and Multilateration algorithms. In our system, the
beeps are only emitted by a single user who is responsible for setting up a lo
cal network. During the localization, a user is requested to hold her phone and
draw a simple gesture. After that, the locations of other devices are calculated and
shared with other users when they join the network. Our approach does not rely
on infrastructure support for communication. Furthermore, the localization process
scales well with the number of devices. W e have implemented S G -L O C on com
mercial smartphones. The experimental results show that our system can achieve
centimeter-level accuracy.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of on-broad sensors and audio
to locate mobile devices. The main contributions of this work are:
• W e design SG -LO C , a system to efficiently group and locate mobile users in
proximity. The localization process cleverly leverage on-broad sensors and
multilateration algorithms without any infrastructure support.
• W e characterize the challenges of implementing SG -LO C , namely significant
drift in integration of inertial m easurem ent unit (IM U ) sensors, signal detection
in environment with highly self-correlated am bient noise, sampling rate drift
between different devices, best moving strategy for drawing gestures.
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• SG -LO C operates in the application layer without relying on any modification
to the OS. W e have implemented S G -L O C on commercial smartphones and
performed extensive evaluation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Th e related work is presented
in Section 5.2. The main idea and system architecture of S G -L O C , followed by
the algorithm for each component, are described in Section 5.3. W e present our
implementation in Section 5.4 and evaluation in Section 5.5. Limitations and the
future work are discussed in Section 5.6. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.7.

5.2

Related Work

Localization without G PS has been studied over two decades. Most of techniques
can be broadly classified into two categories based on the type of media: Radio
Frequency (RF) based techniques and Acoustic techniques. W e nam e some re
lated works in the following.

RF based techniques. In these techniques, location is determined by measur
ing the radio signals sent from W i-Fi APs or cellular towers. Among them, received
signal strength (R S S) is commonly leveraged, since it can be easily measured by
commercial wireless cards. By profiling R SS fingerprints for each location, localiza
tion is performed by finding a location with the matched fingerprint [2 1 ,6 3 ,9 2 ,9 4 ].
Besides that, FM radio [30] and channel responses from multiple O F D M subcarri
ers [73] are recently proposed as signatures. Different from signature-based ap
proaches, several techniques exist for deriving range, angle and proximity informa
tion from radio signals, and then positions can be inferred by applying geometric
algorithms.

Time-of-arrival (TO A ) systems such as [95] determ ine the distance

between devices by measuring RF propagation delays. Time-difference-of-arrival
(TD O A ) systems such as

[51] rely on the signal difference in arrival time and
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phase on time-synchronized devices to determine range. Angle-of-arrival (AOA)
systems [34] utilize the directions from which a signal is received to derive po
sitions. Through measuring the RSS of RF signals, the location of devices can
be also determined by employing a radio propagation model [22, 32, 38]. These
approaches do not provide provisions to accurately locate nearby mobile users in
any circumstance, since they typically need profiling in advance, special hardware
design, or only provide coarse-grained precision (e.g., room-level).

Acoustic techniques. Acoustic techniques can m easure the range more pre
cisely, owing to its relatively slow speed compared with RF signal. Hence, most
acoustic localization schemes leverage range-based approaches. M any systems
such as [4 2 ,4 3 ,6 9 ] adopt custom hardware to m easures the time-of-flight of mod
ulated ultrasonic signals to estimate the range between devices.

The ENSBox

system [37] leverages microphone array to obtain orientation information for local
ization. These approaches cannot be applied to mobile phones without additional
hardware. The BeepBeep system [66 ] designed to work with ordinary mobile de
vices with speaker/microphone introduces a novel w ay to m easure the range based
on the elapsed time between two time-of-arrival (E TO A ) of two audio tones. Based
on BeepBeep, the work [71] uses multiple speakers and microphones to perform
phone-to-phone localization in 3D space.

SwordFight [97] improves BeepBeep

by supporting fast and continuous phone-to-phone ranging. Different from those
approaches, only a single device emits audio tones in our work, thus eliminating
the requirement of time synchronization and significantly improve the scalability.
Recent work [52] proposes another acoustic TD O A -based ranging technique for
mobile phone self-localization with infrastructure support. In addition, acoustic fin
gerprint is also used for indoor localization such as the work [77].

Miscellaneous. There also has been research focused on hybrid techniques
of both RF based and acoustic localization. W A LR U S [25] can achieve room-level
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localization in office environment by broadcasting the identity of the room through
sound and Wi-Fi channels. Centaur [61] improves the resolution of localization by
acoustic ranging plus Bayesian inference. Acoustic ranging techniques are also
leveraged to detect driver phone use [91], and pair indented devices by a pointing
gesture [67]. Other related works in the context expect for localization is to lever
age IMU sensors for the movement recognition. The techniques proposed in the
work [18] can recognize human handwriting using phones. Methods described in
the work [56] can recognize human activities. Those algorithms relies on IMU sen
sors to extract the features of the movement, while our targeted problem is more
challenging that demands measuring the precise displacement of the movement.

5.3

System Design and Algorithm

In this section, we introduce S G -LO C , a system uses acoustic signals to group and
locate mobile phone users in proximity simultaneously. In our system, a user who is
responsible for setting up a local network is requested to move her phone through
a simple gesture to locate other users. After the network is set up, the relative
location of each user is displayed on every user's screen. Next, w e present the key
idea of our system followed by the architecture and its components.

5.3.1

Overview

In the rest of this chapter, the user who initiates the process of localization is called
the sender and other users are called receivers. The main idea of our localization
scheme is illustrated in Fig. 5.1 for the case of one sender and one receiver. To
locate the receiver, the sender will move her phone through a simple gesture, say
from Loci to Loc2 to Loc3 and then back to L o c i. During the movement, several
audio tones are emitted in different locations. Suppose the receiver is located at
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the algorithm where the sender’s phone moves from Loci to Loc2
to Loc3 and back to L o c i. The receiver's phone is stationary at Loc4.
Loc4.

Due to the spatial change of sender's location between two consecutive

tones, the time interval measured by the sender is different from that measured by
the receiver. Fig. 5.2 depicts such a difference for the first segment of the movement
(i.e., from Loci to Loc2), where t A and t B are the time intervals measured by the
sender and the receiver respectively. Because the Loc2 is closer to the receiver,
tB is slightly smaller than tA. With tA - t B and the speed of sound, w e can compute
the distance difference dd using the following equation:

dd = d\4 — C?24 = c ■(tA — t B),

where di4 is defined as the distance between Loci and Loc4 and d24 refers to the
distance between Loc2 and Loc4.

Given dd, a hyperbolic curve is determined,

which indicates the possible locations of the receiver (i.e., every point on the curve
will incur the same distance difference). Any pair of tones can determine such a
curve, so that the receiver is finally located at the intersection point. Leveraging
this idea, our system can position multiple receivers on a 2D plane by just three
beeps. The remaining questions are how to obtain the coordinates of each point
(i.e., L o ci, Loc2 and Loc3) and how to m easure the distance difference. W e utilize
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the difference of beep interval between the sender and the re
ceiver.
IMU sensors to address the first issue, and use speakers/microphones for the sec
ond issue. In the following sections, w e elaborate the system architecture followed
by each component.

5.3.2

Architecture

Fig. 5.3 depicts the system architecture of SG -LO C . In our system, only the sender
emits beeps which are triggered by motion sensors. The rule is as follows: the
first beep is triggered by the initial movement. That location is referred to as the
origin (0,0). During the movement, each pause will trigger a beep sound. W hen the
phone returns to the original location, the last beep is played. Using this rule, each
beep is emitted at the ending point of every segment. As a result, the Doppler effect
that harms the accuracy of any acoustic localization scheme is mitigated naturally.
The reason why we need the sender return back to the origin is to compensate
various drifts that we elaborate later.
Specifically, the m ovement tracking algorithm (T) and beep detection algorithm (2)
on the sender side are used to track the trail of the movement and m easure the
beep intervals respectively. On the receiver side, the beep intervals derived from
the microphone are transmitted to the sender at the time of association. Based on
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Figure 5.3: System architecture o f SG-LOC
the movement trail and the beep intervals, the sender can calculate the coordinates
when emitting a beep. Based on the beep intervals on both sender and receiver
sides, the sender can derive the distance difference mentioned in Section 5.3.1.
All of these are finally used to compute the location of receivers via our positioning
algorithm. In next sections, each component is presented in detail.

5.3.3

Positioning Algorithm

Since three beeps are minimal requirement to position a device in a 2D plane, we
first present the positioning algorithm for three beeps and then extend it to more
than three beeps.

Positioning algorithm for three beeps. Suppose a receiver is located at the
coordinates {x,y). The coordinates of three beeps are ( 0, 0), ( x i , y x), and ( x 2 , y2) re
spectively. The distance difference derived from beep intervals on both the sender
and receiver sides are denoted as ddx and dd2. Thus, we have the following equa
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tions:

ddi

=

y / ( x - x\)2 + ( y ~

V i ) 2

-

\ A 2 + y2

dd2 = y/ ( x - x 2)2 + ( y - Vi )2 ~ \ A 2 + V2

(5.1)

Combining the above two equations produces a linear equation for x and y in terms
of Ax + By = C, where A, B and C a r e all constant variables given ( xi , yi ) , (x2, y 2 ),
ddi and dd2. Now either x or y can be expressed by the other variable and substi
tuted back into Eq. 5.1 to derive the closed-form for x and y using (x i, yi), (x 2, 2/2),
ddx and dd2.
The triangle inequality states that the difference of lengths of any two sides must
be less than the length of remaining side. That m eans the absolute values of ddi
and

dd2must be less than the moving lengths ^ /x \ + y \ and y jx \ + y \ respectively.

In practice, due to measurement errors ddi may be slightly larger the \J x 2 + y'f or
less than - yj x2 + y2 where i e 1,2. In both cases, w e cannot solve the equations.
Instead, if in the former case, the receivers are estimated som ewhere in the mov
ing direction. Otherwise, the receivers are deem ed in the opposite of the moving
direction.
Solving Eq. 5.1 may produce one, two or none solutions in practice.

If two

solutions exist, additional information is needed to select one point. For example,
in a meeting room where all people are sitting around a table and every people is
in front of the others, the solution indicating that the receiver in behind should be
ignored. For the none solution case, extra beeps are needed.

Positioning algorithm for more than three beeps. With more than three
beeps, the happenings of abnormal cases can be reduced and the positioning
accuracy can be improved.

Let the coordinates of the first beep be (0,0) and

(xt, Vi ) i = 1, 2,3, • • • for other beeps. W e have an equation for each delta distance
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as follows:

ddi = V ( x - xi)2 + ( y - Vi)2 - \ A 2 + y2Similar to Eq. 5.1, combing every ddi and ddi yields a linear equation in two vari
ables x and y. Suppose there are n beeps. All of n .- 2 linear equations can be
expressed in the following matrix form

A i

B i

A 2

B 2

C i

X

C 2

y

1
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o e

i

£
CQ

C4
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As long as n > 4, variables x and y can be solved without substituting them back to
the equation of ddi. The least squares method can be used to find an approximate
solution to the overdetermined system. The point derived by such a method has
the minimal distance to all the curves. However, according to our experience, least
squares method does not work well in practice, since some curves are more noisy
than others due to measurem ent errors. Including these curves for calculation may
degrade the overall accuracy. Our method is to first select a unique set of three
beeps from n beeps. The total number of sets is equal to Q ) . For each set, the
positioning algorithm for three beeps is applied to extract possible solutions. The
direction of those points to the origin is then calculated. The majority of points within
a certain angle ( 10° is used in current implantation) are kept and others are filtered
out as outliers. Finally, the geometric centroid of all remaining points is determined
as the location of the target. Although the accuracy of localization may be slightly
deteriorated when a very accurate solution is averaged by several less accurate
solutions, this method can output a good solution for general cases.
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5.3.4

Movement tracking algorithm

Our system uses IMU sensors namely accelerom eter and gyroscope to track the
movement of the phone. These motion sensors on smartphones are typically low
cost Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (M E M S ) that are not specifically used to
track the precise movement. Therefore, the accurate displacement measurement
of the phone is challenging. The main m easurem ent errors come from the follow
ing sources. First, accelerometer and gyroscope are expected to report the read
ings on axes of phone's frame. However, if the internal m easurem ent units are
slightly misaligned with the phone frame during fabrication, the reported readings
are drifted. The second error source is from the gravity. If the screen plate of the
phone is not orthogonal to the gravity direction, both x-axis and y-axis readings may
be added by a small component of the gravity. For example, if the screen plate is
skewed about 1 degree, the gravity provides O . l l m j s 2 (i.e., 9.8m / s 2 * s i n ( p i / 180))
component to x-y axis plate, thus the phone appears to move 8.5cm distance after
1s even though it is actually stationary. Hence, how to remove the gravity correctly
is critical to the displacement measurement. Third, owing to the Brownian motion,
white noise is generated by thermal agitation due to the random charge carrier mo
tion inside the sensors, resulting in a noisy signal sensor output. Last, during the
movement phone’s orientation may change, while each sensor reading is in phone's
instantaneous coordinate system. For example, before moving the phone's y axis
is towards the north. After moving once, the phone's y axis is towards the east. The
current y axis readings are actually the x axis readings before, and the x axis read
ings now are the negative y axis readings before. Without transforming all sensor
readings into a reference coordinate system, the estimated positions are not useful.
To derive displacement, w e double integrate the readings from accelerometer.
The first integration transforms the acceleration to velocity, and the second inte
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gration then converts the velocity to the displacement. Since the sensor readings
are generated at a certain sampling rate, we use the trapezoidal rule to numerically
approximate the integral between two samples. Suppose a sample is generated at
timestamp t x followed by another sample at t 2, and the values of each sample are
denoted by f ( t x) and f ( t 2) respectively. The trapezoidal rule works by approximat
ing the region under the function / between t x and t 2 by calculating:

As mentioned above, there exist many errors in sensor readings. If w e directly
apply double integration on raw readings, these errors will accumulated by each
integration and lead to significant drift. To address this problem, w e propose the
following approaches to reduce the drift.

Motion detection. The integration will accumulate the errors into drift. Typically,
the longer the period of integration, the larger the drift. To reduce the drift, it is
important to decrease the integration period. The first step is to detect when the
phone is moving and when it is not, and only integrate on the period when the
motion is detected. To detect the motion, w e separate all samples into bins with
each size equal to 10 samples and compute the standard deviation of each bin. If
the deviation in a bin is greater than a pre-defined threshold, the first sample in such
a bin is conservatively regarded as the starting of a movement. Given a motion is
detected, if the deviations in consecutive two bins are less than the threshold, the
stop of that movement is detected.

Rotation transformation. Rotation transformation seeks to transform the ac
celeration from phone's frame to a global reference frame. Since the effect of grav
ity is consistent, it can be eliminated by velocity compensation described later. To
perform rotation transformation, w e first need to compute the rotation matrix. The
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gyroscope measures the instantaneous angular speed around phone's x, y, and z
axis. Given the initial phone's frame is the reference frame, the output of the gyro
scope is integrated over time to calculate the angle rotation from sampling instance
to the initial. Again, w e only integrate the readings when m ovem ent is detected.
Suppose at timestamp t u the angle changes on x, y, z axis are roll (<p), pitch (9),
and yaw (t/>) respectively. The rotation matrix is calculated as follows,
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The product of the rotation matrix and the accelerom eter readings in phone's frame
yields the transformed acceleration.

Velocity compensation. W hen users hold their phones to draw a triangle, it
is natural for them to stop at three corners.

During the stop, the phone should

be stationary and its speed is zero. However, the acceleration residues caused
by the gravity and the misalignment of internal sensors typically are integrated to
a non-zero velocity at a stop. If the velocity is not compensated, the integrated
displacement will drift significantly. The method to compensate the velocity is as
follows. First, we detect three segment movements using the method just men
tioned before. At the end of each segment, if the integrated velocity is not zero, all
velocities integrated within such a segment is adjusted to the following value:

v ' i t j ) = v ( t j ) - v { t k) tj _ t l . i
tk
W

e [i , k }

where v ' ( t j ) denotes the adjusted velocity at tj t v(t j ) refer to the originally integrated
velocity at tjs U and t k represent the starting and ending time of a segment. Using
this method, constant gravity and sensor misalignment offset can be eliminated at
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the same time.

Relative displacement compensation. In our scheme, the phone will return to
the original point after drawing a triangle. Thus, the relative displacement between
the starting point and ending point should be zero.

However, due to the errors

mentioned at the beginning of this section, the integrated displacement may not be
zero. To have an accurate displacement measurement, we need to compensate the
integrated displacement over time. Slightly different from the velocity compensation
that is applied to each segment, the relative displacement compensation is applied
to the whole triangle once. First, we detect the beginning of the first segment t lt
the end of the last segment tn, and all stationary duration

before a timestamp

ti. The displacement is adjusted as follows:

d'(ti) = d(ti) - d(tn) t%
tn

5.3.5

tl

St^
St(t n)

Beep detection algorithm

Due to the uncertainty delay between the instance when a command is issued to
emit a tone and the instance when the tone is physically emitted by the hardware,
the actual interval between two beeps on the sender side cannot be accurately
determined by the beep issuing time in the software.

To address this problem,

we adopt the method similar to works [66 ], where the sender needs to record audio
waves from its microphone when beeping. Since the distance between the sender’s
speaker and its microphone never changes, the time interval between two beeps
captured by the microphone is exactly the sam e as they are physically emitted by
the speaker.
Furthermore, we can detect the starting points of beeping by processing the au
dio files recorded from the microphone, and calculate the time interval by counting
how many samples between two beeps. Compared with directly using software
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timestamps to calculate the interval, converting the number of samples to time can
yield more accurate results. That is because the sampling is typically performed by
hardware. Each sample is performed at a specific rate (e.g., 44.1 kHz). The num
ber of samples divided by the sampling rate yields the time duration. This method
can cancel out the uncertainty delay between the instances when the beep is de
tected by the hardware and seen by the software. Furthermore, this method does
not require dock synchronization between devices. It is practical for implementa
tion. As shown in Fig. 5.2, at Loci and Loc2, the sender A emits two beeps. Both A
and the receiver B record audio from their microphones and obtain TDO A: t A and
t B■ Then beep interval is calculated as t A - t B .

5.3.5.1

FFT-based beep detection

For better performance, the beep signal should be designed carefully to cope with
the following issues. First, the sound signal will be attenuated and distorted by the
communication channel, and negatively affected by the environment noise. Thus,
the signal should be designed to have a good Signal-to-Noise Ratio (S N R ) at the
receiver.

Second, the signal should have a better resistance to multi-path and

non-Hne-of-sight (N LO S) effects. Due to these effects, the first arrival signal at the
receiver may not have the largest energy. It imposes difficulties to detect the arrival
signal and determine the D TD O A accurately. Based on the above considerations,
we choose a linear chirp waveforms.
The waveform detection is performed by the matched filtering process, where
the emitted signal is correlated with received signals to determine when a beep
is present in the received signals. Let {«*} (i = 1, 2, ■■■ ,n ) denote the signal se
quence recorded from the microphone, and { t n } ( i =

1,2,••• , m) represent the

emitted signal (i.e., a beep). In matched filtering, a sliding window with the length
equal to m moves from the beginning to the end of { w j sample by sample. The
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sample correlation coefficient r is computed as follows:

r=

T.Zi(ui

-y)

where u and v are sample means of the sliding window and { v{} respectively. The
value of r may vary for each sample. A large r m eans there is a high similarity
between two sequences. As a result, any sample with a much larger coefficient than
its nearby samples is identified as the arrival of a beep. The number of samples
between two beeps divided by the sampling rate infers the beep interval.
However, the calculation of correlation coefficient is computationally expensive
especially when n is large. Som e work [61,66] offloads the computation to a power
ful cloud server or leverage the parallel G PU hardware to accelerate the process.
Such approaches work but at the expense of extra communication overhead or
power consumption. In recent work, Qiu et al [71] propose to use an energy thresh
old to reduce the search space in the sample sequence. However, setting such a
threshold is challenging because the ambient noise m ay be large compared to the
emitted sound in some scenarios. If the threshold is set too low, the computation
overhead is still considerable. By contrast, if the threshold is set too high, not all
beeps can be captured. To overcome this problem, Zhang et al.

[97] uses auto

correlation to estimate a rough position of a beep and then apply cross-correlation
to identify the exact position. Auto-correlation characterizes the self similarity of a
sequence. In their approach, a beep is composed of two sam e sequences: one
followed by the other. If a sequence is found most similar to its half-lag (-shift) se
quence, a beep is detected. Auto-correlation can be computed fast but inherently
has fatten peak, so it is difficult to detect the position of a beep accurately. That is
why cross-correlation is used in the second stage. However, this method cannot
be applied to the scenario with highly self-correlated ambient noise, such as AC.
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Figure 5.4: Beep detection by auto-correlation and cross-correlation, where sampling rate
is 44.1kHz
Fig. 5.4 shows results of both auto-correlation and cross-correlation of recorded
samples in our office. It is seen that the auto-correlating hardly detect beeps due
to the background noise.
In this work, w e propose a fast Fourier transform (FFT) based filter to reduce
the unnecessary search space. First, the emitted chirp sound is converted to fre
quency domain by FFT. Next, the received sequence is divided into equal blocks
with the sam e size as the chirp. In each block, FFT is computed to find whether a
similar spanning frequency is detected. If so, a beep is found. In this block and its
previous block, we then use cross-correlation to derive the accurate position. Oth
erwise, we skip this block to reduce computation overhead. It should be noticed
that the previous block must be considered, because a beep may cross two con
secutive blocks in received signals. Without taking the previous block into account,
we may have a chance to miss a beep. Suppose N beeps are emitted each with
length equal to m and the received signal has n samples in total. To detect the
position of all beeps, our approach needs about © (n lo g m ) time to process FFT
plus © (m 2) time to calculate cross-correlation. Later in the evaluation section, we
present experiment results to confirm the efficiency of this method.
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5.3.5.2

Sampling rate drift

In practice, different smartphones may have a slight drift on a given sampling rate.
In other words, during a certain period of time, two phones are very possible to
collect different number of samples even though the sampling rate is the same.
According to our experiments, this drift often occurs on different brand of phones.
For examples, two phones: a Samsung Galaxy Nexus and a H TC evo 3D , are used
for test. The nexus emitted two beeps separated by 3s. Both phones w ere station
ary and recorded samples from their microphones. W e found that the number of
samples recorded by evo was always less than that of nexus by 14 samples. In that
case, the measured distance difference is inaccurate. To our best knowledge, this
is the first work that pinpoints the impact of sampling rate drift on acoustic ranging
systems.
To cope with this problem, we request users to move their phones back to the
original location. The first beep and the last beep are then emitted at the same
location. With this assumption, we can estimate the speed of drift and compensate
the measured beep intervals. According to our extensive experiments, we found
the drift rate is constant over time. Hence, a linear model is good enough to correct
the intervals.

5.4

Impact of measurement errors

In this section, we discuss the impact of possible m easurem ent errors on the local
ization accuracy and then present the guidelines for our system design. Basically,
there are two sources of errors in our system: distance difference errors due to
the acoustic subsystem and displacement m easurem ent errors owing to the IMU
sensors.
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5.4.1

Distance difference errors

In our acoustic subsystem, some factors may cause inaccurately measuring the
distance changes between sender and receiver due to sender's movement. First,
since we use acoustic signals to detect the distance change, the resolution of
detecting a tiny change in distance is determined by the sampling rate of speak
ers/microphones. For example, recent commercial sound cards support maximum
44.1kH z sampling rate, so that the minimal interval between consecutive samples
is 2 2 .7 ^s. With the speed of sound equal to 341 m/s, a sample difference is trans
lated to 0.8cm changes in distance. In that case, the measured distance changes
can be only the multiples of 0.8cm, resulting in resolution-related errors. Second,
the acoustic signal will be distorted on both phase and frequency when received at
the receiver due to the multi-path effect and the am bient noise during propagation.
Thus, the cross-correlation method may not detect the precise time when the beep
arrives. As a result, the distance difference derived by both sender and receivers
may include errors. To analyze the impact of these errors, w e assum e there exists
a bound A r. It means that if the exact distance difference is r, the measured value
r ' should fall into the range [r - A , r + A]. According to the results from previous

research and the verification by our experiments, the standard deviation of distance
difference errors are within 1cm in practice. Therefore, we set A r = 1.
Consider on a 2D plane the sender moves along a segment and beeps at two
spots. If the distance change is measured without any error, a curve consisting of
possible locations should pass through the exact receiver. However, measurem ent
errors make the curve depart from the actual locations. A lower bound and a upper
bound of such a departure are determined by r - A r and r + A r. Fig. 5.5 illustrates
an example, where the target's phone is located at the coordinates (0,500), while
the sender’s phone is moved from (0 ,0 ) to ( 21, 21) and beep at each point. The
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Figure 5.5: Possible sector of the target device determined by a single movement, where
the maximum measurement errors of distance change is ±1 cm
angle between the target's direction and the direction of movement is defined as
8. The target may exist at any point within the sector embraced by both lower
bound and upper bound curves. W e define a as the angle of such a sector. A
smaller a is better with respect to the localization accuracy. This exam ple is used to
demonstrate the impact of different direction of m ovement (i.e., 8) on the localization
accuracy (i.e., a ). Note that even though different numbers rather than (0,500),

(21,21), and ± lc m are used, the conclusion is still similar.
Fig. 5.6 depicts the relation between 8 and a, where the value of 8 ranges from
-180° to 180°. The positive angles represent the clockwise rotations, whereas the
negative angles refer to the counter-clockwise rotations. W e see that in the case
that the sender's device is moved towards or opposite to the direction of target,
the corresponding a is largest, i.e., the lowest localization accuracy. However, in
the other case that the direction of movement is perpendicular to the direction of
target, the smallest a is achieved. Therefore, the first guideline for movements is
conducted that it is better to move perpendicular than parallel to the direction o f
target.
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Figure 5.6: Relation between 9 and a, where 9 defines the angle of target direction and
moving direction and a refers to the sector angle both illustrated in Fig. 5.5
From Fig. 5.6, we find that any negative 0 and its corresponding positive 9 with
the same absolute value have the sam e a. In fact, they have different capability
to locate the target. Among all errors in the sector determined by the lower bound
and upper bound curves, if the estimated direction of target is greater than the exact
direction of target (i.e., on its right side), w e define these errors as positive ones. By
contrast, if estimated location of target is on the left side, we define them as negative
errors. Fig. 5.7 shows the percentage of positive and negative errors against 9. It
is seen that when 9 is negative, angle errors are prone to be positive. On the other
hand, positive 9s are likely to cause negative angle errors. Recall that our scheme
demands at least two movements to compute a determined location of target. By
overlapping positive errors and negative errors, the final error should be reduced
significantly. Therefore, the second guideline for movements is that if moving more
than once, the directions o f movements are better to flank the direction o f target.

5.4.2

Displacement errors

W e have already discussed the effect of errors in measuring the distance differ
ence on the localization accuracy. In this section, w e elaborate the effect of errors
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of angle errors against 6
in measuring the displacement of sender's phone. The reasons why we have dis
placement errors are described before. Suppose the exact movement of sender's
phone is from (0,0) to (a^, y x). Due to errors, the estimated trail of movement is from
(0 ,0 ) to ( x [ , y [ ) that may ( 1) have variant distance, and (2 ) rotate slightly from the
exact direction of movement. In the following, each case is discussed individually.
First, we assume that (x i, y x) and ( x [ , y [ ) are in the sam e direction but have differ
ent distance \ J x [ 2 + y ' 2 ± y / x x2 + y x2. The maximum deviation between { x \ , y [ )
and ( x , y ) determines an error region. W e then vary the direction of movement
and examine the area of the error region. Th e results are quite similar to Fig. 5.6
and Fig. 5.7. It is concluded that moving perpendicularly to the direction of target
is better than moving in parallel. Second, w e assum e the distance is accurately
measured but in different orientation fj- ^

In this case, w e find the direction of

movement has little effect on the localization accuracy. Combining two cases, the
aforementioned guidelines are still valid.
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of angle errors against 0

5.4.3

Better moving strategy

How to decide a moving strategy is important because it affects the accuracy of
localization. If knowing the location of target in advance, the best strategy for two
movements is shown in Fig. 5 .8 (a ) according to the guidelines. However, that strat
egy may result in a poor estimation for a target whose location is approximately
parallel to the direction of movement like Fig. 5.8(b). Therefore, without knowledge
of target's location, an equilateral triangle is the best moving strategy to achieve a
better performance for any target on average. That is because no matter where
the target is located, we can find two sides that can embrace the direction of target
(see Fig. 5.8).
In practice, our scheme is not very sensitive to the shape of triangle. People are
free to draw any shape of triangle without sticking to a perfect equilateral triangle.
Instead of the shape, how people draw the triangle such as the speed of movement
is more critical to the accuracy. It also should be noticed that to improve the robust
of our localization algorithm, five beeps are emitted along a triangle gesture. W e
design a new moving strategy to draw a triangle: starting from the middle of the
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bottom side to the left corner to up corner to right corner and then back to the
origin. That strategy combines the benefits of both line and triangle gestures. The
detail is described in the evaluation section.

5.5

Security Enhancement

In this chapter, we consider two types of attacks. In the first attack, malicious users
may launch Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to disrupt the process of localization.
Here, we assume adversaries can eavesdrop legitimate beeps but can hardly jam
those beeps. First, since each beep is very short and randomly emitted by users,
predicting the precise timing for jamming is very difficult. Second, it is easy to be
detected if adversaries jam the sound channel for a long time.

Instead, a very

effective DoS attack is for the adversaries to generate fake beeps to impersonate
the sender and prevent other users from correctly calculating beep intervals. To
mitigate this attack, our security-enhanced system leverage a hash chain to ensure
that users can derive beep intervals based on legitimate beeps.
Before emitting beeps, the sender first generates a random number R and cal
culates a hash chain of R.

Let hn (R) denote the output of hashing R n times.

Initially, the head of the hash chain (say, h W0(R)) is broadcasted to users via bea
cons. W hen the user emits a beep, a linear chirp sound followed by an audio tone
encoded with the next value in the chain (say, h " ( R ) , h 9S(R) and so forth) is played.
After locating every beep in samples, the receiver can decode a hash value for that
beep. To verify whether the ith beep is valid, the receiver computes the hashing of
the received value one more time (e.g., h(h98(R)). If the output matches the value
for the i - 1th beep (say h " ( R ) ) , the beep is accepted otherwise rejected. Each
time the hash value is different, and thus cannot be guessed or duplicated by an
attacker.
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Without broadcasting the head of pre-calculated hash chain, our scheme still
works but relies on receivers to supply all hash chains (one by the sender and
others by adversaries) to the sender for authentication. In this case, all hash chains
of previous beeps are stored. For a new beep, the receiver computes the hashing
one more time and tries to match with all stored chains. If matched, such a beep is
added to an existing hash chain. Otherwise, a new chain is created. In addition, any
beep with duplicated hash value is directly discarded. At the end, the beep intervals
for all chains are reported. The sender only accepts the intervals belonging to its
own chain.
For the second attack, w e consider spoofing attacks where malicious users who
are not in proximity of benign users (e.g., outside the room) try to join the group.
Without physically staying closer to users, the adversaries cannot hear all beeps
and report valid beep intervals when associating to the network. The user who
is responsible for setting up the network can thereby exclude these adversaries.
However, more sophisticated adversaries can still join the network by by sending
the forged intervals or replaying intervals reported by benign users.

To defend

against this attack, each user has to prove it received all beeps. The details are
described as follows.
As mentioned above, each beep is identified by a unique hash value. Suppose
m beeps are emitted by the sender and their hash values are v u v2, - - - , v m- All
these beeps can be found by checking whether vx = h( v2), v2 = h(v3) and so forth.
To report the intervals between consecutive two beeps, the receiver has to supply
a hashed value of h {v x © v2 © • • • © vm, I D ) to prove all beeps are actually heard.
The adversaries who did not hear all beeps cannot calculate

© v2 © • • • © vm.

Replaying other uses’ requests also does not work because the reported intervals
are assigned by each user's ID.
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5.6

Implementation

W e implemented our localization scheme on Google Galaxy Nexus running An
droid v4.2.1 as a sender and various other Android phones such as Galaxy Nexus
(v4.2.1), Nexus S (v4.1.x), H TC 3D EVO (v4.1.x) and Samsung Droid Charger
(v2.3.x) as receivers. In the following, we present the details of our implementation.

5.6.1

Beep signal design

Similar to previous research [5 2 ,6 1 ,6 6 ], w e choose a linear chirp as a beep, since
the linear chirp offers good pulse compressibility and increased signal-to-noise ra
tio (SN R), thus making beep signals easy to be detected. For a linear chirp, the
signal frequency increases over time. Given the duration of such a chirp and the
increasing factor, we can determine the frequency range of a chirp. According to
our experience, the frequency range will affect the accuracy of beep detection. The
maximum range of spectrum that Galaxy Nexus can support is within [0,22.05k] Hz.
To study the effect of different frequency ranges, w e first designed a linear chirp
with audible frequency range [1k,5k] H z (humans can hear audio frequencies up to
[19k,20k] Hz). Then, w e tested another linear chirp with near inaudible frequency
range [18k,22k] Hz. After playing these two chirps separately, w e found that re
ceivers can detect both signals but with varying levels of accuracy to pinpoint the
precise location of the beep in recorded samples. As illustrated in Fig. 5.9, lower
frequencies (left figure) typically have smaller sidelobes (marked by left and right
circles) compared to the correlation peak (marked by the middle circle). It is easy to
distinguish the correlation peak from other sidelobes. However, higher frequencies
have large sidelobes, so that once the beep signal is distorted by ambient noise
and multipath effect, the correlation peak may be smaller than a sidelobe. Hence,
the location of the beep is likely to be falsely identified. To m ake our system robust
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of two frequency ranges of beeps
to dynamic environment, the frequency range of beep is set to [1 k,5k] Hz.
For the length of a beep sound, we tested three different durations: 25ms, 50ms
and 100ms under 44.1kH z samples rate, and found the length has little effect on
the accuracy of beep detection. To reduce the computation overhead, we set the
length of beeps to 25ms.

5.6.2

Beep playing design

In our implementation, the time when to play a beep sound is triggered by the
movement of the gesture. Before the phone is moved, the first beep is played.
Thereafter, once a pause of movement is detected at the ending point of a segment,
a beep is emitted. The reasons why we choose to play a beep when phone is
relatively stationary are in two aspects. First, Doppler shifts can be mitigated. If a
beep is emitted when the phone is moving, the beep may be shifted in frequency
domain, making the detection inaccurate. Second, it is easy to find the positions for
beep playing from the gesture trail. Since it is difficult to control both IMU sensors
and microphone to physically start at the sam e time, as well as obtain the precise
timestamp of each audio sample, translating the beep playing time in samples to
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beep playing location in the moving trail is not easy. Using this method, each beep
is emitted when the phone is stationary, so by looking at the ending point from
the moving trail, we can derive the beep playing location without complex time
matching.
W e use AudioTrack class with static mode to play beeps. The buffer size is
set to be the minimal for a sample rate of 44.1kH z.

W e noticed that the beep

sound occupies less space than the minimal buffer size. In this case, the beep
is not actually sent out until the buffer is full. To reduce the playing lag, we call
AudioTrack.stop to force playing the sound once the buffer is written. To record
waves from microphone, we use AudioRecord with an additional shadow buffer to
reduce the contention when copying buffer to memory.

5.7

Evaluation

In this section, we use real-world experiments to assess the performance of SGLOC. W e have evaluated our localization algorithms by answering the following
questions: 1) W hat is the accuracy of displacement determination algorithm based
on IMU sensors? 2) How severe are the sampling drifts of microphone on commer
cial smartphones? 3) W hat is the accuracy of localization algorithms with respect
to both angle and distance errors? 4 ) W hat is the on average computation time to
locate other devices. 5) W hat is the power consumption of S G -LO C ?
In experiments, we use a Galaxy Nexus smartphone with stock Android v.4.2.2
as a sender. Other smartphones including another Galaxy Nexus, H TC E V O 3D,
Nexus S, Droid Charger running various Android versions from v2.x to v4.x are
used as receivers. Note that the main contribution of this work is the localization
scheme, so the network setup is not evaluated.
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of different gesture with and without pause

5.7.1

Accuracy of IMU sensors

Different gestures and moving strategies have varying effect on the accuracy of
our displacement determination algorithm. W e investigated the performance under
line, triangle and circle gestures with and without pause during the movement. To
obtain the ground truth, we first drew specific trails (i.e., line, triangle and circle) as
references and asked users to move their phones following the trails.
In the first experiment, a line gesture is tested. Starting from the middle of the
line, phone is moved along the line and first towards the left ending point then to
the right ending point and then back to the origin. At two ending points, movement
will pause for a short time which is decided by users. After the displacement is
calculated by our algorithm, we m easure the errors between the estimated ending
points and the exact points. The experiment is repeated 30 times. The left cylin
der in Fig. 5.10 depicts the average results with error bar presenting the standard
deviation.
In the second experiment, a triangle gesture is tested. As explained in Section
5.4, drawing a triangle here is slightly different from a regular triangle drawing.
The movement first starts from the middle of the bottom side, then towards the
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left corner, up corner, right corner respectively and then back. At each corner, the
movement is also paused. For comparison, w e conducted the third experiment with
drawing a circle through three reference points without any pause. The middle and
right cylinders in Fig. 5.10 show results for each case.
It is seen that line gesture has the smallest estimation error which is slightly less
than triangle gesture and significantly less than circle gesture. W e conclude that
pausing can significantly help the displacement estimation and the gesture costing
short time is typically better the gesture costing long time. Therefore, we use simple
gestures with natural pause, namely line and triangle for localization.

5.7.2

Validation of sampling drifts

To demonstrate how severe the sampling drifts are, w e measured several phones.
The results are shown in Table 5.1, where a Galaxy Nexus phone is a sender and
other phones are receivers. Six beeps are played with intervals ranging from 0.5s
to 2.5s. Both the sender and receivers were never moved during the whole exper
iment. Without the sampling drift, the number of samples collected between two
beeps on sender and receiver sides should be exactly the sam e (e.g., like the case
of two Galaxy Nexus phones).
However, we indeed observed the drifts between phones of different brands.
Table 5.1 shows the rounded m ean values of ten experiments. The results are
quite stable. Among these ten experiments, the maximum deviate we observed is
only one sample. The positive values m eans the sampling rate of the sender is
faster than that of the receiver and the negative values means the opposite. W e
also changed the roles of sender and receiver for each phone, the sam e drifts were
observed.
From the table, w e see the drifts linearly increase over time. This validates our
compensation approach described in Section 5.3. That is why the last beep has to
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Galaxy Nexus
Galaxy Nexus
HTC EVO 3D
Nexus S
Galaxy S2

1. 0 s
0

1.5s

2

5
3

7
5

-4

-8

-12

0.5s

0
3

0

2 .0 s
0
9
7
-16

2.5s

0
11
9

-20

Table 5.1: Drifts in terms of number of samples over time under 44.1kHz sampling rate
be em itted w hen phone is requested to m ove back to th e origin.

5.7.3

Accuracy of determining direction

Line gesture. As mentioned in Section 5.4, drawing a line is the best for targets
located in the center region.

From Section 5.7.1, w e also know that drawing a

line could introduce less displacement measurem ent errors.

Due to these rea

sons, we first tested our localization algorithms with a line gesture. The gesture
radius is about 20 cm, so two ending points of the line are located at (- 20 ,0 ), ( 20 ,0 ).
Consequently, four beeps are played at (0,0), (-20,0), (20,0) and back to (0,0) (all
units are centimeters). The last beep is used to compensate the unknown sam
pling drifts. Two beep intervals are calculated based on the first-second beep pair
and the first-third beep pair to derive corresponding delta distances. Receivers are
placed along a line which is perpendicular to the moving line, each with 41cm away
from the other. The tested orientations of receivers thereby range from -38° to 35°
with respect to y axis in clockwise rotation. Each location is tested 5 times.
Fig. 5.11 shows the results. W e found that the average angle errors were within
2.5° and the accuracy decreased when the receivers departed from the center.
This is consistent with the the analysis in Section 5.4. It should be noticed that we
indeed tested the cases where receivers were located out of the center region. The
results are bad that we often could not find a solution, hence the results were not
plotted in the figure. In summary, a line gesture achieves good performance for
locating targets in the center region, but bad in the following cases. First, when the
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Figure 5.11: Angle errors with line gesture given targets are located in the left region
angle towards y axis is larger than 40 degree, the degrades significantly. Second,
a line gesture may not distinguish between the front and back region.

Triangle gesture. To overcome the above problems, a triangle gesture with five
beeps is used. A regular triangle only incurs three beeps at each corner. However,
our moving strategy that the movement starts from the middle of the bottom side
can produce five beeps, thus including the sam e advantages of line gestures. In
following experiments, w e investigated our scheme in several locations where a
line gesture cannot work well. The moving radius is kept the sam e and the trial
is from the coordinates (0,0) to (-20,0) to (0,20) to (20,0) then back to (0,0). The
receivers is set to the coordinates (-264,-366), (-264,-244), (-2 64 ,-12 2 ), (-264,0), (264,122), (-264,244) and (-2 64 ,-36 6 ) respectively. Each location is tested 5 times.

The results are shown in Fig. 5.12.

It is seen that the average angle errors

are less than 6 degree. Owing to the symmetry, similar results are obtained for
receivers located in the right panel. Considering both Fig. 5.11 and Fig. 5.12, our
localization algorithm can achieve less than 6 ° angle error in general given gesture
radius equal to 20 cm.
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Figure 5.12: Angle errors with triangle gesture given targets are located in the left region

Moving radius. In addition to the shape of gestures, the moving radius also
has effect on the accuracy. As a rule of thumb, large radius will incur less local
ization errors. W e validate this rule in the following experiments, where receivers
are placed in the center of a sender. W e tested triangles with different moving ra
dius. First, the movement is from the coordinates (0,0) to (-20,0) to (0,20) to (20,0)
and back to (0,0). Next, the moving radius increases, and the moving trail is from
(0,0) to (-40,0) to (0,40) to (40,0) and back to (0,0). Fig. 5.13 depicts the C D F of
angle errors. W e see that the gesture with radius equal to 40cm achieves better
performance. Note that the mean values here are worse than the results shown in
Fig. 5.11, because the outputs in our algorithm for more than three beeps are aver
aged by any possible solutions. Accurate results are deteriorated by the relatively
inaccurate results.

5.7.4

Accuracy of determining distance

Our localization algorithms can estimate the direction of receivers accurately, but in
poor estimation of the distance. That is because the relative m ovem ent of sender's
phone is too small compared to the distances between sender and receivers. A
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Figure 5.13: Angle errors against different moving radius
slight measurement error either in IM U sensors or acoustic systems may cause a
significant departure from the exact point. The larger the distances between sender
and receivers, the bigger the errors. According to our experience, the average
errors are around 1 m when receivers are 2m far aw ay from the sender, and 3m
when receivers are 5m far.
However, to locate group users, we believe that the order of distance is more
useful than the absolute distance. In the case of multiple users located in the same
direction, our localization scheme is still worthy as long as the order of distance
to the sender is correctly determined. In this section, w e present the experiment
results that shows how far two users are apart aw ay in the sam e direction, our
algorithm can detect the correct order with more than 90% probability. This metric
is also known as the localization resolution.
From Fig. 5.14, we found that given the moving radius equal to 20cm , the lo
calization resolution is about 30cm within 1m distance between a sender and a
receiver. That means given a receiver is 1 m far aw ay from the sender, when the
distance of another user to the sender is within 70cm our algorithm can determine
who is closer with high probability.

Otherwise if two receivers are within 30cm
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Figure 5.14: Localization resolution versus relative distance between sender and receivers
under variant moving radius
distance, our algorithm will fail to determine the order. The localization resolution
degrades when the relative distance increases. However, the larger moving radius
is required if high resolution is needed.

5.7.5

Computation time

The finish time of localization process consists of two parts: the movement dura
tion and computation time. W hen a phone is moving, samples collected from the
microphone and IMU sensors are stored in memory or disk (when memory is full).
The entire duration varies according to the shape and radius of the gesture, but
it typically can be finished within 10s. Our algorithm then calculates the moving
trail based on sensor readings, beep intervals based on microphone readings, and
eventually the coordinates of the receivers. Given that all samples are in memory,
the cross-correlation method is first tested then followed by our method. Table 5.2
lists the results. It is seen that our FFT-based correlation method can reduce the
finishing time by more than 90% .
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Gesture
Mean
Std
Cross-correlation (M ean)
Cross-correlation (std)
SG -LO C (m ean)
SG -LO C (std)

Samples

Finish time (s)

Line(4 beeps)
389734
16249
4 6 .0 6
1.78
3.09
0.07

Triangle (5 beeps)
42 70 0 8
9523
50.4
1.16
3.68
0.05

Table 5.2: Comparison of finish time of detecting different number of beeps: traditional
cross-correlation method versus our SG-LOC method
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Figure 5.15: Power consumption o f emitting a beep sound

5.7.6

Power consumption

In our system, a significant contributor to battery drain is the speaker when emitting
beeps. Fig. 5.15 plots the consumed power for a beep. It is seen that the average
power jumps from around 1300m W to 23 00 m W during 25ms (i.e., the duration of
a beep). This overhead also motivates our work to reduce the number of beeps.
W e measured the power consumption of our system on both the sender and
receiver sides.

For locating others, the sender has to turn on the speaker, the

microphone and IMU sensors, but the receiver only needs to open the microphone.
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As a result, the sender is expected to consume more energy than the receiver.
Fig. 5.16 shows the power consumption. In comparison the system power without
SG -LO C is measured when both the screen and Wi-Fi are turned on. As w e see, the
power consumption for the sender increased by 24% (from 1143m W to 1429m W )
when our system is running, while the power consumption for the receiver merely
increased by 6 % (from 1062m W to 1134m W ).
Another significant source of power consumption is the computation overhead.
Hence, we also measured the power for the computation separately. From the re
sults, we found the computation usually incurred around 900m W power consump
tion.

5.7.7

Field test

Finally, we conducted a field test in our office room with 3mx5m size to measure
the overall accuracy of our system.

Five smartphones are placed on the table

(seen in Fig. 5.17), a user is requested to draw a triangle gesture using the phone
without any other limitation. The results show the estimated coordinates of four
phones have less than 1° direction errors and less than 20 cm distance errors on
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Figure 5.17: Field test environment

average. The distance errors are reasonably small so that the smartphones are
placed correctly on the map. W hen the map is transmitted to all the users, each
other users can identify each other correctly by viewing the locations.

5.8

Discussions

Continuously tracking. SG -LO C is originally designed for locating and grouping
users in the network setup stage. To enable the continuous track of users after
that, the localization scheme proposed in SG -LO C can be applied periodically. The
alternative method to achieve continuously tracking is to leverage IMU sensors.
Any rotation or movement of the phone will be detected by the sensors and updated
to other users.

Accurate distance measurement. Our localization scheme can find accurate
orientations of other users but achieve relatively less distance accuracy. To mitigate
this problem, our scheme can be performed on multiple devices. With the angle
information of each pair of devices, a more accurate distance can be derived.

Extension to 3D. In current implementation, 2D location is provided but our
scheme is not limited to 2D only. With more beeps emitted during the movement,
our positioning algorithm can be extended to 3D space with little modification. This
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will be studied in our future work.

5.9

Conclusion

In this chapter, we consider the problem of efficiently and securely grouping and
locating mobile phone users in proximity. A system called S G -L O C is proposed to
leverage a simple gesture to perform localization during network setup. By using
internal motion sensors and speakers/microphones, our scheme combines gesture
detection and acoustic techniques for a user to locate other users in an efficient,
low-cost and scalable manner. W e have designed, implemented and evaluated our
system on commercial smartphones. The extensive experiments have shown that
SG -LO C can achieve centimeter-level accuracy.
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6

Conclusion and Future Work

Mobile computing has played an important role in the modern world. W ireless com
munication, allowing mobile devices to connect to networks and fetch remote re
sources, is an indispensable function to mobile computing. Massively popular mo
bile applications rely on wireless communication to perform their functions. The en
hancements of existing wireless technologies will directly advance mobile technolo
gies. Among all the existing problems, security, energy-efficiency, and locationawareness are the most important for the following reasons. First, many mobile
devices access large amount of sensitive data under risky circumstances. This per
sonal data is not protected by comprehensive security mechanisms because of the
limited resources of mobile devices. Second, today's mobile devices increasingly
perform many complex tasks, thus consuming more energy than ever before. Given
the fact that battery technology has hardly been improved while wireless communi
cation is a big contributor to the battery drain, it is urgent to reduce the power con
sumption while retaining network performance. Third, traditional location-oblivious
wireless communication has become inadequate to m eet the increasing demand
of mobility. Location-awareness will lead to a more intuitive communication experi
ence and improve the quality of communication. However, little research considers
infrastructure-less localization. These problems have impeded the advance of mo
bile systems.
The goal of this dissertation is to mitigate the challenges of security, energy
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and localization for mobile computing. Through three communication patterns in
802.11 wireless networks, w e investigate a collection of disparate-but-interrelated
problems that are faced in today's wireless m anagement. W e enhance the secu
rity of the association mechanism for wireless clients to avoid connecting to mali
cious rogue APs under various network conditions. This is the first work that does
not require administrator or infrastructure support. W e also study the problem of
power-saving for mobile devices working as software-defined APs. Since AP mode
was recently introduced to mobile devices, there is little research in this domain.
Our proposed technique will shed light upon the general research that explores
comprehensive energy solutions for mobile computing systems. Lastly, w e investi
gate the practical feasibility of location-aware wireless communication and design
a fine-grained, efficient, lightweight and scalable localization algorithm. This tech
nique allows mobile devices to know the relative location of others in a network
without the support of network infrastructure and therefore has more advantages
than existing solutions.
The following guidelines derived from our studies are intended to improve the
design of advanced mobile computing systems.
• In a mobile computing environment, any device is potentially untrusted. Be
fore establishing connectivity, a mobile device should verify the authenticity
of the other side in its own right. This helps prevent unauthorized individu
als from masquerading as legitimate devices and gaining access to sensitive
data.
• Hardware technology behind mobile computing improves continuously. This
constantly invalidates old wisdom, so w e should challenge existing solutions
to keep the system design consistent with the advance of hardware.
• When developing power saving systems, we should first consider the charac-
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teristics of their applications. The application-specific design typically achieves
more power savings than the general design.
• An important feature of today's mobile devices is the integration of diverse
sensors on broad. This sensor data may provide the insight into user's con
text. Extracting the context to infer location can achieve very high accuracy
and therefore is a promising research topic for mobile computing.
W e have made some progress in improving the security, energy-efficiency and
location-awareness of mobile computing. In the future, we will continue working
on these challenging problems in wireless communication and mobile computing.
For example, more and more mobile devices use cloud-based services to upload
sensitive data and computational tasks for processing. How to overcome security
concerns by redacting, removing or replacing sensitive data from records that are
sent to the cloud becomes increasingly important. W e attempt to continue research
on this problem. Additionally, the improvement of hardware technologies will intro
duce complicated mobile devices (e.g., from single core to multi-cores). Energy
efficiency will continue to be a source of interesting research problems. Finally, the
increasing demand of mobility will drive the research on localization techniques to
support various levels of location-awareness applications.
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